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Doing It Ourselves: The Networked Practices Of Feminist Media Activism 
Abstract 
Feminist organizing in the United States is undergoing a paradigm shift. Whereas 1960s-era feminism 
unfolded through the in-person activities of formal organizations, today, feminist movements are 
mediated and networked. Contemporary feminism manifests as hashtags, blogs, print zines, digitally 
coordinated protests, online communities, and more. Case studies of recent movements suggest that, for 
feminists, to be networked is to be both politically empowered and politically vulnerable. At the same time 
that emerging media platforms enable activists to quickly reach wide audiences at little or no expense, 
networked movements face online harassment, commercial cooptation, and activist burnout. This 
qualitative study examines how feminists are navigating the double-edged nature of networked activism. 
In particular, I demonstrate how feminists are drawing on networked media to organize resistance, 
mobilize protests, and cultivate communities, all while juggling the affordances and limitations of their 
media tools. Data for this study come from an ethnographic analysis of grassroots feminist media 
activism in the city of Philadelphia, textual analyses of national and transnational feminist media 
campaigns, and interviews with and archived reflections from activists. Through this data, I argue that 
feminists’ negotiations among media platforms, the political context, and their intersectional values 
produce a particular activist praxis. I call this praxis do-it-ourselves (DIO) feminism, an organizing 
paradigm that draws on networked media to build feminist movements from the ground up that reflect 
feminist values and meet the challenges of the current climate. Faced with an electoral system and a 
history of collective organizing that has failed to address intersecting systems of oppression, DIO 
feminists do not rely on existing political institutions. Instead, they draw on networked media to create 
their own communities, discourses, and protests, cutting out the middlemen of political leaders, 
organizations, parties, and policy-makers and integrating protest into everyday life. Feminists’ turn toward 
diffuse, decentralized media networks and away from formal organizations raises questions about 
movement accessibility, sustainability, backlash, impact, and cooptation. But the do-it-ourselves praxis is 
a distinctly feminist form of networked activism that models new possibilities for what collective action 
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 When I began considering the kernel of an idea that would grow into this 
dissertation project in the fall of 2013, my first semester in graduate school, well-
intentioned faculty and colleagues questioned whether feminism was a relevant or timely 
topic. Later that year, I watched, at times in disbelief, as Beyoncé put the word 
“FEMINIST” in lights on the Video Music Awards stage, as viral feminist hashtags burst 
on to the scene, and as “femvertising” became the cutting edge of commercial marketing. 
In five short years, so much has changed across the political and cultural landscape of the 
United States. Chief among these changes has been the popular embrace of feminist ideas 
and rhetoric, even as our political institutions actively work to undo feminist policy gains 
and forestall feminist futures. Today, while we regularly brace ourselves for the relentless 
deluge of bad news for civil rights under the Trump administration, it is at the same time 
nearly impossible to go a week without hearing the word “feminism” mentioned in a 
mainstream news outlet or hashtagged on a social media platform. 
 This project emerged from my own desire as an activist to make sense of what 
this often confusing moment might mean for feminists and gender justice movements. 
But it would not have grown from a kernel into a dissertation if it had not been for the 
feminist activists in Philadelphia, who so generously gave me the opportunity to work 
alongside them and tell their stories, or for the long list of people who believed, tirelessly, 
in me and in this project from the very start.  
 My advisor, Guobin Yang, is at the top of that list. I once read a piece of advice 
for first-year teachers that I think applies especially well to PhD students. The advice 
was, “Find your marigold.” The marigold, it turns out, is one of the best things you can 
plant in your garden because it protects other plants and helps them grow. Guobin is a 
field of marigolds. You bring a wild idea for a dissertation to his office and, instead of 
doubting whether or not you can do it, he helps you draw a map of how to get to your 
vision. He is the kind of advisor who champions and believes fiercely in his students, 
even when they might not believe in themselves. I cannot thank him enough for his 
generosity of time and spirit. I made it to the finish line because he took the time to help 
me grow.  
 I am also deeply grateful for the insights and encouragement of the other 
members of my dissertation committee, Sarah Banet-Weiser, Jessa Lingel, and Victor 
Pickard. From the proposal through the defense, Sarah’s incisive feedback and passion 
for feminist scholarship strengthened this project. For me, her scholarship has modeled 
what a nuanced approach to holding at once both the possibilities and pitfalls of our 
current feminist media moment looks like. Jessa’s and Victor’s unwavering commitment 
to incorporating an ethics of care and social justice into their scholarship has pushed me 
to find new ways to combine my activism with my research. Their presence both on my 
committee and in the Annenberg community has made all the difference in my graduate 
school experience.  
 There are many teacher-scholars whose energy and encouragement over the years 
nurtured my love for critical media scholarship and pedagogy. At the Annenberg School, 
Amy Jordan and Litty Paxton continuously reminded me by example why the work we 
do in the classroom is so vitally important. But before Penn, it was Sheryl Goodman, 
Kirstie Hettinga, Lynne Edwards, Meredith Goldsmith, Liz Ho, and Rebecca Jaroff at 
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Ursinus College who introduced me to feminism and social theory, who gently nudged 
me toward a graduate degree, and who helped this first-generation college student find 
her path forward.  
 The staff and leadership at the Annenberg School made it possible for me to 
pursue that path. I am eternally grateful for the support of Dean Michael Delli Carpini, 
his advocacy on behalf of students, and his willingness to listen to student concerns. The 
Annenberg staff made the school feel like home for me, even in my most stressed-out 
moments. I am particularly indebted to Joanne Murray, Julie Sloane, Deb Porter, Rose 
Halligan, Kelly Fernandez, and Marina Krikorian.  
 Day in and day out, it was the Annenberg student family that kept me going. I 
have to give a special shout out to Sam, Elena, and Emily, my group text therapists who 
have been there from the very start; to Lee McGuigan, the brother I really never wanted 
but was lucky to get anyway; to Christin Scholz, the calm, quantitatively-oriented 
officemate every strung-out critical studies student needs; to Allie Volinsky, Betty 
Ferrari, and Natalie Herbert, three fierce ladies who know how to have their colleagues’ 
backs; and finally, to Jasmine Erdener, my feminist comrade in arms and the best friend I 
didn’t imagine I would find in my adult years. I made it through grad school mostly 
unscathed because all of you were by my side. 
 But of course, I really would not be here if it were not for the people who were 
there from the very, very start – my family. My parents, Sue and Paul Clark, have taught 
me more from their example about what it means to be a good person, to work hard, and 
to make a difference in the world than any teacher or professor. I am who I am and where 
I am, not because of any fancy schooling or degree, but because of their unconditional 
love and support. My sisters, Katie Reimer and Betsy Palumbo, are my best friends and 
biggest cheerleaders. Their sense of humor and constant presence in my life, even when 
we were many miles apart, saw me through some of graduate school’s greatest 
challenges. When it comes to my husband, Ryan, “thank you” is not enough. Ryan has 
done everything he possibly could to support me through this journey, from driving me 
all over the city to feminist meetings, to volunteering at feminist protests and fundraisers, 
to taking on all the cooking and cleaning while I wrote this dissertation, all while 
pursuing his own graduate degrees. Linda and Tom Parsons, my parents-in-law, have 
rooted for me as if I was their own daughter and have been there for both of us through it 
all.  
 This dissertation is dedicated to my five smart, hilarious, and brave nieces – 
Alice, Josephine, Emanuela, Theresa, and Clara – and to our own daughter, Robyn, 
whose arrival we anxiously await at the time of this writing. Whenever I lose hope or 
energy, I think of the six of you and keep pressing forward. My wish for you girls is that 
you will find your passion and pursue it, even when it’s hard, even when the future is 
uncertain, and even when others say you can’t do it. I hope some day that the activists 
whose stories I tell here inspire you to fight for what is right and to be yourself, even in 






DOING IT OURSELVES:  
THE NETWORKED PRACTICES OF FEMINIST MEDIA ACTIVISM 
Rosemary Clark-Parsons 
Guobin Yang 
 Feminist organizing in the United States is undergoing a paradigm shift. Whereas 
1960s-era feminism unfolded through the in-person activities of formal organizations, 
today, feminist movements are mediated and networked. Contemporary feminism 
manifests as hashtags, blogs, print zines, digitally coordinated protests, online 
communities, and more. Case studies of recent movements suggest that, for feminists, to 
be networked is to be both politically empowered and politically vulnerable. At the same 
time that emerging media platforms enable activists to quickly reach wide audiences at 
little or no expense, networked movements face online harassment, commercial 
cooptation, and activist burnout. This qualitative study examines how feminists are 
navigating the double-edged nature of networked activism. In particular, I demonstrate 
how feminists are drawing on networked media to organize resistance, mobilize protests, 
and cultivate communities, all while juggling the affordances and limitations of their 
media tools. Data for this study come from an ethnographic analysis of grassroots 
feminist media activism in the city of Philadelphia, textual analyses of national and 
transnational feminist media campaigns, and interviews with and archived reflections 
from activists. Through this data, I argue that feminists’ negotiations among media 
platforms, the political context, and their intersectional values produce a particular 
activist praxis. I call this praxis do-it-ourselves (DIO) feminism, an organizing paradigm 
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that draws on networked media to build feminist movements from the ground up that 
reflect feminist values and meet the challenges of the current climate. Faced with an 
electoral system and a history of collective organizing that has failed to address 
intersecting systems of oppression, DIO feminists do not rely on existing political 
institutions. Instead, they draw on networked media to create their own communities, 
discourses, and protests, cutting out the middlemen of political leaders, organizations, 
parties, and policy-makers and integrating protest into everyday life. Feminists’ turn 
toward diffuse, decentralized media networks and away from formal organizations raises 
questions about movement accessibility, sustainability, backlash, impact, and cooptation. 
But the do-it-ourselves praxis is a distinctly feminist form of networked activism that 
models new possibilities for what collective action and social transformation can look 







































































LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 ........................................................................................................................... 45 
TABLE 2 ........................................................................................................................... 49 
11 
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction: 
Hope for a Feminist Future 
 
Throughout the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency, journalists and 
commentators across the United States declared 2017 “The Year of Women.” Despite the 
“textbook sexism” (Ghitis, 2017) that riddled his campaign rhetoric, the rise and fall of 
the first woman presidential candidate nominated by a major party, and the election of 
what feminist icon Madeline Albright has described as “the most undemocratic president 
in modern American history” (Ehrlich, 2018), when January brought with it both a new 
year and Trump’s inauguration, editorials promised that women would command the 
social and political landscape in the months to come. A contributor for The Huffington 
Post, for example, confidently explained “Why 2017 Will Be The Year Of Women,” 
assuring her readers in March that “While recent events are a constant reminder of the 
challenges facing women in today’s world, I am more convinced than ever that 2017 will 
be our year” (Jain, 2017). Citing the Women’s March on Washington and the worldwide 
protests it inspired, the feminist “reckoning” (Valenti, 2017) brought on by the #MeToo 
movement against sexual violence, and record numbers of women running for office, 
year-in-review headlines published in December implied that these earlier 
prognostications had been correct: “2017: The Unexpected (and Inspiring) Year of 
Women” (Dvorak, 2017); “The Year of Women, in Policy and Politics” (Epstein, 2017); 
“A Timeline of the Year of Women” (Boston Globe, 2018); “Did You Hear Her Roar? 
2017 was Unquestionably the Year of the Woman” (Shamus, 2017). One piece published 
in Vox argued that a relationship existed between women’s improbable ascendance and a 
recent surge in women-centric film and television narratives within U.S. media culture: 
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“2017 was the year of women’s anger, onscreen and off” (Grady, 2017). The pattern 
would continue into the future. A year-end piece published on CNN’s website guaranteed 
that “2018 Will be the Year of Women” (Schnall, 2017), while a cover story for Politico 
looked farther into the unknown, eyeing the next presidential election: “Why 2020 Will 
be the Year of the Woman” (Scher, 2017). This brash of trend stories indicates that 
women are having a “moment,” in the streets, online, on television, and in politics, in 
spite of the odds they face. 
And the odds are undeniably against women. The same news outlets that have 
heralded “The Year of Women” have made it clear that, under President Trump, women 
and all other marginalized groups, including people of color, immigrants, LGBTQIA+ 
people, Muslims, people with disabilities, and laborers, are under attack.  
Within hours of being signed in as President of the United States, Trump began 
dismantling Affordable Care Act, President Barrack Obama’s signature legislation which 
aimed to make healthcare accessible and affordable to all, even those with preexisting 
conditions (Luhby, 2018). Later, Trump halted Obama’s Equal Pay Rule, ending the 
requirement that large companies report how much they pay workers by race and gender 
(Khimm, 2017) and proposed budget cuts to the National Domestic Violence Hotline and 
programs under the Violence Against Women Act (Planned Parenthood Action Fund, 
2017). In his first month in office, Trump revived a Reagan-era “global gag rule,” 
blocking foreign nongovernmental organizations that receive U.S. family planning aid 
from providing abortion services or information about abortion to their patients (Wilson, 
2018). In May of 2018, the Trump administration enacted a similar “domestic gag rule,” 
prohibiting federally funded reproductive clinics, such as Planned Parenthood, from 
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providing information about abortion or sharing office space with abortion providers 
(Siddiqui, 2018). That summer, the U.S. government, under Trump’s orders, began 
separating families seeking asylum by crossing the border illegally, even going so far as 
to remove nursing infants from their mothers (Kirby, 2018). Meanwhile, the Supreme 
Court, weighted toward conservative opinions thanks to the Trump-appointed Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, voted to allow pro-life “crisis pregnancy centers” to masquerade as 
abortion clinics (Liptak, 2018), to uphold the president’s travel ban on Muslims (Liptak 
& Shear, 2018), and to end the practice of mandatory union dues, delivering a sharp blow 
to organized labor in the process. With Justice Anthony Kennedy’s impending retirement 
— itself a carefully plotted Trump administration victory — the court is now positioned 
to destroy the 1973 landmark Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion (Litman, 2018). 
And this is just a sampling of this administration’s ongoing systematic rollback of civil 
rights and socially just legislation.  
How could 2017, 2018, or even 2020 be “The Year of Women” against this 
backdrop of institutionalized white male supremacy? Why can commentators envision a 
feminist future, precisely at a moment when women’s futures, especially the futures of 
women of color and working class women, seem so bleak? What could explain this 
contradiction? 
In spite of everything, there remains reason to hope because feminist activists 
have been, over the course of the past several decades, drawing on a diverse repertoire of 
media tactics to reinvigorate feminist politics and organizing for the twenty-first century. 
At precisely the same time that their values and hard-won legislative victories have been 
under attack, U.S. feminist movements have also been undergoing a revitalization, 
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spearheaded by media-savvy activists. This revitalization project stemmed first from the 
punk paper zines of the 1980s and 1990s before blossoming into the early feminist 
blogosphere and, later, the viral networks of digitally mobilized protest actions like the 
global Women’s Marches and “hashtag feminism” campaigns like #MeToo. The country 
has been witnessing the steady growth of what some have referred to as feminism’s 
“fourth wave” (e.g., Munro, 2013; Schulte, 2011; Solomon, 2009), riffing on the oceanic 
metaphor long used to periodize U.S. feminisms’ ebbs and flows.1 But while this “wave” 
has descended from the tides and currents of previous generations, a key feature 
distinguishes this cohort from its antecedents. At their peaks, an array of formal 
organizations and grassroots collectives with clear leaders alongside a number of distinct 
voices and luminaries structured the second-wave feminism of the 1960s and the third-
wave feminism of the 1980s (Reger, 2012). Today, however, U.S. feminist movements 
revolve around media and the everyday makers, users, and consumers behind them.  
This new mode of activism can be understood as networked feminism, a feminist 
protest paradigm that replaces the leaders, finances, and people power of formal, big-
name organizations with a variety of media practices, digital and otherwise. Here, 
“networked” refers to the communicative media these feminists draw on, from the 
production and circulation of alternative print media to the participatory web of social 
media platforms. As Beth Coleman (2011) argues, “networked” also captures both the 
																																																								
1 Feminist activists and academics have used the wave metaphor to chronicle the history 
of U.S. feminist movements since the 1960s, with the fight for suffrage labeled as the 
first, the 1960s women’s liberation movement as the second, and the contemporary 
generation as the third or even the fourth wave. Scholars have argued that the metaphor 
flattens the multiple trajectories of women’s rights activism, whose many histories have 
unfolded simultaneously in communities across the country. See Hewitt (2012) for more 
on the history and debates surrounding the wave metaphor. 
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technological affordances — the ability to communicate and receive messages through a 
distributed transmission system — and social affordances — the ability to experience a 
sense of connection with others across time and space — of feminists’ media tools. Both 
sets of affordances combine to enable new social formations and practices. And, 
following Jessa Lingel’s (2017a) unpacking of the term, I use “networked” to refer to a 
“sociotechnical assemblage” (p. 15) of people, their technologies, and their technological 
practices that includes digitally mediated arenas while also extending well beyond them 
to encompass print media, in-person communal spaces, and face-to-face meetings and 
actions. Through this assemblage of platforms, affordances, sites, and practices, 
networked feminists have mobilized global protest actions against the current 
administration, inspired viral conversations about sexual violence (Rodino-Colocino, 
2014), initiated boycotts against sexist media representations (Clark, 2014), and more, all 
without the resources of formally structured organizations. Previous generations 
struggled to shoulder their way into the spotlight of commercial media attention (Steiner, 
1992). But through the highly public nature of social media platforms, networked 
feminist campaigns gain visibility quickly, their political dissent converging with news 
and entertainment media outlets and spilling over onto the popular culture stage (Banet-
Weiser, 2015b). The result has been the rise of an undeniably feminist media culture, one 
that has jumped from the closed-doors meetings of Women’s Liberation groups and the 
countercultural margins of alternative press publications and into the mainstream. With 
feminism in the streets and on our screens, hope for feminist futures feels plausible, even 
under the Trump administration.  
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Feminists’ turn away from formally structured organizations and toward media 
reflects the broader digital reconfiguration of social and political life. Like the 
communication technologies that preceded it, the internet has transformed the public 
sphere, from the macrosocial systems of state politics, global economies, and civil society 
to the microsocial interactions among family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers (Benkler, 
2006; Castells, 1996; boyd, 2007; Friedland, Hove, & Rojas, 2006; Tufekci, 2017). 
Digital networks, rather than formal and informal associations, organizations, and 
institutions, are increasingly becoming the organizing principle and building blocks of 
society (Castells, 1996; Friedland, Hove, & Rojas, 2006). The twenty-first-century public 
sphere is, as Zeynep Tufekci (2017) puts it, a networked public sphere, a “complex 
interaction of publics, online and offline, all intertwined, multiple, connected and 
complex, but also transnational and global” (p. 6). At the same time that digital networks 
are altering the technical means through which we communicate within the public sphere, 
they are also recasting our social sense of connection and community in network terms, 
and with it, the “logic of how and where we can interact; with whom, and at what scale 
and visibility” (Tufekci, 2017, p. 11). This networked “logic” extends well beyond digital 
platforms to permeate life “offline,” as the internet becomes more and more embedded in 
everyday experiences of the world (Hine, 2015; Lingel, 2017a).  
Social movements, as both publics in their own right and collective attempts to 
intervene on the public sphere, take on new forms, tactics, and trajectories within the 
networked public sphere (Tufekci, 2017). Across the political spectrum, the networked 
logic of the digital age is changing how movements mobilize and whom they reach. 
Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg (2012) describe the digital reconfiguration of 
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activism as the shift from collective to connective action. Whereas “the logic of collective 
action” involves strong organizational coordination of actions and messages, “the logic of 
connective action” involves little or no organizational coordination. Within the logic of 
connective action, networked activism becomes the tactic of choice and communication 
networks become key organizing structures, with diffuse assemblages of digital media 
users and outlets taking on roles comparable to activist leaders and organizations.  
Responding to this shift, researchers working at the intersections of both media 
and movements and media and gender have studied the relationships among digital 
platforms’ features, the U.S. political context, and activists’ political goals to debate the 
efficacy of networked activism. Networked activism can be found across a variety of 
social movements and activist campaigns. But as existing scholarship demonstrates, the 
digital reconfiguration of protest and the public sphere presents particular opportunities 
and challenges for feminists.  
On the one hand, research in both areas suggests that digital platforms reduce 
barriers to entry, making it easier not only for diverse constituents to participate in an 
activist campaign, but to play a meaningful role in shaping its core message and tactics. 
Social movement scholars have demonstrated the role digital networks play in informing 
activists of the logistics of protest (Gerbaudo, 2012; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012), sharing 
collective feelings of outrage and hope (Castells, 2015), decentralizing movement 
leadership (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; González-Bailón, 2014), and decreasing the costs 
of organizing and joining a movement (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Importantly for 
contemporary feminist activists, whose guiding normative framework is intersectionality 
(Crenshaw, 1989, 1991), feminist media studies scholars have argued that networked 
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activism enables more inclusive feminist spaces, where activists can collectively develop 
feminist identities, actions, theories, and histories (Keller, 2016; Mendes, 2014; 
Rentschler & Thrift, 2015; Brown, Ray, Summers, & Fraistat, 2017; Daniels, 2016; 
Kendall, 2013; Kuo, 2016; Loza, 2014; Rodino-Colocino, 2014; Tynes, Schuschke, & 
Noble, 2016). In these spaces, feminists share and identify linkages between personal 
experiences of injustice, updating the 1960s-era feminist slogan, “the personal is 
political,” for the digital age. But unlike the most prominent organizations of 1960s 
feminism, which were often dominated by white college-educated women, social media 
platforms offer new opportunities for activists standing at the intersection of multiple, 
overlapping oppressions to build coalitions, deconstruct interlocking systems of power, 
and critique exclusionary activist practices (Noble & Tynes, 2016). Digital media 
platforms, in other words, are easily adapted to contemporary feminists’ political goals 
and values, offering new spaces for political engagement at a time when marginalized 
communities are increasingly disillusioned with traditional political institutions and 
channels (Baer, 2016; Tufekci, 2017). When successful, the networked diffusion of 
activist campaigns through social media platforms pushes these diverse voices into the 
mainstream media spotlight, where they have the potential to significantly alter the 
discourses surrounding and, in turn, the responses to social justice issues (Shaw, 2013; 
Young, 1997). After several decades of repression (Faludi, 1991; Gill, 2016; McRobbie, 
2004), feminist activists’ media savvy has even ushered in what some commentators call 
an era of “popular feminism” (Banet-Weiser, 2015b; Zeisler, 2016). Feminist ideas, 
rhetoric, and figures, once restricted to alternative circles, have suffused popular culture 
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and mainstream media, garnering an unprecedented degree of visibility for feminism in 
the U.S.  
But while digital media users have increased movements’ accessibility, diversity, 
and visibility, feminist media studies scholars argue that networked activism has 
simultaneously left feminists vulnerable to backlash. Social media may have given 
feminist activism a more prominent national profile, but they have also provided an outlet 
for what Sarah Banet-Weiser and Kate Miltner (2016) call “networked misogyny,” a 
highly visible form of white male supremacy that works to block marginalized groups’ 
participation in political discourse through online harassment. In the current political 
context, where neoliberal ideology has taken on hegemonic status, theorists of 
postfeminism argue that feminism’s networked hypervisibility also leaves feminist 
politics open to cooptation. As feminist rhetoric and ideas become “popular” and 
circulate through commercial media, activist messages of empowerment are often 
repackaged to support marketplace values of individualism, choice, and consumption, 
rather than collective politics (Banet-Weiser & Portwood-Stacer, 2017). This 
commodified form of popular feminism “turns the idea of the personal-as-political on its 
head” (Gill, 2007, p. 153) and reduces the political to the personal. In turn, critics have 
also questioned whether feminists’ shift toward networked activism and away from more 
traditionally organized collective action punctuated by leaders with well-defined 
platforms has come at the cost of achieving long-term institutional change (Banet-Weiser, 
2015a; Fraser, 2013). Feminism’s “new luminosity” (Gill, 2016, p. 614) in U.S. media 
culture has done little, for example, to forestall the anti-feminist backlash made manifest 
in the Trump administration’s policy efforts. Further, as critical scholarship on networked 
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activism demonstrates, activists must navigate the structural constraints of corporately 
owned social media platforms, which raise concerns about surveillance, accessibility, and 
censorship (Youmans & York, 2012). And while digital networks enable movements to 
mobilize more quickly than ever before, activists are at times left without the collective 
solidarities, leadership structures, decision-making capabilities, and capacities for tactical 
innovation necessary for sustained struggle (Tufekci, 2017). 
Taken together, these bodies of scholarship suggest that for feminists, to be 
networked is to be both politically empowered — to have access to a potentially global 
audience through new, low-cost, digital modes of protest without the limitations of 
traditional political institutions — and politically vulnerable — to be subjected to violent 
harassment, neoliberal cooptation, and activist burnout without the capacities or support 
of a traditionally organized movement. The contradictory confluence of “The Year of 
Women” and Trump’s first years in office is tied up with the double-edged nature of 
networked feminism. Paradoxically, digital networks are, to borrow Angela McRobbie’s 
(2004) phrase from her study of early-millennium feminist media cultures, doubly 
entangled in the rejuvenation and suppression of feminist politics.  
Little research, however, addresses how feminist activists navigate this paradox. 
While existing scholarship offers critical analyses of the structures of political 
opportunities and constraints surrounding networked feminist activism, it tells us little 
about the perspectives, experiences, and agency of actual activist practitioners. Their 
voices are often missing from both popular press declarations of the dawning of women’s 
“time” and academic studies of the assemblages of activists and media technologies that 
have ushered in this moment. If 2018, 2019, 2020, or any year is to be the “Year of 
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Women,” we need a better understanding of how feminist activists are navigating this 
contradictory political context and complex media landscape. How are feminists using 
media to craft an activist praxis that reflects their intersectional values and responds to 
the challenges of today’s political context? What strategies do they use to navigate the 
double entanglements of networked activism? How does this generation of feminist 
activists imagine the role networked media play in political liberation? And finally, what 
are the implications of feminists’ media practices and politics for the face and reach of 
contemporary feminism in particular, and social movements more generally? 
This study approaches media not as merely texts or tools, but as practices, and in 
the process, centers feminist activist-practitioners — their voices, actions, and 
perspectives — to address these questions through a mixed-methods qualitative analysis 
of contemporary U.S. feminists’ media tactics. In particular, I examine how feminists are 
drawing on networked media to reconfigure their methods for organizing collective 
resistance, performing protest actions, and building safe communities, such that their 
activist work, in process and product, both reflects their values and meets the demands of 
the current context, all while juggling the affordances and limitations of their media tools. 
On a pragmatic level, honing in on U.S. feminist activism narrows down a global 
plurality of movements with varied political philosophies, histories, and tactics to 
collective action and discourse within a particular geographic region. It also allows me, 
as a feminist academic living and working in the U.S., to more easily tap into feminist 
networks and observe and talk with feminist activist-practitioners. At the same time, the 
geographic boundaries on this study also bring into view a wide range of different 
practices across a variegated political spectrum, from liberal feminist critiques to more 
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radical feminist calls for social transformation. Moreover, U.S. feminists have been key 
pioneers in the global practice of networked feminism; they were among the first to use 
blogs as vehicles for fostering internal dialogue and mobilizing street protests (Everett, 
2004). Through the Western domination of global media flows, their voices and actions 
have often, for better or worse, risen to prominence as models for activists organizing in 
other national contexts. Existing scholarship has produced a detailed record of individual 
case studies of networked feminism. With U.S. feminist media activism as my focus, my 
goal is to develop a theoretical framework that illuminates connections and similarities 
across individual cases and creates opportunities to reflect on best practices in feminists’ 
ongoing struggle for social justice.  
Data for this study come from a multi-sited ethnographic analysis of localized 
feminist media activism in the city of Philadelphia, textual analyses of national and 
transnational feminist media campaigns, and in-depth interviews with and archived 
reflections from activists who participate at both levels of networked feminism. In all, 
there are six case studies at the heart of this project: 1) the 2017 Women’s March on 
Washington, which inspired a global wave of protests on Trump’s Inauguration Day; 2) 
Philadelphia’s annual March to End Rape Culture, the city’s local chapter of the 
international SlutWalk movement; 3) the #MeToo campaign, which went viral toward the 
end of 2017; 4) Girl Army, a Philly-based feminist Facebook group; 5) the U.S. feminist 
zine community, a nationally dispersed network of print media-makers; and 6) Permanent 
Wave Philly, a grassroots feminist music and arts collective. Together, they represent a 
set of what Lingel (2017a) calls networked field studies, linked not only “by a shared 
interest in addressing a particular set of questions” (Lingel, 2017a, p. 13), but through 
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participant overlap. Practitioners in each field site participate or have participated in at 
least one of the other five field sites; for example, the organizers behind Philly’s March 
to End Rape Culture participated in the city’s local Women’s March, used the march’s 
social media accounts to amplify the #MeToo campaign, connect with other area 
feminists through Girl Army, create zines, and have attended or even helped organize 
Permanent Wave events. My study of feminist activism began with the march and I, in 
the spirit of anthropologist George Marcus’ (1995) take on multi-sited ethnography, 
“followed the people” (p. 106) from one site to the next, mapping a web of networked 
feminist practices that scale up from the hyperlocal to the global. While I do not claim to 
offer a representative or generalizable view of all U.S. feminist media, this multi-sited 
approach offers a detailed and situated account of a variety of practices that, as evidenced 
by the overlap in my field studies, are central to the networked feminist repertoire.  
Through this data, I argue that feminists’ negotiations among digital media 
platforms, the political context, and their intersectional values produce a particular 
activist praxis, or embodied relationship between their political goals and political 
actions. I call this praxis do-it-ourselves feminism, an organizing paradigm that draws on 
networked media to build feminist politics, actions, and spaces from the ground up that 
reflect feminist values and meet the challenges of the current climate.  
While networked feminist campaigns vary in form and content, from hashtags and 
zines to street protests and communities, they share a do-it-yourself ethos, a common 
orientation toward crafting new solutions regardless of activists’ level of experience or 
available assets. But unlike traditional do-it-yourself projects, do-it-ourselves feminism is 
not an individualistic or self-serving endeavor (Dawkins, 2011; Lee, 2014; Luvaas, 
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2012). By contrast, while campaigns may sometimes start with the actions of one person, 
DIOF is a fundamentally collective endeavor, that grows not through the aspirations and 
enterprising of a single leader, but through the energy and solidarity of a group. Its 
practitioners possess a rebellious spirit that thrives on the type of cooperative creativity 
that emerges when either collective outrage, a collective need, or both combine with a 
collective commitment to change, limited access to organizational resources, and a 
certain degree of networked media know-how. Faced with an electoral system and a 
history of collective organizing that has failed to address intersecting systems of 
oppression, DIO feminists do not rely on existing political structures or institutions; 
instead, they draw on networked media to build their own communities, discourses, and 
protests, cutting out the middlemen of political leaders, organizations, parties, and policy-
makers and integrating protest into everyday life.  
Over time, feminist activists have exercised and sharpened this praxis to build a 
reflexive organizational logic that prioritizes the validation of everyday experiences of 
injustice and prefigures the intersectional values of difference and inclusion. The do-it-
ourselves organizational logic can be found at work in networked feminist protest actions 
that, like the Women’s March, the March to End Rape Culture, and the #MeToo 
campaign, enable the open expression of personal narratives, unfiltered by the purview of 
any one movement leader or institutional gatekeeper. Its self-starting nature also 
characterizes networked feminist communities like Girl Army, the feminist zine scene, 
and Permanent Wave, whose members come together online and off to build safe spaces 
that center otherwise marginalized voices. As is the case with other networked activist 
movements, DIO feminists’ turn toward diffuse, decentralized media networks and away 
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from formal organizations does raise questions about movement accessibility, 
sustainability, backlash, impact, and cooptation. But the do-it-ourselves praxis is a 
distinctly feminist form of networked activism that models new possibilities for what 
political activism and social transformation look like in the networked era.  
Literature Review 
Scholarly approaches for theorizing the liberatory potential and political dynamics 
of networked feminism have shifted over time.  
Early cyberfeminist thought, inspired by Donna Haraway’s (1985) writing on the 
subversive potential of a cyborg future, took on a utopian view of the internet as a space 
where women could leave gender and the body behind. In her 1997 book Zeroes + Ones, 
Sadie Plant, the leading figure in the popularization of cyberfeminism within and beyond 
the academy, argues that the textual, multiprocessing world of cyberspace lends itself to 
“the female” (p. 23), who is inherently more expressive and a better multitasker than the 
male. These conditions would, Plant conjectured, bring about a revolution, in which the 
yonic, nonlinear zeroes of the binary code behind basic programming language would 
displace the phallic, linear ones, pushing toward a digital future characterized by an equal 
distribution of power and resources. Plant’s writing radically reconfigures dominant 
conceptualizations of technology as inherently masculine (Wajcman, 2004). Her work 
and the work of her early cyberfeminist peers, however, has been rightly critiqued for not 
only reifying essentialist notions of gender, but also for ignoring the ways in which 
gendered body politics and their intersections with race and other axes of identity are 
reinscribed online (Daniels, 2009). The unbridled techno-optimism behind less radical 
cyberfeminist approaches quickly fell out of favor when compared with the reality of 
early cases of online harassment, websites enforcing traditional gender roles, and the 
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exploitation of computer manufacturing plant workers in developing nations (Daniels, 
2009).  
A more critical and intersectional approach to studying networked feminism grew 
out of this critique. Scholars began focusing on how, contrary to the notion of leaving the 
body behind, feminist activists were using media, digital and otherwise, as key spaces for 
deconstructing and contesting body politics. This entailed a shift away from 
essentializing notions of gender and gender-based oppression and toward a more diffuse, 
everyday, highly contextual conceptualizations of power and resistance. Scholars 
engaged in this turn retained U.S. feminists’ historical emphasis on the personal as 
political while also adopting an intersectional analysis of how systems of power overlap 
to produce particular subjective and material experiences of the world. This more recent 
wave of scholarship on networked feminism has centered discourse as a primary concern 
for the field. Drawing on Foucault’s (1991) theorization of discursive power, a growing 
body of research has highlighted the ways in which feminist activists use media to 
deconstruct and challenge the taken-for-granted norms that govern everyday life, 
normalize oppressive experiences, and privilege some voices while marginalizing others. 
Their research reflects U.S. feminism’s historical emphasis on discursive activism 
(Young, 1997), outlined in the Introduction, while also pointing to the especially high 
degree of mediation that sets this generation of feminist activism apart from previous 
ones.  
Above all else, scholars frame self-produced, alternative, feminist media, from the 
zine scenes of the 1980s to today’s burgeoning world of online feminism, as tactics for 
challenging hegemonic discourses about gender and sexuality, especially those 
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promulgated through commercial media representations. Piepmeier (2009) and Zobl 
(2009) describe feminist zinesters’ practice of cutting and pasting images from 
commercial print media to critique them and offer alternatives as a vital form of 
countercultural production. In recent years, Twitter hashtags have been especially central 
to feminist media critique; feminists have initiated hashtag campaigns to intervene on 
degrading or oppressive representations of gender and sexuality in advertisements (Clark, 
2014), news media (Meyer, 2014), and the entertainment industry (Horeck, 2014). 
Hashtag feminists have been especially effective in debunking the victim-blaming myths 
that characterize news coverage of sexual assault and domestic violence (Clark, 2016; 
Rentschler, 2015; Rodino-Colocino, 2014; Thrift, 2014) as in the case of #WhyIStayed, 
and in challenging stereotypical or offensive representations in advertisements, as in the 
case of #NotBuyingIt (Clark, 2014).  
Scholars also describe feminist media as giving voice to the voiceless and making 
visible oppressive, everyday experiences normalized into invisibility. Licona (2005), for 
example, argues that feminist zines open up productive third spaces for authors who fall 
outside the boundaries of white, heterosexual masculinity and who, consequently, might 
not otherwise have access to or find representation in media outlets. Visibility and 
recognition also play key political roles in Carrie Rentschler’s (2014) theory of digital 
feminist tactics, like hashtag feminism, feminist blogging, and the anti-street harassment 
mobile app Hollaback, as “feminist networks of response-ability to rape culture” (p. 68), 
which cultivate the capacity for collective responses to individual experiences of sexual 
violence. Baer (2015) highlights a similar dynamic through her case study of 
#YesAllWomen; hashtag feminism and other digital feminist tactics, she argues, are most 
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effective when they articulate “body politics experienced in a local context” at a 
“translocal and transnational” level (p. 18).  
As outlets for free expression, feminist media are critical spaces for developing 
feminist identities, politics, theories, and histories. Piepmeier (2009), Chidgey, Payne and 
Zobl (2009), Guzzetti and Gamboa (2004), among others highlight the ways in which 
zines offer open and accessible spaces for the negotiation of complex feminist identities 
that allow for wide-ranging expressions of gender. The democratic exchange and, more 
recently, the diligent efforts to archive these feminist ephemera have created a vibrant, 
rhizomatic record of feminist history grounded in the work of grassroots activists and 
makers, whose extra-institutional voices are typically underprivileged within dominant 
discourse (Chidgey, 2013; Eichhorn, 2014). Feminist media have also functioned as key 
spaces for confronting tensions within feminist movements. Catherine Steele (2016) 
argues that blogs offer black feminists outlets to “talk back” to not only the systems of 
power that marginalize people of color, but to feminist and anti-racist activist 
communities that have historically excluded black women’s voices and concerns. Susana 
Loza (2014) makes a similar argument in her analysis of the 2013 hashtag campaign, 
#SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, as a watershed moment for reflecting on who is and is not 
included in U.S. feminism.  
Lastly, scholars have documented how the discursive webs of networked 
feminism lay the groundwork for new feminist social formations and communities. Harris 
(2003), for example, argues that the exchange of zines, often for free, barter, or trade, 
forges communal bonds that encourage the collective formation of critical feminist 
subjectivities. Others have highlighted similar social processes unfolding online. Keller 
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(2016), in her ethnographic study of girl feminist bloggers, explores how blogs function 
as a “discursive space” (p. 14) where young women develop feminist identities and 
alternative feminist histories through personal reflections and interactions with one 
another, forming “networked counterpublics” (p. 80). According to Kaitlyn Mendes 
(2015), the networked counterpublics of the feminist blogosphere were crucial for 
sparking SlutWalk, a global street protest movement that began in 2011; these same 
networks later became critical spaces for feminists to debate the movement’s tactics and 
messages. Carrie Rentschler and Samantha Thrift (2015) argued that “networked 
community building” (p. 330) has also unfolded through the viral spread of feminist 
memes, like the 2012 Mitt Romney-inspired “Binders Full of Women” meme; by 
constructing and circulating memes, feminists not only engage in collective acts of 
political critique, they also foster communal ties through shared humor that cut across 
differences. Importantly, point to their open, low-cost, participatory nature, feminist 
media studies scholars have also described these networked communities as key spaces 
for launching intersectional analyses of social issues and critiques of feminist movements 
and communities (Brown, Ray, Summers, & Fraistat, 2017; Daniels, 2016; Kendall, 
2013; Kuo, 2016; Loza, 2014; Rodino-Colocino, 2014; Tynes, Schuschke, & Noble, 
2016).  
Much scholarship on networked feminism retains at least some of Sadie Plant’s 
(1997) original optimism about the potential of emerging media as discursive outlets for 
women and other marginalized communities, celebrating the possibilities new platforms 
offer activists. Even so, some have voiced concerns and critiques about networked 
feminism’s shortcomings. At the same time that social media are opening up new 
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platforms for feminist discourse, they have also become hotbeds for targeted harassment 
against marginalized groups, a tactic scholars have described as a “silencing practice” 
(Shaw, 2013, p. 94). Others have argued that networked feminism’s emphasis on 
discourse, personal expressions, and everyday life may distract from the need for 
institutional reforms (Banet-Weiser, 2015a). Also up for questioning is feminist activists’ 
choice to use corporately owned platforms altogether. While new media provide 
feminists with important tools for theory-building and community-organizing, services 
like Facebook and Twitter financially benefit from activists’ labor and volunteering of 
their personal data, a relationship of capitalist exchange that contradicts feminist politics. 
While this review is certainly not exhaustive, it highlights six key goals scholars 
consistently identify as motivating contemporary feminists’ orientation toward media: 
critiquing dominant discourse, promoting free expression, making oppression visible, 
negotiating feminist principles, fostering collective solidarity, and navigating the 
strengths and limitations of particular feminist tactics. These are longstanding priorities 
for U.S. feminism. As Michelle Rodino-Colocino (2014) argues, while some forms of 
contemporary feminist media activism are new, their content shares common “mobilizing 
threads” (p. 1114) that bridge generational “waves.” Today’s feminist media activism 
descends from a long tradition of feminist struggles for recognition, voice, and 
community; researchers have likened feminist zines, blogs, hashtags, memes, and apps to 
the consciousness-raising circles, protests, speak-outs, and underground presses of the 
second wave, recognizing the urgency with which U.S. feminists have always taken up 
discourse and communication as necessary forms of activism (Keller, 2012; Kennedy, 
2007; Shaw, 2012b; Wood 2008; Young, 1997).  
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What sets the current generation apart, however, is the high degree of mediation 
that characterizes contemporary feminist tactics, discourses, identities, communities, and 
organizational structures. The activism of “second wave” feminism unfolded primarily 
through in-person meetings and actions coordinated, mobilized, and framed by formal 
organizations with a distinct membership and, often, a central leadership (Dicker, 2016; 
Reger, 2012). In stark contrast, contemporary feminist activism in the U.S. unfolds 
primarily through mediated social processes, through “the flow of media productions, 
media circulation, media interpretation and media recirculation” (Mattoni & Treré, 2014, 
p. 260), rather than through participation within a formally structured organization. This 
is what Bennett and Segerberg (2012) describe as the core difference between the logic of 
collective action and the logic of connective action.  
Of course, media production and critique were important political priorities for 
previous feminist generations. The second wave feminist underground press, composed 
of hundreds of self-published newspapers, magazines, and newsletters that cropped up in 
cities and towns across the country throughout the 1960s and 1970s, stands as an 
important precursor to today’s feminist media networks (Steiner, 1992). A key difference, 
however, separates these two generations of feminist media activists: whereas a web of 
second wave organizations, collectives, and leaders structured movement 
communications, actions, and participation, today, media and communication networks 
have become organizing structures, in and of themselves. As the case studies reviewed 
above suggest, for contemporary feminists, collectively producing, consuming, 
critiquing, and circulating media are political actions that, due to the open, everyday, 
participatory nature of social media platforms, no longer require the resources of formal, 
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membership-based organizations. Instead, participation in feminist movements and 
campaigns is structured through blogs, hashtags, memes, email listservs, zines, among 
other media genres and outlets. These channels mediate political discourse, direct action 
campaigns, collective identity formation, community building, coordination of street 
protests, and more.  
Throughout the growing body of scholarship on networked feminism, however, 
one important element remains missing — activists’ voices and perspectives. With a few 
important exceptions (Keller, 2016; Keller, Mendes, & Ringrose, 2016; Mendes, 2015; 
Mendes, Ringrose, & Keller, 2018), nearly all of the existing research on networked 
feminism focuses on the content of feminist media campaigns and the platforms used to 
launch them, rather than the feminist makers, users, and producers organizing and 
launching actions behind the scenes. Consequently, while scholars have produced a 
thorough record of particular feminist media campaigns, the field lacks theoretical 
frameworks that draw connections among these campaigns and shed light on 
consistencies across feminists’ media practices. Two major questions remain 
unanswered: why has this central orientation toward media come to operate as a key 
organizing principle for U.S. feminists, and how has this turn toward mediated 
engagement affected the shape and reach of feminist politics? Alice Mattoni and 
Emiliano Treré (2014) suggest that this problem underlies most research at the 
intersection of social movements and media, whose empirical focus is often limited to a 
single medium or to the latest technological innovations; scholarship on media activism, 
they argue, is “in need of more encompassing analytical concepts that are able to grasp 
the multiple dimensions that characterize the interaction between activists and the media 
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they use in different moments and for different purposes in the context of protest politics” 
(p. 255). In the case of networked feminism, there remains a need to theorize 
contemporary feminists’ media praxis, or the relationship between feminists’ politics and 
their participatory, extra-institutional media practices.  
In order to understand the processes through which feminist negotiate between 
their goals, contexts, and media tools, it is necessary to first build a theoretical framework 
that positions media as not merely materials, tools, or texts, but as political practices that 
emerge from the resources, conventions, and needs of the practitioners’ context (Couldry, 
2012, 2010; Postill, 2010; Williams, 1977). I turn to this framework in the next section.  
Toward a Theory of Networked Feminism as a Political Media Practice 
Media and Social Movements 
Building a theory of networked feminist as a political media practice requires a 
conceptual framework that makes media legible as sites for political contestation. The 
field of social movement research offers a logical first stop in the search for theoretical 
resources. Traditionally, however, theorists of social movements have positioned media 
and communication as resources activists mobilize in the service of more conventional 
forms of political and civic engagement happening elsewhere, rather than political actions 
in and of themselves. In their analyses of pre-digital movements, scholars have described 
news outlets as arenas in which activists and their targets compete for public attention 
(Koopmans, 2004), documented the power of personal stories to mobilize activists into 
action (Polletta, 2009), framed discourse as a tool for building collective identities 
(Melucci, 1989), and highlighted media’s role in maintaining movement ideologies and 
solidarities during periods of abeyance (Rupp & Taylor, 1987). While this research draws 
much needed attention to movement cultures, framing processes, emotions, and identities, 
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in each case, media and communication only become politically significant when 
mobilized in support of other movement actions. Research related to online activism 
continues this trend, despite activists’ innovation of new, digital protest forms. Scholars 
often speak in broad strokes about information-communication technologies’ inherent 
ability to facilitate political engagement offline, resulting in recurring debates between 
“techno-optimists” (Castells, 2009, 2015; Shirky, 2008) and “techno-pessimists” 
(Morozov, 2011). On both sides, this instrumentalist approach oversimplifies the ways in 
which media, digital and otherwise, operate as spaces for political participation (Zayani, 
2015).  
The limited role media play in much existing social movement theory is due in 
part to the definitional boundaries theorists draw around what qualifies as political work. 
A great deal of social movement research within the fields of sociology and political 
science adopts what is known as “the political process model,” a state-centered view of 
power that defines social movements as only those collective challenges explicitly aimed 
at policy change or institutional reform (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008). In an exemplary 
work within this tradition, Tilly and Tarrow (2015) develop a theory of “contentious 
politics” to differentiate between political and nonpolitical collective action. Their 
definition of contentious politics includes “interactions in which actors make claims 
bearing on other actors’ interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared 
interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, 
or their parties” (p. 7). Tilly and Tarrow acknowledge that forms of contention unfold in 
spaces beyond the state’s reach, but label such realms as “nonpolitical settings” (p. 9); for 
them, involvement of the state “distinguishes collective action and contention from 
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politics” (p. 10). Within the political process model, only highly visible, state-targeted 
“public performances including marches, rallies, demonstrations, creation of specialized 
associations, public meetings, public statements, petitions, letter writing, and lobbying” 
(Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 11), are recognized as social movement activity. The role of 
media is limited to that of “interested third parties” (Tilly & Tarrow, p. 69), who might 
increase the reach and visibility of a protest or advance competing interpretations of a 
contentious event, but who remain exterior to the actual contestation between challengers 
and their opponents.  
The assumptions about power, domination, and resistance that underscore the 
political process model are problematic for feminists and feminist scholars for a number 
of reasons.  
For one, contemporary feminists’ tactics simply do not fit the model’s definition 
of collective action. While in-person, “public performances,” like the marches, rallies, 
and demonstrations Tilly and Tarrow describe, remain part of the feminist repertoire, 
mediated tactics, like hashtag campaigns, blogging, and zine-making, are just as, if not 
more, prevalent. Here, media are not “interested third parties” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 
69) or a means “to choreograph collective action” (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 4), but the very 
sites where political contestation unfolds; the political process model is not equipped to 
capture the political work feminist media activism performs. 
Second, the political process model’s emphasis on public actions and public 
institutions obscures the behind-the-scenes work of movement building. Alberto Melucci 
(1989) argues that the model creates the “action without actors” problem, treating social 
movements as “unified empirical datum, which, supposedly, can be perceived and 
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interpreted by observers…the collective reality is seen to exist as a thing” (p. 18). While 
protest event dynamics are important objects of study, an exclusive focus on highly 
visible action ignores the less visible processes through which activists organize and 
maintain movements: “This process of ‘collective action’ transforms social action into an 
incontrovertible fact, a given that does not merit further investigation” (p. 18). The 
political process model, in other words, is inadequate for theorizing the political 
dimensions of movement activity like collective identity formation, movement framing 
processes, ideological maintenance work, and the performance of movement ideals 
within everyday life at the collective and individual levels (Armstrong & Bernstein, 
2008; Benford & Snow, 2000; Rupp & Taylor, 1987; Taylor, Whittier, & Morris, 1992; 
Melucci, 1989; Young, 1997). Rather than account for activists’ agency as political 
actors, the political process model positions protest events as wholly determined by 
structural arrangements (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008).  
Third, this analytical focus on highly visible protest events is especially 
problematic for feminist movements because it overlooks the historical exclusion of 
marginalized groups, particularly women and girls, from the public sphere (Fraser, 1992; 
Harris, 2008; Keller, 2016; Taft, 2010). In her study of girl feminist bloggers, Jessalynn 
Keller (2016) argues that academic definitions of activism, social movements, and 
politics have been “based primarily around the experiences of white, middle-class, 
heterosexual, Western, adult men” (p. 50). Masculinist biases embedded in social 
movement theory reify hegemonic binaries that mark “women as personal and private 
and men as civic and public” (Keller 2016, p. 50). When scholars like Tilly and Tarrow 
(2015) restrict their definition of political contention to public performances, they fail to 
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grapple with how gender, among other social categories, differentially inscribes access to 
and legitimacy within the public sphere and how this differential access has fostered 
alternative forms of political engagement. Consequently, systematic studies of activism 
often report that women are less politically active than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003), 
but fail to question whether their methodologies and analytics exclude political work that 
takes place along the margins of the public sphere. This gendered dynamic is especially 
salient when it comes to studying networked feminism, which often takes place through 
individual engagements with collective media campaigns, as in the case of blogs and 
hashtags. 
Lastly, the political process model’s restriction of politics to governments and its 
prioritization of direct engagement with institutions of governance as activists’ strategy 
of choice obfuscates the ways in which power, and therefore, resistance operate across 
multiple institutions within everyday life (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Young, 1997). 
This is especially problematic for studying collective action that challenges sociopolitical 
systems of oppression and authority, including feminist movements, anti-racist 
movements, and LGBTQ movements, which are often relegated under the label of 
“identity politics” in contrast to the “real” politics of state-centered activism (Armstrong 
& Bernstein, 2008). Frances Shaw (2012) argues that the opposition within social 
movement literature between cultural, identity-based activism and political, state-
centered activism reflects the gendered divisions between the public and private sphere. 
Whereas scholars working within the political process model associate state-centric 
activism with contentious collective action performed in public and capable of enacting 
structural changes, scholars of so-called “cultural” activism tend to view its tactics and 
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effects as “private, internal, cognitive, and personal” (Shaw, 2012a, p. 378). This formula 
casts movements centered around gender, sexual, and racial justice as personal and 
expressive rather than political and instrumental, framing culture as separate from and 
secondary to structures of power (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Shaw, 2012a; Young, 
1997). Such binaries are deeply at odds with U.S. feminism, whose longstanding mantra, 
the personal is political, explodes conventional boundaries surrounding political 
domination and resistance.  
The study of contemporary feminists, whose activism is highly mediated, aimed 
at forms of domination that permeate everyday life beyond the state, and necessarily 
adopts diffuse, quotidian, and inventive tactics, requires a broadening of what “counts” as 
political work. In this section, I draw on media sociology, Foucauldian theories of power, 
and existing scholarship on feminist activism to develop an interpretive framework for 
analyzing media as political practices. This move toward a more robust theory of 
networked feminism requires two analytical steps: 1) framing media as practices, as 
actions, tactics, strategies, values, and relationships, rather than merely texts or tools; and 
2) outlining the conditions under which media practices become political practices. I 
argue that the political nature of feminists’ media practices is rooted in their engagement 
with discursive power. In synthesizing these resources into an interpretive framework that 
positions media as political practices, I move closer toward theorizing do-it-ourselves 
feminism as an activist media praxis.  
Media as Practices 
“This book is an action.” These five words, which open Robin Morgan’s iconic 
1970 feminist anthology, Sisterhood is Powerful, sum up the key assumptions that have 
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guided feminist media activism across its long history in the U.S. As Jaime Harker and 
Cecilia Konchar Farr (2015) write in the introduction to their eponymous volume, to 
claim that a book is an action is to claim “that writing can function as activism, just as 
protests, sit-ins, and marches do…that books could be revolutionary, that language could 
remake the world, and that writing mattered in a profound way” (p. 1). Media-making, 
discourse, and cultural production, in all of their varied forms — from books to 
newspapers to magazines to blogs to hashtags — have played pivotal roles in U.S. 
feminist activism, dating back to the self-published suffrage pamphlets of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Young, Harker & Farr, 2015). Media have only 
become more central to feminist activism with the rise of commercial internet access and 
social media platforms. Today, Robin Morgan still writes books, but like countless other 
media savvy feminists, she also blogs, Facebooks, tweets, and even podcasts, each post, 
status update, hashtag, and episode an action.  
But when does a book, or a zine, tweet, or blog, become an action? How can 
media function as sites for political contestation and media-making as a tactic for 
resistance? Answering these questions requires theoretical resources that highlight media 
not as texts or tools, but as social processes embedded in everyday life (Zayani, 2015).  
Theories of media as practices, as habits, techniques, values, and relationships 
that emerge from the conventions, resources, and needs of a particular cultural context, 
help explicate the process through which a text becomes an action. Raymond Williams 
(1977) moved media studies in the direction of this practice paradigm in his essay, “From 
Medium to Social Practice,” which argues that a medium is more than the materials of 
which it is composed. According to Williams, a medium is a “practice, which has always 
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to be defined as work on a material for a special purpose within certain necessary social 
conditions” (p. 160). Williams’ framework of “material social practice” highlights both 
the medium’s materials and the social, cultural, political, and economic values, 
relationships, and conditions which both inform and are enacted through any one 
particular practice of media-making.  
The field of media anthropology has since adopted the practice paradigm as an 
ethnographic mandate to study media as sites where broader sociopolitical phenomena 
unfold, including global cultural flows, national imaginaries, indigenous activism, 
postcolonial identities, diasporic communities, ritual and performance, and more 
(Hughes-Freeland, 1998; Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod, & Larkin, 2002; Postill, 2010; 
Rothenbuhler & Coman, 2005). But while media anthropologists have done the important 
work of pushing media studies beyond its traditionally limited focus on media content in 
the global North and West, John Postill (2010) argues that researchers working in this 
field frequently deploy the term media practices without adequately defining or 
problematizing it. Instead of positioning media practices as objects of study, media 
anthropologists have taken up media practices as “conduits though which to reach other 
research objects” (Postill, 2010, p. 4).  
To this end, Nick Couldry’s (2012) media-as-practice framework directs 
researchers’ attention to “the specific regularities in our actions related to media and the 
regularities of context and resources that make certain types of media-related actions 
possible or impossible, likely or unlikely” (p. 78). Rather than using media practices as 
sites for analyzing other phenomena, Couldry’s media sociology approach is primarily 
concerned with empirical questions regarding the “media-oriented practices” (2010, p. 
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41) that makeup people’s everyday lives: “Such a media sociology is interested in actions 
that are directly oriented to media, actions that involve media without necessarily having 
media as their aim or object; and actions whose possibility is conditioned by the prior 
existence, presence or functioning of media” (2012, p. 80). Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s 
notions of habitus and field and Theodor Schatzki’s work on the organizing properties of 
everyday routines, Couldry de-centers media texts and institutions and re-centers media 
users, consumers, and producers and their social, political, cultural, and economic 
contexts. This empirical prioritization of people’s practices over media content helps 
“sidestep insoluble problems over how to prove ‘media effects’: how can we ever know 
that a particular media text changed the behaviour of audiences in particular ways?” 
(Couldry, 2012, p. 82). Rather than beginning with content and asking how media 
messages affect consumers, the media-as-practice paradigm begins with people and asks 
what people actually do with media, how people understand what they do with media, 
and how context, conventions, values, and needs yield particular media practices.  
This approach helps clarify how media become sites where feminist activism 
unfolds. Whereas existing scholarship at the intersections of both media and movements 
and gender and media tends to focus only on media content, which may or may not 
undermine feminist politics or mobilize dissident actions, Couldry’s (2012, 2010) 
framework pushes researchers toward a less deterministic, more participatory view of 
media. The media-as-practice approach provides a framework for analyzing media as 
actions that productively balances structure with agency, bringing users’, producers’, and 
consumers’ actions and contexts into view. 
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Media as Political Practices 
But, as Couldry (2012, 2010) notes, an incredibly broad range of actions and 
routines — from watching a football game on television to publishing a video on 
YouTube — fall under the umbrella of “media practices.” Moreover, the same media 
practice enacted by one person in one context can take on different significance when 
enacted by another person in a different context. Under what conditions do particular 
media practices become political practices? When is tweeting a hashtag a feminist action 
and when is it just another status update? Can an email listserv or a Facebook group be a 
grassroots feminist community? 
The literature on alternative media offers some possible answers. While scholars 
have long disputed the boundaries separating mainstream media from alternative media, 
otherwise labeled as “citizens’,” “radical,” “community,” “civil society,” “critical,” 
“tactical,” “autonomous,” “rhizomatic,” “small,” “our,” and “DIY” media, the term is 
typically associated with activist-produced media, broadly defined (Atton, 2001; Bailey, 
Cammaert, & Carpentier, 2007; Downing, 2001). Despite these debates and the genre’s 
heterogeneity, Bailey, Cammaert, and Carpentier (2007) synthesize existing scholarship 
to highlight four general interventions that alternative media projects make: 1) alternative 
media center groups and topics that are marginalized within the public sphere; 2) 
alternative media offer spaces for counter-hegemonic discourses and anti-capitalist 
modes of production that subvert the producer/consumer binary; 3) alternative media 
create new democratic arenas for civil society participation; and 4) alternative media, as 
collaborative outlets for communication, link diverse struggles and foster coalitions. 
These four interventions, which can be found across the existing scholarship on 
networked feminism reviewed earlier, point to the political work activist-produced media 
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perform in and of themselves, regardless of whether they spark more conventional forms 
of collective action, such as street protests.  
Alternative media theories, however, are only helpful insofar as they highlight the 
production, circulation and content of activist media texts. An exclusive focus on 
alternative media overlooks the fact that, as John Downing argues, “all such media are 
part of popular culture and of the overall societal mesh and are not segregated into a 
radical political reservation” (p. 8). Oppositional cultures are intertwined with 
commercialized mass cultures; a feminist activist may collaborate with others to publish a 
zine about reproductive justice using cheap or even stolen materials and distribute it for 
free at a zine festival, but she may also enact feminist politics through everyday media 
practices, like using corporately owned social media platforms. In other words, 
alternative media theories cannot account for contemporary U.S. feminism’s central 
orientation toward media, alternative and mainstream alike, as sites of domination and 
resistance. The study of feminist media practices as a composite whole requires a more 
robust theoretical framework.  
A theory of feminists’ media-oriented practices, including alternative media 
production but also media consumption, usage, critique, and circulation, as political 
practices begins with the common thread that cuts across the media practices Couldry 
(2010, 2012) describes — the everyday. All of Couldry’s case studies are either mundane 
routines embedded in the flow of everyday life (e.g., watching TV) or more remarkable 
activities enabled by everyday technologies (e.g., social media). Understanding the 
political dimensions of everyday media practices requires theoretical concepts that 
illuminate how power operates in everyday life. To pose the problem in feminist terms, a 
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theory of media as political practices must shed light on how the personal is political, 
how domination and, in turn, resistance unfold through quotidian performances, 
interactions, processes, and technologies. Like the feminist project more generally, this 
necessitates a categorical expansion of “the political” that challenges distinctions between 
the private/personal and the public/political (Butler, 1988; Young, 1997). 
Michel Foucault’s concept of discursive power offers helpful resources for 
developing a broader definition of what qualifies as political work and theorizing the 
political dynamics of feminists’ media-oriented practices. In Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison, Foucault (1991) traces the development of the modern Western penal 
system in order to historicize a transition in the practice of power. Foucault’s genealogy 
charts a shift from sovereign power, a top-down model of control in which a single 
authority wields absolute power over the population through physical coercion, to 
disciplinary power, a bottom-up model of control in which power is dispersed throughout 
the social fabric and enacted between people on a micro-social level through the 
everyday performance and enforcement of behavioral norms. According to Foucault, 
discourse is the primary vehicle for the diffusion and wide acceptance of a particular set 
of norms at a given time and place. While Foucauldian theory often eludes precise 
definition, Stuart Hall (1992) helpfully summarizes Foucault’s conceptualization of 
discourse as  
a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of 
representing knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical 
moment. … Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. 
But … since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and 




A discourse, in other words, consists of speech, writing, and actions that appear across a 
variety of sites, texts, and institutions, govern the way a topic can be talked and thought 
about, and, consequently, influence behaviors and practices.  
Similar to Antonio Gramsci’s (1995) notion of hegemony but encompassing 
relationships more complex and diffuse than the single axis of class domination, 
discourse carries the authority of scientific knowledge or basic truth. Discourse, then, is 
inseparable from and co-constitutive of power, as discursive practices construct 
commonsensical thinking about particular groups of people, and, in turn, shape their 
material realities. Unlike coercive sovereign power, the disciplinary power of discourse is 
not only restrictive, prohibiting particular behaviors, it is also productive, creating the 
subject positions that delineate systems of power; it is “one of the prime effects of power 
that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be 
identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault 1980, p. 98). Whereas Marxist 
theories suggest the existence of fundamental truths or authentic subjectivities behind the 
veil of power, Foucault (1980) argues that no meaning exists outside of discourse and all 
discourse produces patterns of social relationships:  
Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the 
same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We 
should admit rather that power produces knowledge…that power and knowledge 
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations. (p. 76) 
Discourse offers a far more efficient means of control than sovereign power. 
Normalized into knowledge, discourse renders subjects as docile bodies “manipulated, 
shaped, and trained” (p. 332) to think and act in line with a set of accepted facts and 
standards. Discursive power does not require coercion at the hands of a single leader or 
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institution; instead, individuals become self-disciplining, internalizing normative 
discourse and regulating their bodies and the bodies of others accordingly, as if under 
surveillance from an invisible overseer. This phenomenon is captured metaphorically in 
Foucault’s discussion of the panopticon, the nineteenth century penal system composed 
of prison cells arranged around a central watchtower, from which guards could watch 
inmates, but inmates could not see inside the tower’s windows to confirm whether or not 
guards were watching them at any one moment; the result, over time, is a state of self-
policing. Power, for Foucault, is not the domination of one group over another, but 
“something which circulates…employed and exercised through a net-like organisation” 
(1980, p. 98). Within this net, power is not possessed but relationally enacted and 
individuals “are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements 
of its articulation” (Foucault 1980, p. 98). Diffuse, everyday, and everywhere, the 
disciplinary power of discourse is multidirectional, historically contingent, and constantly 
under negotiation. 
For feminist social movement theory, Foucault does the important work of 
expanding the domain of “the political” to include sites of power at the micro-level of 
society. Rather than working from a top-down model that positions the locus of power in 
government institutions, Foucault (1991) calls for a bottom-up analysis of the everyday, 
everywhere “micro-physics of power” (p. 73). As Stuart Hall (2013) writes, “Without 
denying that the state, the law, the sovereign or the dominant class may have positions of 
dominance, Foucault shifts our attention away from the grand, overall strategies of 
power, towards the many, localized circuits, tactics, mechanisms and effects through 
which power circulates” (p. 35). Stacey Young (1997) describes Foucault’s emphasis on 
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discursive power as a critical intervention on liberalism, whose insistence on 
individualism and the rational objectivity of democratic governments suggests that 
citizens need only to turn to state institutions to redress inequities in their personal lives: 
“Ideologies that construct power as being centralized in state institutions divert attention 
from other arenas and processes of domination, keeping them out of sight and thus 
decreasing the likelihood that they will become sites of resistance” (p. 6). This 
intervention, Young argues, is especially important for U.S. feminist theory and practice, 
whose “longstanding focus on domination and resistance at the level of daily life” (p. 14) 
grates against liberalism’s categorization of social conflict beyond the reach of the state 
as “‘private’ and therefore non-political” (p. 5).  
The concept of discursive power and its categorical expansion of “the political” to 
include sites and interactions beyond the state moves social movement theory toward a 
stronger framework for interpreting the political dynamics of feminist media practices. 
Importantly for my purposes here, Foucault’s work sheds light on how media operate as 
everyday sites of political domination and, in turn, targets for feminist activism. As 
perhaps our greatest purveyors of social meanings and norms, commercial media function 
as disciplinary technologies that reproduce and maintain discursive formations and, in 
turn, power. Hall (2013), drawing on Foucault, argues that media texts’ joining of images 
and ideologies through particular “regimes of representation” constitutes an exercise in 
“symbolic power” (p. 249) that naturalizes difference, marks “Otherness,” and 
normalizes imbalances of power. Patricia Hill Collins (2000) cites media as one source of 
the “controlling images…designed to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of 
social injustice appear to be natural, normal, and inevitable parts of everyday life” (p. 
3838 
69); Collins argues, for example, that white male media producers have repeatedly 
perpetuated stereotypical images of black women as mammies, jezebels, or welfare 
queens, pushing these discourses into hegemonic status and rationalizing black women’s 
social, economic, and political oppression throughout history. In the neoliberal era, the 
discursive power of media representations operates as an everyday technology of 
governmentality; Laurie Ouellette (2008) highlights how media texts, from reality 
television shows to self-help manuals, “construct templates for citizenship that 
complement the privatization of public life, the collapse of the welfare state, and, most 
important, the discourse of individual choice and personal responsibility” (p. 224). 
Media, in other words, shape and constrain the material conditions of consumers’ lives. It 
is for this reason that, as Van Zoonen (2004) argues, “media are part of feminism’s 
cultural and…material struggle” (p. 148).  
Feminists’ cultural and material struggle against dominant discourse’s “micro-
physics of power” has unfolded through similarly mediated, diffuse, everyday, 
everywhere forms of political actions. As Michel de Certeau (1984) argues in his 
response to Foucault, consumers may be “caught in the nets of ‘discipline’” (p. xiv), but 
they have not been reduced to it; rather, through creative tactics, they “make do” (p. 66) 
with everyday materials and resources to “evade” and “manipulate the mechanisms of 
discipline” (p. xiv). The repertoire of feminist media activism is filled with such tactics 
that artfully challenge and reappropriate the “symbolic power” of dominant discourse. 
U.S. feminists, past and present, have consistently adopted mundane, everyday media 
practices to perform what Stacey Young (1997) calls discursive activism, or collective 
action directed at “promoting new grammars, new social paradigms through which 
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individuals, collectivities, and institutions interpret social circumstances and devise 
responses to them” (p. 3). Feminist media activists endeavor to make visible and 
deconstruct those hegemonic discourses that, on a daily basis, marginalize some bodies 
while privileging others. In their place, feminist media activists collectively construct 
new discursive frameworks for representing marginalized identities, interpreting 
oppressive experiences, and responding to systemic injustice. Their everyday media 
practices, from sharing personal stories of encounters with rape culture on Twitter to 
borrowing time at the office to print copies of their grassroots collective’s latest zine, 
seize opportunities “on the wing” (de Certeau, 1984, p. xix) to throw a wrench into the 
disciplinary machine that is discourse.  
But contrary to de Certeau’s tactical practitioner, who may creatively adapt to the 
net of discipline but never change it despite daily struggle (“What it wins it cannot keep” 
(p. 37)), networked feminist practices are transformative. Collins’ (2000) theory of black 
feminist standpoint formation helps illustrate how everyday discursive tactics create 
change at the levels of both the individual and the collective, the personal and the 
political. For Collins, resistance under the conditions of discursive domination is not 
tactical in de Certeau’s sense of the word – momentary, opportunistic, makeshift – but 
instead takes the form of an achievement over time that grows from personal experience 
to collective struggle. In her black feminist framework, resistance begins “when the 
contradictions between Black women’s self-definitions and everyday treatment are 
heightened” (p. 89) and the constructed nature of controlling images becomes 
increasingly visible. These contradictions and the processes of deconstruction they trigger 
lead individual women to develop a stronger sense of self rooted in a “dual 
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consciousness” (p. 97) aware of both the discursive norms inscribing her social position 
and her own sense of identity. Individual self-definition grows into a collective 
standpoint through what Collins calls rearticulation, in which black women, in 
conversation with one another, affirm individual political consciousness, form 
communities, develop new interpretations of everyday social situations, and devise 
responses to them. Collective self-definition in the form of a black feminist standpoint 
produces alternative epistemologies that not only debunk the myths underpinning 
controlling images but also challenge the very process of knowledge production:  
Alternative epistemologies challenge all certified knowledge and open up the 
question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative 
ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s 
standpoint using Black feminist epistemology calls into question the content of 
what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of 
arriving at that truth. (p. 270-271) 
 
Collins argues that a critical mass of individuals espousing a black feminist epistemology 
not only fosters collective empowerment by changing the ways in which women interpret 
everyday life situations, but also challenges the set of norms and assumptions limiting 
black women’s political agency and access to material resources. Collins’ theory of 
standpoint formation suggests that a dialectical relationship exists between discursive 
activism and material life, illuminating the political dimensions of feminists’ media-
oriented practices.  
The political work of feminists’ media practices does not end with the 
construction of alternative discourses and epistemologies. The collective acts of 
producing and circulating feminist counter-discourses also foster activist movements, 
communities, and spaces. Nancy Fraser (1992) argues that second-wave feminists formed 
a subaltern counterpublic through their “variegated array of journals, bookstores, 
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publishing companies, film and video distribution networks, lecture series, research 
centers, academic programs, conferences, conventions, festivals, and local meeting 
places” (p. 123). Within these “parallel discursive arenas” (p. 123), feminists addressed 
“informal impediments to participatory parity” (p. 119) that kept women from 
participating fully within the public sphere, including gendered discourses circumscribing 
appropriate social roles for women, long after they were legally licensed to participate. 
The second-wave counterpublic offered spaces “where members of subordinated social 
groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of 
their identities, interests, and needs” (p. 123). Through these processes of discursive 
invention and circulation, counterpublic spaces functioned as both “spaces of withdrawal 
and regroupment” and “bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed 
toward wider publics” (p. 124). What Michael Warner (2002) calls “the reflexive 
circulation of discourse” (p. 62) created and maintained the second-wave counterpublic. 
Just as dominant discourse is productive, generating, as Foucault argues, particular 
subjectivities and social positions within the net of discipline, feminist media activists’ 
counterdiscourses perform “poetic world-making” (Warner, 2002, p. 82), calling 
dissident subjectivities and collectivities into being.  
Taken together, theories of discursive power and resistance help illuminate the 
political dynamics of feminists’ media-oriented practices. Networked feminism, whether 
oriented toward critiquing mainstream media, using social media platforms, or producing 
alternative media, is a distinctly political practice because it disrupts and, when 
successful, transforms discursive power, advancing new interpretive frameworks for 
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responding to injustice and fostering the formation of counterpublic spaces that center 
marginalized voices.  
Methodological Approach 
The media-as-political-practices approach outlined in the previous section calls 
for a methodology that prioritizes media makers, users, and consumers in both the data 
collection and analysis stages. If the goal of the practice-based approach as outlined by 
Couldry (2010, 2012) is to contextualize and understand what people are doing with 
media and why, then the researcher must treat her participants as expert sources on the 
meaning and significance of their actions. Throughout the entire methodological process, 
the practice-based approach consequently calls for a high degree of reflexivity on the part 
of the researcher. In order to center and uplift practitioners and hold their perspectives in 
the same regard as scholarly analyses or high theory, the researcher must remain critical 
of her role in the field, her subjective interpretations of her participants, and the power 
imbalance between herself as the researcher and her participants as the researched. She 
must also take steps to triangulate her findings, approaching a set of media practices 
through multiple methods to build as thorough an understanding as possible, and to 
perform participant check-ins, weighing her interpretations against her participants’ 
understandings. The ethical stakes of this methodology increase when a project revolves 
around activists, who, due to the dissident quality of their activities or the marginalized 
nature of their identities, occupy a precarious position in the fabric of society.  
In this section, I outline a general overview of the methodological approach I take 
to study networked feminism as a political media practice. Each of the following three 
chapters includes a section on methods, data, and theoretical resources specific to the 
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case studies taken up in that chapter. Here, however, I describe the feminist, practitioner-
centered methodology the guides my approach for each case.  
Data 
Throughout this study, I employ a mixed-methods qualitative approach that takes 
up feminist activist practitioners’ voices, perspectives, and actions as primary source 
material to consider four questions: 
RQ1. How are feminists using media to craft an activist praxis that reflects their 
intersectional values and responds to the challenges of today’s political 
context?  
RQ2. What strategies do they use to navigate the double entanglements of 
networked activism?  
RQ3. How does this generation of feminist activists imagine the role networked 
media play in political liberation?  
RQ4. And finally, what are the implications of feminists’ media practices and 
politics for the face and reach of contemporary feminism in particular, and 
social movements more generally? 
 
Six case studies structure this project. They include, in the order that they appear in the 
following chapters, 1) the Women’s March on Washington (WMOW); 2) Philadelphia’s 
annual March to End Rape Culture (MTERC); 3) the #MeToo campaign; 4) Girl Army, a 
feminist Facebook group; 5) the U.S. feminist zine community; and 6) Permanent Wave 
Philly (PWP), a grassroots feminist music and arts collective.  
 My study of networked feminist activism began in 2014, when I attended 
MTERC for the first time. Following Jenna Burrell’s (2009) work on the field site as a 
network, I approached the march as a localized hub, which might act as an entry point for 
accessing multiple nodes across the broader networked field site that is contemporary 
U.S. feminism. Every year, MTERC offers tabling space to dozens of Philadelphia-based 
organizations and collectives interested in mobilizing local activists. At MTERC 2014, I 
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connected with representatives from several organizations and signed up for their email 
listservs.  
 Ultimately, through this strategy, I followed networked connections outward from 
MTERC 2014 to the organizing team behind the march, Girl Army, and Permanent Wave 
Philly: I joined the MTERC team after speaking with Chelsea, a key MTERC organizer, 
at the 2014 march about my research; another MTERC organizer later invited me to join 
the Girl Army group, a communicative hub for Philly feminist happenings, via Facebook; 
and I became involved with PWP after signing up for the collective’s listserv at their 
march table. These three network connections opened doors to others. PWP members, 
who collaborate on an annual zine, introduced me to the handmade paper booklets and 
the broader circuit of feminist zine festivals, distributers, and websites. It was through 
Girl Army members that I first learned about the earliest rumblings of the Women’s 
March and, later, the #MeToo movement.  
 As I discuss in more detail below, my study of each protest or community was not 
always ethnographic, but my approach mirrors Marcus’ (1995) articulation of “multi-
sited ethnography,” which moves ethnography “from its conventional single-site 
location…to multiple sites of observation and participation” (p. 95) in order to develop a 
more robust understanding of participants’ lifeworlds. In selecting my case studies, I 
adapted Marcus’ “follow the people” (p. 106) mode of multi-sited research, following my 
participants from one site or practice to the next. Together, my case studies, 
interconnected through both my research questions and participant overlap, reflect 
Lingel’s (2017b) comparative “networked field studies” approach, which “allows for 
looking across multiple communities and field sites to build a coherent set of analytical 
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claims” (p. 1). By taking a networked approach toward studying networked feminism, I 
allowed my participants to guide my analytical attention, thereby centering activist-
practitioners in the scaffolding of my project. 
For each site, I drew on at least two of three different qualitative methods: 
participant observations, in-depth, semi-structured interviews, and textual analysis. See 
Table 1 for an overview of the methods I used across my case studies. In every case, I 
deployed a particular set of methods with the goal of understanding, from multiple 
angles, the relationship between feminists’ politics and their media practices. 
Table 1 
 
Case Studies and Methods 
 
Case Study Methods 
Women’s March on Washington Participant Observations, Textual Analysis 
 
March to End Rape Culture Participant Observations, Textual Analysis 
 
#MeToo Textual Analysis 
 
Girl Army Participant Observations, In-Depth Interviews, 
Textual Analysis 
 
Feminist Zine Community Participant Observations, In-Depth Interviews, 
Textual Analysis 
 
Permanent Wave Philly Participant Observations, In-Depth Interviews, 
Textual Analysis 
 
Participant observations. Data collection for the three cases localized in 
Philadelphia — MTERC, Girl Army, and PWP — involved extensive ethnographic 
observations. I spent three years within the networked field of grassroots feminist media 
activism in Philly, from September 2014 through September 2017. During that time, I 
was actively involved in the planning and execution of MTERC’s annual protest event 
and of PWP’s music shows, arts events, and annual zine. For nine months during that 
three-year period — from January to October 2015 — I conducted an ethnographic 
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analysis of Girl Army, a secret feminist Facebook group whose members are primarily 
from the greater Philadelphia area. Over the course of those nine months, I interacted 
with Girl Army throughout the day via the Facebook mobile app and I also set aside one 
hour per week dedicated to browsing, posting, and lurking in group discussions. I 
estimate that I spent approximately 120 hours, 300 hours, and 100 hours working and 
interacting with the MTERC organizing team, the PWP collective, and Girl Army 
members, respectively. A more detailed overview of my ethnographic approach to each 
case study can be found in Chapters 2 and 4.  
The three remaining translocal case studies — WMOW, #MeToo, and feminist 
zines — involved more episodic participant observations. I watched the Women’s March 
grew in the fall of 2016 from a Facebook event to a globally networked protest 
movement through my own social media accounts and later joined the local march in 
Philadelphia. When #MeToo went viral the following year, I watched as important 
conversations about sexual violence began popping up all around the world and joined in 
activist discussions on Twitter about the promise and perils of a media campaign that 
asked survivors to tell their stories on a public stage. A similar mix of casual and formal 
observations informs my analysis of feminist zines. As a participant observer in PWP, I 
contributed to and edited one annual zine and helped produce and sell copies of others. I 
also participated in local zine festivals, distributed copies of PWP zines to local 
bookstores, where I connected with other zinesters, and contributed to another 
collaborative zine published by a different feminist grassroots collective. In all three 
cases, these episodic observations give my analysis more contextual details. 
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Whether extensive and ethnographic or casual and episodic, participant 
observations of networked feminism in the Philadelphia area gave me the opportunity to 
study activists’ practices firsthand. Each of the following three chapters begins with one 
or more vignettes from this fieldwork to ground my analysis in the actions and 
experiences of my participants.  
In-depth interviews. For three of my case studies — Girl Army, PWP, and the 
feminist zine community — I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
participants. Table 2 provides a complete list of my interviewees. To develop a deeper 
understanding of Girl Army members’ practices, I supplemented my ethnographic 
observations with interviews with seven members, each of whom represented a different 
level or type of experience in the group, from highly active moderators to lurkers. I took a 
similar approach to studying PWP, using interviews with the collective’s three most 
active members to explore themes that emerged throughout my fieldwork in greater 
depth. In my analysis of the feminist zine community, interviews constitute the bulk of 
my data. I interviewed twelve zinesters who had exhibited work at the Philly Feminist 
Zine Festival to consider the role the paper-based goods play in the digitally networked 
feminist media repertoire. In total, I interviewed 22 feminist activist practitioners. All 
interviews had a semi-structured agenda that incorporated scripted but flexible, open-
ended questions and encouraged participants to take the conversation in the direction of 
their choosing. While participant observations allowed me to study feminists’ actions, in-
depth interviews gave participants a chance to reflect on their practices, offering new 
insights into the behind-the-scenes negotiations feminist perform between their politics 
and their media tactics. Moreover, the three sets of practitioners I interviewed – Facebook 
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users, grassroots collective members, and zine makers and readers – represent the three 
general categories that the networked feminist practices under study here fall under: 
digital, in-person, and print media activism. More information about the structure of these 
interviews can be found in Chapter 4.  
Textual analysis. For all six case studies, I used textual analysis in conjunction 
with observations and/or interviews to study the media texts participants produced, news 
media coverage related to the activism in question, and activists’ written reflections 
regarding feminist movements and their tactics. To understand activists’ public outreach 
work as well as public opinion about their tactics, I archived and studied the public-
facing websites and social media accounts as well as news coverage of WMOW, 
MTERC, and PWP. Data collection for the other three case studies — #MeToo, Girl 
Army, and Zines — involved developing more targeted archives of a particular feminist 
media practice: tweeting hashtags, posting in Facebook groups, and circulating print 
zines. For both WMOW and #MeToo, I also collected activists’ reflections on the 
movements’ tactics that were published in editorial pages or on public platforms like 
Twitter. Importantly, for my case study of #MeToo, I developed a new methodological 
approach that I call meta-tweet analysis, through which I collected and analyzed activists’ 
tweeted commentaries about the hashtag campaign as an activist tactic. Rather than 
analyzing the content of the hashtag campaign as a whole, this purposive sampling 
approach, discussed at length in Chapter 3, centers the perspectives of practitioners on 




   
Interviewees    
Case Study Interviewee Affiliation Interview Format 
Girl Army Dee* Former member of Girl Army Facebook chat 
 
Girl Army Jasmine Founder and moderator of Girl Army Skype 
 
Girl Army Kim Girl Army lurker In-person 
 
Girl Army Nikki Girl Army lurker In-person 
 
Girl Army Sylvia Active Girl Army member Skype 
 
Girl Army Rebecca Active Girl Army member In-person 
 
Girl Army Zola Active Girl Army member In-person 
 
Permanent Wave Dee* Highly active Permanent Wave member In-person 
 
Permanent Wave Callie* Permanent Wave founding member In-person 
 
Permanent Wave Jenny* Long-time Permanent Wave member In-person 
 
Feminist Zines Adelaide Barton** Author of: I Just Can’t Have This 
Conversation Anymore; Lady Gardens; 
Menstrual Cup: A Love Story 
 
Email 
Feminist Zines Annie Mok Author of: No No No: A Guide to Girling 
Wrong; Shadow Manifesto; Worst Behavior  
 
In-person 
Feminist Zines Christine Stoddard Author of Quail Bell Magazine 
 
Email 
Feminist Zines Dre Grigoropol Author of: Dee’s Dream, She Magazine, 
Lupa Cachula’s Life 
 
Email 
Feminist Zines Candice Johnson Contributor to Permanent Wave Philly In-person 
 
Feminist Zines Dee* Contributor to Permanent Wave Philly In-person 
 
Feminist Zines Jenny* Contributor to Permanent Wave Philly In-person 
 
Feminist Zines Kate P. Bennett Author of: Sticking Around; Cakes on the 




Feminist Zines Kerri Radley Author of Deafula Email 
 
Feminist Zines Moose Lane** Author of: Don’t Put Trash in my Toilet; 




Feminist Zines Nicole Rodrigues Author of: Bump-Ins; Cave Royalty; 
Incognito Jams; Level Up 
 
In-person 
Feminist Zines Sky Kalfus Author of Analytical Girl Manifesto In-person 
*Denotes pseudonym 
**Denotes interviewee’s chosen pen name 
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In existing scholarship on networked activism, researchers often use textual 
analysis to conduct studies focused on campaigns’ content. This work has yielded a 
wealth of rich descriptions of feminist media, but has also resulted in an under-
theorization of the politics and philosophies that inform feminists’ media practices. In 
this study, I also use textual analysis to study feminist media content, but this material 
functions primarily as contextual information for my case studies. To refocus attention on 
the feminist activist-practitioners behind the content, I paired my study of feminist media 
content with observational and interview data and conducted textual analyses of activists’ 
published reflections. The combination of all three qualitative methods across this project 
highlights activists’ actions, voices, and perspectives from a variety of different angles.  
Analysis 
To center practitioners while also remaining in dialogue with existing scholarship 
and theories of power and resistance, I took a constructivist grounded theory approach to 
analyzing the data described above. This mode of analysis allowed me to privilege 
practitioners’ words and actions while also drawing on theoretical resources to guide my 
interpretation of their perspectives and experiences. 
Developed by sociologists Barney Glaser and Anslem Strauss in the 1960s 
through their work in health and nursing studies, grounded theory involves “the 
systematic elaboration of concepts and theories that are rooted in the empirical materials 
at the center of the investigation” (Mattoni, 2014, p. 21). The approach was originally 
developed during a period in which the credibility of qualitative research was under 
attack and interpretive social scientists were seeking methodological frameworks that 
carried the same empirical weight as positivistic claims to quantitative objectivity and 
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generalizability (Mattoni, 2014). As such, the original formulation of grounded theory 
has a staid, mechanistic quality involving a strictly inductive approach, in which the 
researcher develops coding categories through constant comparison across case studies, 
which in turn become the building blocks for generating theory (Charmaz, 2014; Lingel, 
2017b). The method’s intensive emphasis on rooting theory in data in the search for 
empirical validity left researchers struggling to balance knowledge grounded in fieldwork 
with existing scholarship on the case under study (Mattoni, 2014). 
Over time, grounded theory has moved toward the more flexible “constructivist” 
approach Mattoni (2014) outlines in her work on the potential of the method for social 
movement research. The constructivist grounded theory approach maintains Glaser and 
Strauss’ (1967) original emphasis on rich, empirical data driving theory-building projects, 
while also recognizing that the research is embedded in a particular field of study that 
includes a variety of relevant theoretical resources. The earliest conceptualizations of 
grounded theory openly discouraged the use of existing scholarly knowledge to formulate 
or guide a research project. The constructivist model, however, “starts from the 
assumption that the researcher is situated in social reality and, as such, brings with her 
previous knowledge — both empirical, related to the fieldwork, and theoretical, related to 
concepts and models — when engaging with grounded theory” (Mattoni, 2014, p. 25). 
Although the researcher maintains the same degree of self-reflexivity and critical scrutiny 
of previous scholarship built into grounded theory’s emphasis on empiricism, she may 
also use “sensitizing concepts” (Mattoni, 2014, p. 25) to shape her fieldwork and her 
interpretative analysis. The constructivist approach to grounded theory continues the 
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method’s tradition of building theory from emergent themes and codes, while also putting 
this themes and codes in conversation with existing theories. 
Throughout this study, I use constructivist grounded theory to pursue analyses 
that are simultaneously rooted in feminist activist-practitioners’ actions and voices and 
informed by existing feminist and social movement theories. In each chapter, I bring the 
theories of power and resistance embedded in the media-as-political-practice approach 
outlined in the previous section to bear on my interpretation of feminists’ media politics 
and tactics. It is this combination of theoretical resources born out of social justice 
projects and practitioner-focused data that brings do-it-ourselves feminism to light as an 
organizational paradigm guiding contemporary feminist movements and communities.  
Reflexivity 
When Couldry’s (2010, 2012) media sociology is applied to activist media 
practitioners, an especially high degree of reflexivity is necessary. Stefania Milan (2014) 
outlines four special ethical considerations that social movement scholars must take, all 
of which apply to my study of networked feminism. First, because social movements are 
knowledge projects in and of themselves, social movement researchers must treat this 
knowledge with the same respect granted to academic scholarship and work to 
incorporate knowledge “from below” into their own work. Second, activism in any 
context is often risky and disclosing the dynamics of activism through scholarly work 
might expose activists to surveillance, repression, and personal threats. Researchers must 
incorporate an awareness of these potential consequences into their project designs. 
Third, activists are, of course, highly invested in their movements and may likely expect 
movement scholars to at least be politically aligned, if not politically involved, in their 
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dissident work, leaving the researcher to strike a balance between their own activist and 
academic work. Fourth and finally, practitioner-centered scholarship in any context 
requires research subjects to perform labor for the researcher. In the case of social 
movements, the researcher takes from practitioners’ limited time and energy, which 
might be otherwise invested in activist projects. The researcher, then, must interrogate 
this power imbalance and develop strategies for compensating for it. When read 
alongside Couldry’s work, Milan’s concerns indicate that a media sociology approach 
that truly centers practitioners must include an “ethically informed positioning of the 
researcher in relation to the values and practices of the movement” (p. 447) under study.  
To address these ethical concerns, throughout this study, I strive to incorporate the 
values that have shaped and driven feminist epistemological projects across the social 
sciences. More specifically, regardless of the actual method I use to pursue a particular 
case study, I take up the same normative assumptions that have long guided 
contemporary feminist ethnographic projects.  
Since the 1980s, feminist researchers have launched important challenges to the 
norms and assumptions underpinning knowledge-building projects across multiple 
disciplines within social science. Whereas, in decades prior, feminist social scientists 
invested ample energy into correcting the androcentric biases of their fields by adding 
women to research samples and preexisting theoretical frameworks, this more radical 
generation of researchers advanced a fundamental line of questioning that shook the very 
foundations of their fields: what is the nature of social reality? Who can know? What can 
be known (Hesse-Biber, 2007)? Feminist researchers, instead of attempting to improve 
the objectivity, accuracy, and universality of social science and theory, disputed the 
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validity of these taken-for-granted ideals that position the researcher as occupying a 
“view from nowhere” (Hesse-Biber, 2007, p. 16), value-free, detached, and neutral. 
Dorothy Smith (1990), a feminist sociologist and central figure within this movement, 
explains why the ethic of objectivity is problematic for researchers interested in women’s 
experiences: “how sociology is thought – its methods, conceptual schemes, and theories – 
has been based on and built up within the male social universe, even when women have 
participated in its doing” (p. 13). Smith and others shed light on a different kind of 
androcentric bias, one that may include women in its samples but is nevertheless unable 
to center their knowledge and experiences, contributing to their further marginalization.  
In an effort to disrupt knowledge-building projects that exclude while seeming to 
include, that universalize dominant groups’ perspectives despite their embeddedness 
within a specific social location, feminist research has for three decades endeavored to 
deconstruct the researcher/researched binary and center marginalized subjects as 
legitimate authorities on social life. Ethnography, with its emphasis on grounded, thick 
descriptions and participatory observation, has been a key method for this project. There 
is no single, coherent definition of feminist ethnography, as the boundaries of both terms 
are contentious, nor is there a particular subject matter specific to feminist ethnography 
(Schlock, 2013). Even so, regardless of the phenomena under study and the 
methodological practices used, certain normative assumptions tend to guide feminist 
ethnographic research, in all of its forms and practices. Like most feminist researchers, 
feminist ethnographers typically do not identify as unbiased scientists capable of 
producing universal theory, but instead view their methods as situated and subjective, 
their representations as partial and constructed, and their research as explicitly political 
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projects that contribute to social change (Hesse-Biber, 2007; Schlock, 2013). Feminist 
ethnographers often attempt to destabilize the hierarchy between the researcher and the 
researched by validating participants’ situated experiences as knowledge, grounding their 
claims in their participants’ experiences, engaging in research that is of use and relevance 
to their participants, and seeking participants’ feedback throughout the research process 
(Hesse-Biber, 2007; Schlock, 2013). Reflexivity is central to this process; at every stage, 
feminist ethnographers must “recognize, examine, and understand how their social 
background, location, and assumptions affect their research practices” (Hesse-Biber, 
2007, p. 17).  
Feminist scholars have launched important critiques of the plausibility of feminist 
ethnographers’ egalitarian goals. Judith Stacey’s oft-cited 1988 article, “Can There Be a 
Feminist Ethnography?” questions the method’s ability to mitigate the power imbalances 
between the researcher and the researched, arguing that “the appearance of greater 
respect for and equality with research participants afforded by feminist ethnography can 
make the potential for deeper forms of exploitation” (p. 22). In a 1990 article published 
(unintentionally) under the same title, Lila Abu-Lughod critiqued feminist ethnographers 
for often assuming the existence of a universal and romanticized women’s experience or 
standpoint, erasing important differences among women, including the researcher and her 
participants. Other scholars have charged that privileged feminist ethnographers’ 
representations of subaltern groups often exoticize “the Other” or erroneously assume 
access to more marginalized individuals’ subject positions (Borland, 2007; Schlock, 
2013). 
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Even so, with these critiques in mind, the feminist ethnographic project offers an 
instructive guiding framework for researchers studying the media practices of social 
movements. Politically motivated, partial, and reflexive, feminist ethnographers, working 
closely with their participants, attempt to produce social science that honors difference 
and advances justice.  
Throughout the course of conducting this study, I have attempted, to the best of 
my ability to do the same. This has involved a range of pragmatic steps, such as using 
pseudonyms to protect participants’ identities, compensating interviewees for their time, 
making careful choices about which tactics and personal stories to bring to light through 
my scholarship, and sharing what I learn with the activists who could use it. My research 
approach has also included more complex processes, such as asking participants for 
feedback on my findings and developing methods for highlighting activists’ voices 
without also asking them to perform extra labor on my behalf. Most importantly, I have 
tried, at every opportunity, to contribute to participants’ social justice projects. 
Sometimes, this has entailed “borrowing” reams of printer paper from the department 
office for zine-making or using local university connections to promote a protest. Other 
times, it has meant utilizing my privilege as an academic to procure campus event spaces 
for film screenings or panel discussions. Still elsewhere, I have taken up the everyday 
grunt work known to most all activists deep in the struggle, from screen-printing t-shirts, 
stapling flyers on telephone poles, and taking meeting minutes to drafting press releases, 
fielding emails, and fundraising. And in its most exciting moments, doing research that 
centers the needs, wellbeing, and work of activist-practitioners has meant being an 
accomplice, not an ally (Indigenous Action Media, 2014), and talking back to the sexist 
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cop who made fun of an anti-rape protest chant or using a megaphone to rally a crowd 
against a group of misogynist counterprotesters. While my participants and I share certain 
marginalized identity markers — many of the voices that fill these chapters are, like me, 
women from working-class backgrounds — I recognize that my status as a white, 
educated woman not only shapes my subjective understanding of power and oppression, 
but also enables me to push where less privileged activists might face pushback. I have 
written this study as an accomplice, in hopes that the space it creates for reflecting on the 
activist media praxis behind networked feminism might function as a social justice 
project, in and of itself, and help activists craft tactics for pushing forward, even in the 
face of incredible odds, until every year is our year.  
Project Preview 
Taking up the media-as-political-practice approach outlined here, the following 
three chapters identify the activist praxis guiding networked feminism and demonstrate 
how this paradigm has shaped U.S. feminist movements, actions, and spaces. Chapter 2 
traces the history and contours of a new feminist organizational logic, identifying, 
through examples of protest actions of varying scales, the relationship between 
contemporary feminists’ political visions and their networked mobilization tactics. Then, 
against the backdrop of this broad sketch, Chapters 3 and 4 draw offer more detailed 
looks at how feminists put this organizational logic into practice to launch networked 
visibility campaigns and build networked community safe spaces. Each chapter focuses 
on a particular dimension of networked feminist activism: networked feminist organizing, 
networked feminist visibility, and networked feminist communities. These three 
categories are not mutually exclusive; an organizing team or a protest event can, for 
example, feel like a community. But they represent longstanding core objectives of U.S. 
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feminism, the pursuit of which has shifted alongside activists’ turn toward highly 
mediated modes of collective action and away from formally structured organizations. 
Together, these three empirical chapters tell the story of the rise of do-it-ourselves 
feminism, the possibilities and challenges this activist media praxis opens up, and the 
strategies feminists are using to navigate both.  
The next chapter begins to unpack the question at the heart of this project: how 
are U.S. feminists using media to craft an activist praxis that reflects their values and 
responds to the challenges of today’s political context? Drawing on two case studies of 
contemporary feminist protest — Philadelphia’s March to End Rape Culture and the 
Women’s March movement — Chapter 2 identifies do-it-ourselves feminism as the 
emergent organizational logic underpinning networked feminist actions, from local, 
grassroots initiatives to global waves of protest. The chapter begins with a historical 
overview of feminism’s status within the U.S. and the role media — both mainstream 
commercial media and activist-produced media — have played in its many rises and falls. 
I argue that networked feminism grows out of three interrelated histories: 1) the long 
tradition of feminist media activism in the U.S., 2) the need to redevelop collective 
politics in the wake of neoliberalism, and 3) the intersectional critique of second-wave 
feminist organizing tactics. Then, through a comparative study of MTERC and WMOW 
grounded in data from ethnographic and textual analyses, I describe the key features, 
strengths, and shortcomings of the do-it-ourselves feminist logic that characterizes both 
protests. Citing examples from each, I describe DIOF as an everyday political praxis that 
draws on the media tools we use on a daily basis to make visible the ways in which 
power operates throughout individuals’ personal lives, updating the 1960s feminist 
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mantra, the personal is political, for the twenty-first century. Given its everyday qualities, 
DIOF is also accessible and participatory, enabling more intersectional and inclusive 
feminist protests and communities. These same features, however, leave DIOF 
precarious, as networked feminism’s personalizability and accessibility leave it 
vulnerable to activist burnout, internal discord, commercial cooptation, and anti-feminist 
backlash. Even so, DIOF is a reflexive praxis built around intersectionality theory’s 
emphasis on self-critique and its practitioners are constantly working to grow and 
strengthen their organizing tactics as new obstacles become apparent. Although 
networked activist tactics can be found in other social movements, I argue that DIOF 
represents a distinctly feminist form of networked activism, that not only emerges from a 
unique feminist history, but also reflects a specific set of feminist values and responds to 
the particular opportunities and challenges facing feminists in the current sociopolitical 
context.  
Following this general overview of do-it-ourselves feminism, Chapters 3 and 4 
trace how activists take up this feminist praxis in pursuit of different movement goals. In 
particular, I examine how feminists are using media to bring visibility to personal 
experiences of oppression and to cultivate safe, inclusive spaces while navigating the 
challenges of the current context and the structural constraints of media platforms, all 
without the capacities or resources of formal organizations. Visibility and community 
have been key goals of U.S. feminist movements for decades but the double 
entanglements of networked activism — the mix of affordances and limitations of highly 
mediated protest tactics — raise new questions for today’s activists. Both chapters 
address two: what strategies do feminists use to navigate the double-edged nature of 
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networked activism? And how does the current generation of feminist activists imagine 
the role networked media play in political liberation?  
Chapter 3 focuses on a feminist protest tactic that, though it has roots in the street 
protests and speak-outs of previous “waves” of U.S. feminism, has become a central 
component of the contemporary feminist repertoire — networked visibility campaigns, or 
digitally networked protest actions aimed at drawing attention to a particular issue. These 
campaigns can take many forms, but hashtag feminism, a mass mobilization tactic for 
gender justice that unfolds through Twitter hashtags, is an especially widely practiced 
form of networked visibility. Taking up a recent and highly visible campaign — the 
global #MeToo movement against sexual assault and harassment — this chapter 
considers practitioners’ perspectives on hashtag feminism and highlights the processes 
through which activists develop their tactics within the social and technological 
constraints of both the current context and the Twitter platform. While much discourse 
about online activism revolves around whether or not digital media are effective tools for 
creating social change, I work from the assumption that both sides of the “techno-
optimist” versus “techno-pessimist” debate may be telling one part of a larger story about 
the possibilities and limitations of networked protest. I approach digital media as political 
practices rather than tools, so as to bring the contradictions of networked activism and the 
strategies practitioners use to navigate them into view. Through an analysis of a large 
sample of hashtagged meta-tweets, or tweets about the #MeToo campaign, I argue that 
hashtag feminism is a contentious performance through which activists make the personal 
political by making it visible, bridging the individual with the collective and illustrating 
the systemic nature of social injustice. But making the personal visible on a globally 
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networked media stage opens activists up to a variety of negative consequences, 
including re-traumatization, backlash, and the erasure of those whose stories may not fit 
the ideal victim narrative. To compensate for these limitations while also taking 
advantage of hashtag feminism’s affordances, #MeToo participants developed 
performance maintenance strategies, through which they evaluated the campaign’s 
shortcomings and advanced solutions informed by their goals and values. Their 
reflexivity points toward hashtag feminism as a complex, interactional, recursive process 
aimed at achieving a transformative politics of visibility.  
While Chapter 3 focuses on public-facing protest actions, in Chapter 4, I turn my 
attention toward feminists’ practices for building networked safe space communities, or 
carefully bounded, inward-facing communities, fostered through the technological and 
social affordances of digital media and closed off from the misogynistic harassment that 
plagues other online spaces. Networked safe spaces do not fit traditional definitions of 
“activism” or “protest,” which frame political engagement as highly visible, state-
targeted public performances. In this chapter, however, I apply the media-as-practice 
approach to three case studies — a secret feminist Facebook group, the feminist zine 
community, and a feminist grassroots collective — to identify the connections between 
feminists’ goals and their mediated community-building tactics and illuminate the 
distinctly political work networked safe spaces perform. More specifically, I argue that 
feminists in each site use media to construct community boundaries that prioritize 
marginalized voices and foster open expression among members, who otherwise lack safe 
outlets to share their experiences of oppression. Rather than mobilizing viral protest 
actions that spread across the globe, these activists aim to produce counterpublic spheres 
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that draw like-minded activists inwards, together, where they can create communities that 
prefigure the kind of society they seek to bring about. In the process, they challenge 
conventional notions of what “counts” as political work and model alternative, more 
empowering modes of social engagement that are instructive for any community space, 
online or off.  
Lastly, in the final chapter, I review the core findings of this project and turn 
toward the implications of feminists’ media practices and politics for the study of social 













CHAPTER 2 – “We’ll just keep doing it ourselves.”  
Networked Feminist Organizing: Crafting an Activist Praxis  
 
In the weeks leading up to the 2017 Women's March on Philadelphia, one of a 
staggering 673 sister marches planned around the world to demand support for women’s 
rights on President Donald Trump's first day in office (Women's March on Washington, 
2017b), organizers predicted that approximately 20,000 people would join the Center 
City protest (6abc, 2017). When I arrived at Logan Square on the morning of January 21 
and waded into a sea of picket signs and pink pussyhats bottlenecking slowly toward the 
Benjamin Franklin Parkway, it quickly became apparent that our numbers were much 
bigger, too big even to truly march down the half-mile strip between City Hall and the 
Art Museum. Local news outlets later reported that some 50,000 people from the 
Philadelphia area and beyond inched, shoulder-to-shoulder, down the Parkway over the 
course of the afternoon (6abc, 2017).  
By all accounts, Election Day had been dark one for U.S. feminism. Hillary 
Clinton, the first woman candidate for president nominated by a major party, a lifelong 
public servant, and a fervent supporter of women’s rights, had lost to Trump, a 
businessman who had never held office and who ran a campaign that so frequently 
degraded or threatened women, people of color, queer communities, immigrants, people 
with disabilities, Muslims, and others. But the mood that morning on the Parkway was 
one of jubilant defiance. A dozen women and girls led the procession to the rhythm of 
drums, keeping spirits high even as the temperature dropped and the massive protest 
occasionally ground to a halt. Nearby, a portable Bluetooth speaker belted out Beyoncé at 
one moment, Aretha Franklin at another. In a different section of the crowd, call-and-
response chants let passersby and news media know that “This is what democracy looks 
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like!” Still elsewhere, a group of protesters from a local synagogue directed a makeshift 
choir to the familiar tune of “This Little Light of Mine,” improvising lyrics for the 
occasion: “all the way to the White House, I'm gonna let it shine. All the way to Trump 
Tower, I'm gonna let it shine…” And while birds-eye photos shared on social media 
platforms would depict the protest as a single, pink-spotted mass moving in unison, on 
the ground, individual protesters represented a multiplicity of personal identities, 
experiences, and concerns. Their colorful posters addressed reproductive justice, sexual 
violence, immigrants' rights, LGBTQIA rights, Islamophobia, white supremacy, ableism, 
climate change, public education, affordable healthcare, and voter suppression, among 
other issues. Commentators and activists had and would continue to critique the 
inclusivity of the global protest movement, particularly the original Women's March on 
Washington's emphasis on white, cisgender women throughout its early stages of 
development (Stockman, 2017). In Philadelphia, however, intersectionality emerged as a 
key organizing principle among protesters (Crenshaw, 1989; 1991). Their signs and 
chants pointed toward capacious definitions of womanhood, women's rights, and 
women's issues that captured personal experiences of gender and gender-based injustices 
across the overlapping axes of race, sexuality, class, faith, and ability. One protester's 
sign articulated in rainbow-colored marker what Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), founding 
theorist of intersectionality, calls the “multidimensionality” (p. 139) of gender: “I am 
black, Latina, LGBT, Muslim, Jew, all of these and WOMAN, too!” The Women's 
March on Philadelphia, and the hundreds of local protests like it expressed a collective 
message of dissent from a broad spectrum of subject positions that grew into the single 
largest demonstration in U.S. history (Chenoweth & Pressman, 2017). 
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*** 
Eight months after the Women’s March, on September 30, 2017, I joined a 
decidedly smaller crowd of several hundred people, who had converged on Thomas Paine 
Plaza in Center City to participate in Philadelphia’s seventh annual March to End Rape 
Culture (MTERC), formerly known as SlutWalk Philadelphia. MTERC protesters took 
over the streets surrounding City Hall, waving signs and chanting loudly, their unified 
voices breaking into laughter at one corner and erupting with righteous indignation at 
another. Picket signs and banners, ranging dramatically from hilarious to heartbreaking, 
called out a myriad of issues: sexual violence, sexual consent, intimate partner violence, 
victim-blaming, street harassment, homophobia, transphobia, racism, police brutality, 
slut-shaming, fat-shaming, reproductive health rights, restrictive gender roles, the erasure 
of male survivors, the concept of “friend-zoning,” sexist media, and more.  
While protestors marched for two and a half miles under these seemingly 
disparate rally cries, volunteers gave bystanders postcards that defined the umbrella term 
under which their grievances fell: “Rape culture is a term used to describe a culture in 
which sexual violence is accepted as a part of everyday life.” Marching under this broad 
framework, protesters held signs that told stories of surviving a range of violent 
experiences, from sexual harassment to sexual assault. For some, the violence was 
emotional or psychological, as in the case of protestors demanding an end to shaming 
people on the basis of their sexuality, gender identity, or body type. In most cases, the 
violence was doubly inflicted, once by the perpetrator – the rapist or the harasser – and 
then again by the discourses that enable the violence to persist – the mainstream media 
tropes or the ineffectual legislation. With a sense of painful irony, we witnessed this 
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system manifest itself as a group of men seated at a sidewalk cafe catcalled protestors 
who had chosen to wear little clothing to declare their right to move safely through public 
space without facing harassment or assault regardless of their appearance or state of 
dress. An organizer on a bullhorn led our response: “Wherever we go, however we dress, 
‘no’ means no and ‘yes’ means yes!” Following the march, protestors reassembled in the 
plaza and speakers connected sexual violence to the rights of transgender people, people 
with disabilities, immigrants and refugees, and the homeless, and to the Black Lives 
Matter Movement, labor movements, movements for the decriminalization of sex work, 
and movements against mass incarceration. This intersecting system of violence 
represented collectively through protestors’ signs, chants, speeches, and bodies 
constituted what MTERC organizers call “rape culture.” 
*** 
These two protest events vary drastically in scale. The record-breaking turnout for 
Women’s Marches held across the globe stands in sharp contrast to the small but mighty 
crowd that gathers annually for Philly’s March to End Rape Culture. They share, 
however, what social movement scholars have termed a common organizational logic 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013), a similar methodological approach for organizing and 
mobilizing collective action that sets them apart from previous generations of feminists in 
the U.S.  
Both the Women’s March and the SlutWalk movement, of which MTERC is a 
critical offshoot, have inevitably drawn comparisons to the Women’s Liberation 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Dow & Wood, 2014; Hess, 2017a). Like this 
earlier “wave” of U.S. feminist activism, both protest events emphasize that the personal 
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is political, that structures of power circumscribe individual actions and experiences, that 
seemingly private concerns and situations are symptomatic of systemic injustices (Butler, 
1988; Hanisch, 1969). And, like their foremothers, the protesters at both marches must 
have been galvanized in part by the notion that the inverse is also true, that individual 
actions can reshape configurations of power, that choosing to protest could rewrite the 
scripts that marginalize some bodies while privileging others (Butler, 1988).  
But unlike the protests of previous generations, neither the Women’s March nor 
the March to End Rape Culture emerged from the political vision of a formally structured 
organization or a high-profile feminist leader. Their global and local expressions of 
dissent were not fueled by the membership or finances of a nonprofit like the National 
Organization for Women (NOW), nor were they spearheaded by luminaries the likes of 
Gloria Steinem or Angela Davis, though all three 1960s icons made appearances at the 
Women’s March on Washington. Instead, both protests stemmed from the digital media 
practices and the resilient creativity of dispersed networks of activists who, working with 
little or no institutional resources, sought to transform intersecting systems of oppression 
equally as diffuse and persistent as their support bases. It was a Facebook event 
organized by one person that ultimately led an estimated five million people to take to the 
streets worldwide the day after Trump’s inauguration and take a stand against the hatred 
and bigotry that defined his campaign (Stein & Somashekhar, 2017). Meanwhile, a crew 
of about ten stalwart volunteers operating on their spare time, crowdsourced funds, and 
digital media savvy alone launch MTERC every year to protest sexual violence and the 
sociocultural norms that enable it. Both movements are self-starting, extra-institutional, 
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participatory, and above all, mediated and networked, tactically appropriating the 
technological and social affordances of digital media platforms for their own purposes.  
I call this new organizational logic do-it-ourselves feminism (DIOF), an activist 
praxis that draws on digital media tools to mobilize protests and build communities from 
the ground up that, in process and product, reflect feminists’ values. In naming this 
praxis, I am borrowing from the language of MTERC organizers who participate in and 
draw resources from the “DIY community” in Philly, the city’s underground arts and 
music scene, which thrives on offbeat venues, independent bookers and outlets, and an 
economy of sliding-scale admissions fees and handmade goods (Lingel, 2017; Silberling, 
2015). Despite their contrasting sizes, the same emphasis on creativity, collectivity, 
resourcefulness, and freedom from institutional restraints characterizes the organizational 
logic behind both the Women’s March and MTERC. Throughout this study, I use the 
term “do-it-ourselves” feminism to describe contemporary feminist praxis because, 
unlike “DIY” feminism (Bail, 1996) or “do-it-together” feminism (Mann, 2014, p. 23), 
“doing it ourselves” captures the collective, though not always communal or 
collaborative, nature of feminist media activism; DIO feminism includes both the 
collaborative work of organizing a feminist protest and the individually produced but 
collectively networked expressions of feminist discourse on social media. And, whereas 
do-it-yourself modes of civic and cultural engagement have been critiqued for their 
complicity in the neoliberal restructuring of social welfare and the marketplace value of 
individualism (Dawkins, 2011; Lee, 2014; Luvaas, 2012), do-it-ourselves feminism is a 
distinctly collective praxis, committed to the revitalization of collective feminist politics.  
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But these two protest events are not the only examples of do-it-ourselves 
feminism; rather, the turn toward DIOF constitutes a major paradigm shift for 
contemporary U.S. feminism in general. Reflecting the broader digital reconfiguration of 
social and political life (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2011; boyd, 2008; Friedland, Hove, & 
Rojas, 2006; Tufekci, 2017), social media platforms, rather than formal and informal 
associations, organizations, and institutions, have become the building blocks of feminist 
movements in the twenty-first century. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. feminist 
movements unfolded within a web of closely tied, highly structured organizations like 
NOW, the Women’s Equity Action League, and the National Women’s Political Caucus, 
alongside more radical but still formally structured groups like the New York Radical 
Women and the Redstockings (Reger, 2012). Over the past decade, however, as scholars 
have documented since the earliest days of Web 2.0, networked feminism, from the 
feminist blogosphere to hashtag feminism, has outpaced movement organizations and 
institutional politics. With access to wide audiences just a few keyboard strokes away, 
feminist social media users have mobilized direct action campaigns and sparked 
transnational movements, despite lacking infrastructural support and despite, as in the 
case of the Women’s March, initially acting alone.  
In 2017, for example, it was not feminist nonprofits or lobbyists, but feminists’ 
networked activism and media campaigns, like the Women’s March and #MeToo, that 
led dozens of news outlets and commentators to dub the first year of Trump’s presidency 
“The Year of Women,” despite the misogyny, racism, heterosexism, and xenophobia at 
the heart of this administration’s policies and rhetoric (e.g., Dvorak, 2017; Epstein, 2017; 
Grady, 2017; Jain, 2017; Shamus, 2017). The global protest events that marked “The 
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Year of Women” were only the latest in a new tradition of viral feminist media activism, 
including SlutWalk and hashtag campaigns like #YesAllWomen, #WhyIStayed, 
#NotBuyingIt, and #SayHerName, among others. As these examples suggest, networked 
feminism campaigns vary widely in form — from Twitter hashtags to street protests — 
and content — from liberal critiques to more radical demands for social and political 
transformations. They share, however, a common do-it-ourselves ethos, a central 
orientation toward rebellious, bottom-up cultural production fostered through the 
participatory nature of digital media networks. Their tenacity and ingenuity have 
reenergized feminist politics precisely at a moment when women’s rights and the rights 
of marginalized communities are under siege in the U.S.  
This chapter offers an in-depth exploration of do-it-ourselves feminism as an 
emerging organizational paradigm for contemporary U.S. feminism. First, citing existing 
research on both feminist media activism and feminist movements’ relationship with 
media, I map the history of feminism’s status within the U.S. since the end of the second 
wave and the role media have played in its ebbs and flows. Through this history, I 
consider why and how networked feminism has emerged at this moment in time and, in 
the process, establish the context for the study as a whole. One contribution of this 
chapter is to provide an overview of the development of networked feminism over time 
through a synthesis of feminist media studies scholarship, a history that is otherwise 
missing from existing research. Then, taking a case study approach grounded in three 
years of ethnographic fieldwork with the MTERC organizing team and media associated 
with the Women’s March, I identify the key features, strengths, and shortcomings of the 
organizational logic underlying networked feminism — do-it-ourselves feminism. In 
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doing so, I begin to unpack the question at the heart of this project: how are U.S. 
feminists using media to craft an activist praxis that reflects their values and responds to 
the challenges of today’s political context?  
While scholars have documented a similar shift from away from formally 
structured organizations and toward networked activism within other social movements 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013), I argue that do-it-ourselves feminism represents a distinctly 
feminist form of networked activism that emerges from a unique feminist history, set of 
feminist values, and political and social context.  
DIOF is the latest iteration in a rich history of U.S. feminist media-making 
stretching back to the 1960s underground press; its digitally networked and mediated 
nature reflects U.S. feminists’ historical emphasis on discourse — everyday language and 
personal expressions — as a site of power. 
Though rooted in this long lineage of feminist media activism, do-it-ourselves 
feminists’ extra-institutional activism also offers both a contemporary feminist critique 
and response to the exclusionary organizational logic of the second-wave generation. 
Whereas 1960s-era feminism often centered the voices of white, middle-class women 
who had the capital necessary to build and participate in formal organizations (Reger, 
2012), the current generation’s intersectional values conflict with the structural inequities 
and gatekeeping functions baked into bureaucracies. Instead, they craft and share their 
own dissident expressions through free or cheap media platforms, which not only grant 
immediate access to broad audiences, but enable a greater diversity of activists to 
mobilize and participate in campaigns.  
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Lastly, DIOF faces a range of obstacles, from movement sustainability to activist 
burn-out, that plague most all networked activist movements, but digitally networked 
feminist movements also face a particular set of challenges and shortcomings. Despite 
decades of backlash and the reality of the current administration, this generation of 
media-savvy feminists has created a moment in which feminist ideas, rhetoric, and 
figures are not only highly visible but celebrated within U.S. popular culture. With this 
popularization, however, has come the rise of neoliberal “marketplace feminism” 
(Goldman, Heath, & Smith, 1991; Zeisler, 2016), in which feminist personal politics are 
coopted and commodified to support the capitalist ideals of consumption and 
individualism. Worse still, what commentators have heralded as today’s “feminist 
zeitgeist” (Banet-Weiser, 2015b; Valenti, 2014a) has triggered in equal measure a violent 
anti-feminist backlash, whose proponents make use of the same digital platforms and 
tools that have fueled this new wave of feminist activism and discourse (Banet-Weiser, 
2015b, 2018b; Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016). To borrow McRobbie’s (2004) phrasing, 
today, digital media are “doubly entangled” in both the “undoing” (p. 255) and “redoing” 
(Baer, 2016, p. 19) of feminism, leaving do-it-ourselves feminists to juggle both the 
affordances and shortcomings of networked activism. 
Given the complexities of this critical juncture, where feminism is both 
reinvigorated yet precarious, Gill (2016) argues that it is necessary “to unpick and 
disentangle the profoundly uneven visibilities of different feminisms in media culture” (p. 
615), to highlight the possibilities for resistance feminist activists are seizing despite the 
challenges they face. Existing scholarship has yielded a thorough record of feminist 
media campaigns and outcomes, but there remains a need to theorize contemporary 
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feminists’ media praxis, or the relationship between their political ideals and their 
networked media tactics (Couldry, 2012, 2010; Postill, 2010; Williams, 1977). Drawing 
on theories of power and resistance (Collins, 2000; de Certeau, 1984; Foucault, 1991), 
this chapter highlights DIOF as a political media praxis informed by contemporary 
feminists’ ideals, goals, needs, resources, and context. The chapters that follow this one 
offer case studies of how feminists put this praxis into action to mobilize networked 
visibility campaigns and build networked communities, all while navigating the double 
entanglements of media platforms and tools.  
Literature Review 
Feminisms Across the U.S. Media Landscape 
As Gill’s (2016) phrasing suggests, the current media culture is marked by a 
plurality of feminisms. A convergence of often contradictory discourses has swirled 
around the concept of feminism across U.S. media over the past several decades, creating 
a complicated social and political backdrop for feminist media activists. In this section, I 
“disentangle” (Gill, 2016, p. 615) this complex web by mapping out a series of four 
feminist media histories, each of which overlap with and feed into one another, through a 
review of existing feminist media studies scholarship. Together, they recount how 
feminism’s status within the U.S. has shifted since the rise and fall of second-wave 
feminism and the role media, including both mainstream commercial media and activist-
produced media, have played in this process. In turn, they also tell the story of networked 
feminism’s rise and historicize contemporary feminists’ media practices and organizing 
logic. While a growing body of scholarship offers case studies of individual networked 
feminist campaigns, less clear is why this highly mediated organizing logic has emerged 
at this particular point in time. Pushing beyond overly simplistic techno-deterministic 
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narratives, I argue that U.S. feminists’ turn toward networked activism and away from 
highly structured organizations cannot be explained through the availability of digital 
media tools alone. Rather, their practices stem from a precarious sociopolitical context 
for feminist discourse, a desire to reimagine a more intersectional feminist politics, and a 
long tradition of feminist media-making. This history lays the groundwork necessary to 
theorize the do-it-ourselves praxis that undergirds networked feminism today and 
establishes key context for the following chapters.  
Media and the Undoing of Feminism  
Starting in the mid- to late 1980s, feminism took on a precarious position in the 
U.S., and commercial media representations of women in general and feminists in 
particular were partly to blame. The activism of feminists throughout the 1960s and 
1970s had fundamentally altered the social, political, and economic fabric of society, 
troubling patriarchal norms and creating new possibilities for women in the workplace, in 
the home, and in the public sphere. Following this period of revolutionary change, 
however, a “postfeminist sensibility” (Gill, 2007, p. 5) flooded U.S. media, declaring 
feminist movements as unnecessary, undesirable and out of touch with young women’s 
lives (McRobbie, 2004). Some scholars have pointed to the 1980s rise of the Religious 
Right’s conservative “family values” platform under Ronald Reagan and described this 
era as a concerted backlash aimed at undermining feminist legislative and cultural 
achievements (Faludi, 1992; Whelehan, 2000). But while the backlash thesis tells a 
compelling narrative of America’s political pendulum swinging from left to right, 
theorists of postfeminist media culture argue that the reality was not so straightforward. 
The postfeminist sensibility did not offer a flat-out rejection of feminism. Rather, 
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postfeminism, McRobbie (2004) argues, selectively took some feminist ideas and values 
“into account” (p. 255) as common-sensical thinking, while simultaneously dismissing 
feminist politics. As Gill (2007) puts it, within postfeminist culture, “Feminist ideas are at 
the same time articulated and repudiated, expressed and disavowed” (p. 163).  
The postfeminist sensibility, loaded with ambivalence and contradictions and 
normalized into hegemonic status, was far more pernicious and complex than an outright 
backlash. Much like the feminist underground press publications of the 1960s and 1970s 
described in the Introduction, according to Tasker and Negra (2007), postfeminist media 
texts produced throughout the 1990s and early 2000s emphasized “educational and 
professional opportunities for women and girls; freedom of choice with respect to work, 
domesticity, and parenting; and physical and particularly sexual empowerment” (p. 2). At 
the same time, however, these texts suggested that feminism had already achieved these 
goals, that those who continued to perform feminist activism were extremists, and that 
participation in feminist politics deprived women of some essential feminine fulfillment 
in the domestic sphere. As McRobbie argues (2004), postfeminism engages in a “double 
entanglement” with both neoconservative values and the liberalization of choice in 
domestic relationships and professional aspirations.  
This double entanglement, according to Gill (2007), “turns the idea of the 
personal-as-political on its head” (p. 153) and reduces the political to the personal. Rather 
than drawing connections between personal experiences and political inequities, as 
second-wave feminists had worked to do, the postfeminist “grammar of individualism” 
(Gill, 2007, p. 153) reframed political inequities in exclusively privatized terms, recast 
empowerment as a personal responsibility, and refracted all aspects of life through the 
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lens of individual choice and self-determination. Evidenced most clearly in the 
“makeover paradigm” (Gill, 2007, p. 156) that dominated television throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the ideal postfeminist subject achieved empowerment through self-
surveillance, self-discipline, and self-improvement via participation in consumer culture, 
not collective action. To put it differently, the postfeminist sensibility refused to 
acknowledge the role systems of power like sexism or racism play in shaping individuals’ 
personal lives, instead positioning “women as autonomous agents no longer constrained 
by any inequalities or imbalances whatsoever” (Gill, 2007, p. 153). With structural 
inequities erased from view and empowerment framed as a matter of choice, the 
collective politics of a social movement were no longer necessary. The result was a 
generation of women who, by some accounts, refused to identify as feminists, even as 
they acknowledged their debts to past feminist movements and the persistence of 
gendered inequities (Scharff, 2012). Postfeminism’s double entanglements left feminism 
to exist, in Jo Reger’s (2012) words, “everywhere but nowhere,” a distilled version of 
feminist ideas and identities “diffused into the culture and structure of society” (p. 3) but 
without the collective politics of a social movement.  
The 1980s shift within U.S. media culture toward the postfeminist sensibility of 
empowerment through self-determination was rooted in a parallel turn toward 
neoliberalism (Baer, 2016; Gill, 2007; Gill & Scharff, 2011). Neoliberalism is a political 
and economic philosophy that rejects the social welfare model of governance, favors 
free-market capitalism, and pursues policies that deregulate corporations, privatize public 
goods, and encourage competition in open markets (Harvey, 2007; Marwick, 2013). 
Neoliberal economic policies rose to prominence throughout the 1980s and 1990s, when 
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politicians like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Bill Clinton advocated for a 
completely deregulated global market society, inspired by the laissez-faire ideology of 
the Chicago School of economists (Harvey, 2007; Marwick, 2013). But neoliberalism 
extended far beyond specific economic policies to, in David Harvey’s (2005) words, 
“become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought 
to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us 
interpret, live in, and understand the world” (p. 3). Neoliberalism’s individualistic market 
logic infiltrated everyday life, becoming “a form of governmentality,” a “technique that 
determines the strategies available for people to use in interpersonal relationships and 
self-expression” (Marwick, 2014, p. 12). Citing Foucault, Alice Marwick argues that 
neoliberal governance unfolds not through top-down regulation, but through the creation 
and popularization of “technologies of the self” (p. 13), from therapy and self-help books 
to fitness tracking devices and personal social media profiles, that encourage voluntary 
self-regulation in accordance with marketplace ideals. Neoliberal discourse constructs the 
myth of the rational and self-interested economic actor with complete control over and, in 
turn, responsibility for her own life (Phipps, 2014). In this formula, structural inequalities 
are reconstructed as personal shortcomings that can be resolved through self-discipline. 
As Alison Phipps (2014) explains, within the neoliberal framework, “Success is 
measured by individuals' capacity for self-care via the market, and those who do not 
achieve their potential are viewed as failures rather than as victims of oppressive social 
structures” (n.p.). Neoliberalism, in other words, privileges private, corporate solutions to 
social and structural problems, obfuscating systems of power and, consequently, making 
social movements seem obsolete. 
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While neoliberal discourse and policies pose major obstacles for any downwardly 
redistributive social movement, there exists an especially powerful resonance between 
postfeminism and neoliberalism (Gill & Scharff, 2011). Both emphasize individualism, 
choice, and agency at the expense of vocabularies for talking about social welfare, 
structural inequities, and collective politics (Gill, 2007; Gill & Scharff, 2011; Harvey, 
2007; Marwick, 2013; McRobbie, 2004, 2008; Phipps, 2014; Tasker and Negra, 2007). 
And, in each case, media play a major role in the individualization of collective politics 
and action; both require media representations that reify their discourses of self-
responsibility and willing subjects who practice self-governance through the countless 
technologies of the self available in the marketplace (Gill, 2007; Marwick, 2013; 
McRobbie, 2004, 2008; Ouellette, 2008). 
Feminist scholars have accounted for the relationship between neoliberalism and 
postfeminism in two ways.  
Some argue that the postfeminist sensibility is part and parcel of neoliberalism 
(Gill & Scharff, 2011; McRobbie, 2009). To a much greater extent than men, neoliberal 
media texts call on women to regulate and transform the self. For these scholars, 
“neoliberalism is always already gendered” and “women are constructed as its ideal 
subjects” (Gill, 2008, p. 164).  
But others have also questioned whether the second-wave values of personal 
empowerment and economic mobility for women left U.S. feminism ripe for neoliberal 
cooptation. Writing for The Guardian in 2013, Nancy Fraser observed that, “In a cruel 
twist of fate, the movement for women’s liberation has become entangled in a dangerous 
liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society.” U.S. feminism has, in 
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Fraser’s words, become “capitalism’s handmaiden,” its Civil Rights Era emphasis on “the 
personal as political” coopted and corrupted to support a “liberal-individualist scenario.” 
To make matters worse, Fraser argues, feminists have done this to themselves, pushing a 
platform focused on identity politics that dovetailed all too nicely with neoliberalism’s 
focus on individual freedoms, self-empowerment, and personal responsibility at the cost 
of collective rights, coalitional solidarity, direct action, and structural analyses of power. 
Others have turned a similarly critical eye onto feminist theory, questioning whether 
academic feminism compounded neoliberalism’s depoliticization of feminist rhetoric and 
ideas to produce the postfeminist sensibility. McRobbie (2004) argues that 
neoliberalism’s selective cooptation of feminist ideas was enabled in part by feminist 
theory’s “dismantling of itself” (p. 20) throughout the 1990s in response to debates 
surrounding the field’s claims to represent women’s experiences. This dismantling was 
an important political project; postcolonial and critical race scholars led the field toward 
more reflexive feminist knowledge projects that troubled essentializing notions of 
womanhood and instead sought to develop contextual understandings of power, 
subjectivity, and the body. But this shift toward locating oppression and, in turn, 
resistance in more dispersed sites, such as everyday discourse and individual 
performances, rather than universal phenomena fit neatly within the neoliberal narrative 
of personal choice and individualism. Feminist theory’s new emphasis on subjectivity 
combined with second-wave identity politics left feminist movements especially 
vulnerable to neoliberal cooptation.  
From the 1980s through the early 2000s, the parallel rise of postfeminism and 
neoliberalism pushed a flattened, one-dimensional, individualistic understanding of 
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agency into hegemonic status, erasing from view the systems of power that structure 
everyday life and making collective action seem unnecessary. Theorists of postfeminism 
describe this era as an impasse for feminist activists; late capitalism had so artfully 
adapted to the diffusion of feminist values and rhetoric that the possibility for widespread 
social, political, and cultural transformations informed by feminist politics appeared 
increasingly improbable. In step with the rise of neoliberal philosophy since the 1980s, 
the Left in the U.S. has witnessed a systematic retraction of the policy gains of previous 
generations, along with the decline of radical collectives, presses, publications, and 
bookstores, and with them, their progressive ideals (Eichhorn, 2014). Combined with 
growing internal discord over the marginalization of women of color, queer women, and 
working-class women within feminist movements, these conditions made feminist work 
especially precarious (Reger, 2012).  
This, McRobbie (2004) argues, was the “undoing of feminism” (p. 255).  
Media and the Popularization of Feminism 
But, by the mid-2010s, the tide of popular culture shifted. In the words of Andi 
Zeisler (2016), founder of feminist outlet Bitch Media, “feminism got cool” (p. x). Across 
the U.S. media landscape, the repudiation of the postfeminist sensibility gave way to 
celebration, and a new era of “popular feminism” began (Banet-Weiser, 2015b, 2018a, 
2018b). 
The shift from postfeminism to popular feminism reached a fever pitch in August 
2014. More than eight million viewers watched Beyoncé close out the MTV Video Music 
Awards while standing defiantly in front of a giant screen emblazoned with the word 
“FEMINIST.” Her girl power anthem “Flawless,” which samples a recording of Nigerian 
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author Chimimanda Ngozi Adichie paraphrasing a dictionary definition of “feminism,” 
blared in the background. But while she created a breathtaking moment in feminist media 
history, Beyoncé was not the only celebrity aligning herself with the feminist label. A 
number of other stars “came out” as feminists, including Miley Cyrus, Lady Gaga, Lorde, 
Lena Dunham, Ellen Page, Emma Watson, and even Taylor Swift, who had previously 
distanced herself from the “f-word,” and media outlets began curating lists of “top” 
celebrity feminists.  
This “celebrity feminism” emerged against the backdrop of an undeniably 
feminist “moment” in U.S. media. 2013 and 2014 saw the rise of “hashtag feminism” 
through some of the first feminist hashtag campaigns, including #YesAllWomen, 
#NotYourAsianSidekick, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, #WhyIStayed, 
#BringBackOurGirls, #YouOkSis, and #RapeCultureIsWhen, among others. During 
those same years, feminist nonprofit The Representation Project launched the 
#NotBuyingIt campaign and mobile app, inviting Super Bowl viewers to take to Twitter, 
call out the big game’s traditionally sexist commercials, and harness the power of women 
consumers through threats of brand boycotts (Clark, 2014). Their efforts went viral, 
ushering in a new era of what commentators have alternatively referred to as 
“femvertising,” “empowertising,” or “go-girl marketing” (Ciambriello, 2014; Zeisler, 
2016; Zmuda & Diaz, 2014). In 2015, women’s lifestyle company SheKnows Media 
launched their annual Femvertising Awards and, from Always feminine hygiene products 
to Bud Light beer, socially conscious advertisements featuring positive representations of 
women and girls breaking down gender roles and barriers became the new norm 
(SheKnows Media, 2018). Meanwhile, successful female entrepreneurs, like Facebook 
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Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg and Nasty Gal founder Sophia Amoruso, 
penned best-selling feminist books, drawing on their own life experiences to advise 
women on how to Lean In and become a #Girlboss. And while gender gaps still plagued 
the television and film industries, these years also brought an increase in the presence of 
trans women in popular culture through television series like Transparent, Orange is the 
New Black , and I am Cait and the activism of celebrity actors and advocates like Laverne 
Cox and Janet Mock. Feminist ideas and rhetoric popped up in even the most unexpected 
places. Women’s magazines, such as Cosmopolitan, Elle, and InStyle, shifted away from 
the genre’s traditional representations of gender and sexuality and started running 
feminist content (Groetzinger, 2016). Even Playboy, the men’s “lifestyle” magazine 
known for its pornographic centerfolds and long derided by feminists, (temporarily) 
stopped printing nude photos and began publishing stories with headlines like, “You 
Can’t Have Feminist Liberation Without Choice.” 
These are just a fraction of the media sites, figures, products, and trends that have 
explicitly embraced feminism in recent years. By 2017, Merriam-Webster declared 
“feminism” its “Word of the Year,” citing the Women’s March and the #MeToo 
movement alongside film and television offerings like the Wonder Woman reboot and 
The Handmaid’s Tale as evidence for the term’s comeback. Suddenly, in a clear reversal 
of Reger’s (2012) prognosis, feminism, with a big, capital “F,” was everywhere, loud, 
proud, and clear-as-day.  
It is difficult to isolate any one variable that triggered feminism’s ascent in U.S. 
media culture. But while the exact cause of feminism’s popularization remains unknown, 
as feminist blogger Jessica Valenti (2014a) argues, one thing is for certain: “The zeitgeist 
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is irrefutably feminist.” We are living in a moment that Banet-Weiser and Laura 
Portwood-Stacer (2017) describe as “decidedly not postfeminist” (p. 886). Rather than 
casting feminism as unnecessary or outmoded, advertisers, celebrities, and corporate 
leaders have explicitly adopted the feminist label and its associated rhetoric of 
empowerment. In a dramatic shift from the “backlash media” (Faludi, 1991, p. 94) of the 
postfeminist era, the current media landscape has given feminism a “new luminosity in 
popular culture” (Gill, 2016, p. 614). As Banet-Weiser and Portwood-Stacer (2017) put 
it, “For us as feminist media scholars, feminism has always been a useful lens through 
which to understand popular culture. However, we are now living in a moment when 
feminism has undeniably become popular culture” (p. 884). 
Media and the Traffic in Feminism  
The popularization of feminism through its commercial and digital media 
diffusion has made feminism accessible and even admired, a remarkable feat when 
compared with the postfeminist sensibility that infused media markets in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Feminism’s unprecedented degree of visibility has offered gender justice 
activists a variety of new political opportunities and affordances, as feminist ideas and 
rhetoric diffuse through mainstream media outlets and reach wider audiences than ever 
before.  
Feminism’s hypervisibility, however, has also created new challenges for feminist 
activists. Like the postfeminist sensibility, popular feminism has become doubly 
entangled in both the resurgence and the undermining of feminist collective politics.  
For one, popular feminism’s emphases on identity, representation, and 
empowerment are easily coopted and commodified to support neoliberal values. Banet-
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Weiser and Portwood-Stacer (2017) argue that “the terrain of popular feminism is 
currently occupied in large part by the individualist-feminism of neoliberal consumer 
culture” (p. 884). The most popular forms of feminist media are inflected with a 
neoliberal discourse of self-improvement and individual choice; from the inspirational 
self-care messages that circulate on social media to feminist-branded clothing to the girl 
power marketing of femvertisements, popular feminism often celebrates feminism in 
name only while simultaneously upholding marketplace values. Zeisler (2016) argues 
that these manifestations of popular feminism, however alluring they may be for activists 
who could once only imagine a culture that celebrates feminism, are merely “facsimiles” 
of feminist “ideas, objects, and narratives that are, on closer inspection, almost 
exclusively about personal identity and consumption” (p. 74). This “marketplace 
feminism” (Zeisler, 2016, p. xiii) is necessarily decoupled from analyses of structural 
inequities, which would undermine the capitalist systems of exchange that enable it to 
exist. The most popular forms of feminism only go so far as to recognize that feminism is 
necessary and that inequities exists, but stop short of actually disrupting the systems of 
oppression that justify feminist politics in the first place, instead pointing to consumption 
and the marketplace as solutions to social injustices (Banet-Weiser & Portwood-Stacer, 
2017). Drawing on Gayle Rubin’s (1997) analysis of the “traffic in women” within 
capitalism, Banet-Weiser and Portwood-Stacer (2017) refer to this phenomenon as the 
“traffic in feminism” (p. 886); just as capitalism depends upon and reproduces gendered 
oppression, today, capitalism depends upon and reproduces a particular version of 
feminism that supports individualist marketplace values. Popular feminism enables the 
gendered, racial, sexual, and economic oppressions that undergird capitalism by linking 
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empowerment with consumption and work on the self, masking persistent inequities, and 
creating the illusion that we live in a feminist society (Banet-Weiser, 2015b; Banet-
Weiser & Portwood-Stacer, 2017; Gill, 2016; Zeisler, 2016). The traffic in feminism 
produces and reproduces a more palatable, depoliticized version of feminist ideas and 
rhetoric, shoring up neoliberal ideologies and benefitting only those most privileged 
“feminists” — the celebrities, CEOs, and marketers — best positioned to profit from 
marketplace visibility (Banet-Weiser & Portwood-Stacer, 2017). 
Second and relatedly, popular feminism’s linking of empowerment to 
consumption and choice implies that feminism is an individual enterprise, one open to 
interpretation and uncommitted to a particular political agenda. Perhaps nowhere does 
this dynamic play out more clearly than in the media frenzy over celebrity feminism. 
Entertainment media’s obsession with exposing which actors and pop artists identify as 
feminists and which do not has produced a full roster of celebrity activists. What being a 
“feminist” actually means, however, has gotten lost in the f-word’s recent surge in 
popularity, leaving feminism to be treated as a label rather than an action, a movement, or 
a set of values (Valenti, 2014b). This has opened the door for celebrities and politicians 
whose beliefs and platforms contradict basic feminist ideals, including Sarah Palin and 
Ivanka Trump, to brand themselves as feminists (Filipovic, 2017; Valenti, 2014b). 
Celebrity feminism and other forms of popular feminism make the movement more 
accessible to a broader base, offering what Roxane Gay (2014) has called a “gateway” to 
feminist politics for the otherwise uninitiated; the importance of these mainstream 
engagements with the rhetoric of social justice movements should not be discounted. 
However, when feminism is boiled down to a label, a sound bite, or a headline, it is left, 
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in Gill’s (2016) words, “contentless” (p. 618), an identity that can be taken on or off like 
a trendy t-shirt, unencumbered by the weight of a specific set of politics or positions. As 
such, whether it takes the form of Beyoncé putting the word FEMINIST in lights on the 
VMA’s stage or Super Bowl advertisers promoting girl power, popular feminism is not 
equipped to confront ongoing systemic inequities. Moreover, the large amount of media 
attention given to identifying as a feminist rather than engaging in feminism makes 
activism appear as easy as proclaiming yourself an activist. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
popular feminism operates within an “economy of visibility” (Banet-Weiser, 2015a, 
2018a, 2018b), in which the representation of feminism in the marketplace, not feminist 
collective action, is positioned as the solution to structural imbalances of power.  
Third and finally, popular feminism has been met in equal measure with “popular 
misogyny,” a “misogynistic political and economic culture, where rape culture is 
normative, violent threats against women are validated, and rights of the body for women 
are either under threat or being formally retracted” (Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016, p. 
172). The hypervisibility of feminist cultures, Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) argue, 
has triggered an anti-feminist backlash, ushering in “a new era of the gender wars” (p. 
171). Discussed at length in Chapter 4, this backlash is especially rampant on social 
media platforms, where women face high levels of sexual harassment, death and rape 
threats, and doxxing attacks (Duggan, 2017). The same digital platforms feminists have 
used to launch viral campaigns against sexual violence have also been complicit in the 
perpetuation of violent harassment against feminist activists, as misogynist and racist 
users often face few consequences for their actions. Offline, the backlash of popular 
misogyny has also taken the form of attacks on the policy gains of previous feminist 
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generations under the Trump administration, including access to safe abortions and 
reproductive healthcare, anti-domestic violence programs, and workplace discrimination 
laws (Planned Parenthood Action Fund, 2017). Despite the veneer of popular feminism, 
whose media takeover creates the perception that feminist values have won the day, 
women’s rights and the rights of marginalized communities are have never been more at 
risk.  
While we are living in a moment that is “decidedly not postfeminist” (Banet-
Weiser & Portwood-Stacer, 2017, p. 886), the challenges popular feminism presents to 
activists are similar to those of postfeminism: neoliberal commodification and cooptation, 
depoliticized individualism, antifeminist backlash. There remains, however, a key 
difference between the postfeminist era and the current context of popular feminism. The 
undeniable commercial media market for explicitly feminist content combined with the 
sociotechnical affordances of digital media platforms have enabled feminist activists to 
mobilize highly visible campaigns, reach new audiences, amplify hitherto ignored voices, 
and build their own virtual communities, all with little or no resources. To be sure, to 
borrow Banet-Weiser’s (2012) terminology from her work on branding, it is important 
that both scholars and activists remain critically aware of the “politics of ambivalence” 
(p. 211) that lurk beneath the surface of popular feminist media content. The hashtag 
campaign or girl-power advertisement might empower a user to express herself or 
introduce a young viewer to feminist ideas, but it also supports a capitalist system of 
exchange and marketplace individualism, exploitative ideologies that run counter to 
feminist collective politics. Within the “double entanglement” of ambivalence, however, 
lies a “generative potential” (p. 221), the possibility for creative resistance and subversive 
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meaning-making even as capitalist white male supremacy works to subsume it, a reason, 
I argue in the next section, to hope.  
Media and the Redoing of Feminism 
At the same time that the parallel forces of neoliberalism and postfeminism 
conspired to “undo” U.S. feminism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a 
new generation of feminist activists began making their own media to “redo” (Baer, 
2016, p. 29) feminism for this precarious political climate. Whether in print or online, I 
refer to this emerging feminist media practice as networked feminism because its 
practitioners adapt the social and technical affordances of a particular medium to connect 
activists and assemble protest actions without the resources of a formally structured 
movement organization.  
Their efforts were motivated by two factors.  
The first involves the political climate. Following Couldry’s (2010, 2012) 
definition of media as practice, the origins of networked feminism emerged in part from 
the conventions, challenges, and needs of practitioners’ context. Just as the 
underrepresentation of second-wave politics and actions led Civil Rights-era feminists to 
develop a feminist underground press, this generation of feminists turned toward media 
to fill the void of discursive spaces for feminism in the U.S. in the wake of neoliberalism 
and to correct postfeminist media representations of feminism as unnecessary or 
outmoded.  
The second, and more important, factor involves contemporary feminists’ 
political values.  
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Dissatisfied with the second wave’s centering of white women, marginalization of 
women of color, and essentializing conceptualization of womanhood and women’s 
condition, this generation of feminists drew on critiques authored by feminists of color to 
move toward more intersectional gender justice platforms. Writing in 1989, legal scholar 
Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality to capture the 
“multidimensionality” (p. 139) of gender and to critique the “single-axis framework” (p. 
139) for interpreting identity and building movement communities. Intersectionality 
posits that gender, race, class, sexuality, and other identity categories are overlapping, 
mutually constitutive, and inseparable. Any one person's lived identity cannot be fully 
understood through the lens of one of these categories alone. Consequently, systems of 
oppression rooted in these identity categories also interlock and reinforce one another, 
creating what Patricia Hill Collins (2000) calls a “matrix of domination” (p. 18). An 
intersectional approach to analyzing privilege and oppression rejects one-dimensional 
views of power and instead aims to account for differences and inequities between and 
within groups. Intersectionality, however, is not just a theoretical tool for describing and 
analyzing oppression. Developed within the context of social justice struggles, 
intersectionality is an activist praxis for building inclusive movements (May, 2015). 
Crenshaw’s (1989, 1991) theory of intersectionality directs feminists to evaluate and 
redress organizing practices (e.g., when and where meetings are held, who takes on 
leadership positions) and political visions (e.g., what problems and solutions are 
considered “feminist” ones, whose voices and concerns are prioritized) that collude with 
systems of oppression by excluding those who are of color, queer, and/or poor.  
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In the nearly thirty years since Crenshaw (1989) defined the term, 
intersectionality has become the “gold standard” (Nash, 2008, p. 2) within both academic 
disciplines and activist communities for analyzing oppression and practicing inclusive 
politics. Networked feminism, which unfolds through media campaigns rather than 
formally structured and thereby potentially exclusive organizations, offers a more 
inclusive, participatory mode of feminist organizing and protest (Brown, Ray, Summers, 
& Fraistat, 2017; Daniels, 2016; Kendall, 2013; Kuo, 2016; Loza, 2014; Rodino-
Colocino, 2014; Tynes, Schuschke, & Noble, 2016).  
What scholars have alternatively referred to as the “resurgence,” “reclaiming,” 
“renewing,” and even “rebranding” of feminism (Baer, 2015; Dean & Aune, 2015; 
Evans, 2015; Lewis & Marine, 2015; Payne, 2012; Thornham & Weissmann 2013) as an 
intersectional, modern, and sorely needed movement began quietly at first, tucked 
between the pages of young feminists’ handcrafted zines, before exploding into a vibrant 
web of feminist blogs, message boards, online communities, and more.  
During the 1980s ascent of neoliberalism and decline of leftist politics, disaffected 
youth began building alternatives spaces that offered what Stephen Duncombe (2008) 
describes as “a way of understanding and acting in the world that operates with different 
rules and upon different values than those of consumer-capitalism” (p. 10). It is within 
this context that punk zines, descended from the science fiction “fanzines” of the 1930s 
and the underground press of the 1960s and 1970s, emerged (Duncombe, 2008). While 
the genre eludes precise definition, Duncombe identifies several key features of zines: 
“zines are noncommercial, nonprofessional, small-circulation magazines which their 
creators produce, publish, and distribute by themselves” (p. 11). Throughout the 1980s 
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and early 1990s, their production, circulation, and exchange cultivated the network ties of 
a counterculture where alternative politics ruled.  
The punk scene at the center of this alternative underground culture, however, 
was male-dominated; women were not viewed as legitimate contributors to the traditional 
masculine space and were often sidelined, their voices marginalized and their activist 
labor made invisible (Piepmeier, 2009). Confronted with a variety of factors – a political 
climate where collective action was no longer seen as viable but severe inequalities 
persisted, a feminist movement that seemed too distant and exclusive, an alternative arena 
that, like the New Left and the abolition movement before it, claimed to challenge power 
dynamics and yet did not fully recognize the contributions and concerns of women – 
young women drew on the long tradition of alternative media-making among U.S. 
feminist movements and began creating their own zines (Piepmeier, 2009). Starting in the 
Pacific Northwest and spreading through different cities across the country, the Riot Grrrl 
movement exploded against the backdrop of an emerging “third-wave” feminism that 
emphasized the politics of everyday life and identified culture as a site of both oppression 
and resistance (Duncombe, 2008; Piepmeier, 2009). Like zinesters within the broader 
punk scene, grrrl zinesters’ handmade publications followed a do-it-yourself ethics; their 
zines were printed cheaply, poached from commercial print outlets, exchanged at low 
cost or free of charge, created activist networks, and often focused on music, artists, 
celebrities, or media. Unlike other zine genres, however, grrrl zines also served as 
important sites for feminist theory-building and knowledge production for a cohort of 
activists that was largely dissatisfied with their antecedents’ treatment of femininity, 
sexuality, and difference across the overlapping intersections of identity (Duncombe, 
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2008; Eichhorn, 2014; Piepmeier, 2009). Drawing on their everyday, personal 
experiences, third-wave media-makers explored identity and oppression, talked back to 
mainstream media, meditated on both the burdens and the pleasures of gender 
performance, and reimagined feminism for a new generation. 
Commercial access to the internet emerged precisely at the moment that legacy 
feminist media institutions were struggling to survive and young feminists were eagerly 
developing alternative media platforms from which to theorize their experiences, share 
knowledge, deconstruct popular discourse, and build communities while also including as 
many voices as possible. Digital media’s destabilization of the producer/consumer binary 
and participatory nature paralleled the do-it-yourself ethos and intersectional politics of 
the third-wave generation (Lievrouw, 2011). Some zinesters created online distros 
(distributors) for their print zines, while others produced “ezines,” a genre that closely 
mirrored grrrl zines and laid the groundwork for feminist bloggers (Piepmeier, 2009). By 
the early 2000s, the feminist blogosphere was a thriving network composed of countless 
nodes and growing every day, as the work of pioneering sites like TheFBomb.org, 
Feministing.com, Feministe.us, CrunkFeministCollective.com, Scarleteen.com, 
Shakesville.com, among others, inspired readers to take part.  
This budding feminist blogosphere helped mobilize one of, if not the, earliest 
instances of networked feminist activism. The 1997 Million Woman March in 
Philadelphia, the original namesake of the Women’s March on Washington, is among the 
largest protest marches in U.S. history. Like the Women’s March, the Million Woman 
March was not organized by high-profile leaders or big-name organizations, but by two 
local women, Phile Chionesu and Asia Coney, who found their particular concerns as 
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black women unrepresented in either anti-racist or feminist movements (Everett, 2004). 
Without the support or resources of a movement organization, Chionesu and Coney 
created their own network of websites to promote the event and its mission statement. 
Women of color in homes and offices across the country printed the websites’ pages to 
share with computerless friends and family members (Everett, 2004). On October 25, 
1997, their digitally networked grassroots efforts brought, by some estimates, 1.5 million 
people to the Benjamin Franklin Parkway to demand social, political, and economic 
empowerment for black women, their families, and their communities (Everett, 2004).  
In the two decades between the Million Woman March and the Women’s March 
on Washington, networked feminism flourished, with activists developing new protest 
forms as new platforms became available. Feminist bloggers initiated the dialogues that 
led to the 2011 international SlutWalk movement and to the recent rise in activism 
against sexual violence on college campuses and (Mendes, 2015). Social media users 
developed hashtag feminism, a practice I discuss in Chapter 3, pairing viral campaigns 
with traditional protest actions like street protests and boycotts (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015; 
Clark, 2014). At present, despite the reality of President Donald Trump, digitally 
coordinated feminist protest against the new administration thrives in multiple modalities 
— in the streets (Merlan, 2016), across hashtagged discussions (Levit, 2016), over 
congressional phone lines (Killough, 2017), and through online fundraising campaigns 
(Ryan, 2016). Beyond direct action, networked feminism has created countless spaces for 
feminist dialogue and critique, which have spilled over into mainstream commercial 
media. The success of the feminist blogosphere, for example, demonstrated a demand for 
feminist content, leading mainstream outlets to hire feminist voices and cover feminist 
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topics (Groetzinger, 2016; Keller, 2016). Today, several bloggers responsible for the 
early growth of the feminist blogosphere, including Jessica Valenti (Feministing), Jill 
Filipovic (Feministe), and Brittney Cooper (Crunk Feminist Collective) have landed gigs 
at commercial media outlets the likes of The Guardian, Cosmopolitan, and Salon, 
suggesting that these early feminist bloggers’ early and energetic adoption of the internet 
played a sizable role in the popularization of feminism discussed in the previous sections. 
And while online platforms continue to inspire new, highly visible forms of resistance, 
feminists have also used digital networks to facilitate older tactics for internal 
community-building, including the production and circulation of paper-based zines and 
the cultivation of safe spaces, both of which I discuss in Chapter 4. 
Like feminism more generally, networked feminism is complex, multiple, diverse, 
and often, messy, contradictory, and filled with inner tensions. Any attempt to trace its 
growth over time is bound to be incomplete and to oversimplify its history and nature. 
But while it may be too expansive to define or historicize with exact precision, one thing 
remains certain — networked feminist activism and discourse are, against seemingly all 
odds, thriving.  
Methods, Data, and Theoretical Resources 
If the vitality of feminist politics and activism are, as the scholarship reviewed 
above suggests, bound up with the growth of networked feminism, then identifying and 
meditating on shared struggles, successes, and tactics across networked feminist projects 
is key to building stronger feminist movements over time. This is where academic 
researchers studying feminist social movements and their media practices can directly 
support feminist activists, who, embedded in the daily struggle of mobilizing and 
sustaining protest actions and movement communities, do not often have the time or 
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ability to take a step back and reflect on common threads that cut across the broad 
spectrum of U.S. feminist activism. 
To move toward a theory of networked feminism as a media praxis, I consider 
several practitioner-focused questions in this chapter: how are U.S. feminists using media 
to develop an activist praxis uniquely suited to the contemporary moment? What are 
feminists doing with media? How do they imagine the role media play in feminist 
politics? And what are some of the affordances and limitations of their media practices? 
While I begin to address these questions here, they also motivate the project as a whole. 
The following two chapters continue to pursue this line of inquiry within the specific 
contexts of feminist visibility campaigns and feminist communities. The primary goal of 
this chapter is to provide a robust description and definition, rooted in practitioners’ 
perspectives, of the activist praxis behind networked feminism. The other chapters offer 
analyses of this praxis in action, with special attention to the ways in which activists 
navigate the double entanglements of do-it-ourselves feminism’s networked organizing 
logic. 
Following Couldry’s (2010, 2012) call to treat media as practices requiring 
sociological exploration, I explore these questions through the constructivist grounded 
theory approach outlined in the Introduction. This approach allows the researcher to 
generate theory from data and, importantly for media sociology, center the voices of the 
practitioners under study. At the same time, it recognizes the researcher’s situated 
position within a particular sociopolitical context, an existing body of research, and a set 
of theoretical frameworks or “sensitizing concepts” (Mattoni, 2014, p. 23), all of which 
inform, but do not determine, the elements illuminated through the analysis.  
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In what follows, I bring two case studies of networked feminist activism — the 
Women’s March and Philadelphia’s March to End Rape Culture (MTERC) — and a set 
of theoretical resources for theorizing power and resistance to bear on each other. 
My exploration of contemporary feminists’ media practices began with MTERC 
in 2014. I attended my first march on September 27 of that year. There, I met the 
MTERC organizers, informed them of my research, and asked if I could join their team 
as both an activist and an academic studying activism. They agreed to allow me on the 
team, or what members refer to as the MTERC “planning committee.” As a committee 
member, I participated in the planning and execution of three annual marches — 2015, 
2016, and 2017 — and, in addition to MTERC 2014, also attended each of these marches. 
At first, I took on mostly simple, day-of tasks, such as setting up tents and tables for the 
pre- and post-march rally or serving as a “marshal,” directing protestors around corners to 
follow our permitted march route, as designated by the mayor’s office. But as time went 
on, I was invited to take on larger tasks, including fundraising and reaching out to 
feminist organizations on local university campuses. By the time planning began for 
MTERC 2017, I was a member of the “core organizing committee” and worked with 
several other members to delegate tasks, oversee the execution of the event as a whole, 
and resolve disputes within the planning committee. This trajectory is typical for 
planning committee members. At any one point, about 20 people are involved in some 
capacity in planning the march. The committee’s membership is partly revolving, with 
newcomers attending MTERC meetings as their schedule and interest permits. A group 
of about ten members has consistently attended MTERC planning meetings throughout 
the past several years. Over time, these experienced members have taken on informal, 
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unelected leadership positions within various subcommittees dedicated to particular tasks, 
such as scheduling speakers, raising funds, or promoting the march on social media.  
This long-term fieldwork provided me with the data necessary to center 
practitioners’ voices in my analysis of their media practices. I was able to observe 
practitioners’ media practices and organizational decision-making and hear firsthand their 
understandings of the role media play in feminist activism, while also developing my 
own “insider knowledge” as an MTERC organizer. As a participant observer, while I can 
never step into my participants’ subject positions, I can develop the situated knowledge 
of an activist in the space under study. To develop this knowledge, I attended monthly 
MTERC planning meetings, typically held at local community centers and, between 
meetings, I participated in committee discussions via email, a private committee 
Facebook group, and later, a chatroom hosted on Slack, a free-to-use, browser-based 
application for group project management. I also worked on independent MTERC-related 
tasks between meetings. While, given the periodic nature of the group’s meetings, my 
fieldwork was sporadic, I estimate that I spent at least 120 hours “in the field.” At 
meetings, I wrote down “jottings,” which I later typed up and formalized. I “exited the 
field” immediately following MTERC 2017. To supplement my participant observations, 
I also archived and analyzed media associated with MTERC, including activist-produced 
media and news coverage of the protest. Using the inductive, constructivist approach to 
grounded theory described above and outlined in the Introduction, I coded these materials 
for emergent themes. 
In the early stages of my ethnographic observations, the networked nature of 
MTERC quickly became apparent. The MTERC team lacked the institutional structure 
9898 
and finances of a formal organization and instead consistently relied on volunteer labor, 
donated funds, cheap resources and supplies, and free-to-use media platforms to sustain 
their coalition and launch the annual protest. Once I observed this pattern within 
MTERC, I began noticing it elsewhere. While this may be expected of a relatively small, 
local, grassroots initiative, the same makeshift creativity seemed to characterize much 
larger feminist protest actions. For example, feminist hashtag campaigns, the earliest of 
which were taking off around the same time I began my fieldwork, typically start with a 
single actor, unaffiliated with any particular movement or organization, posting a 
message with a hashtag on Twitter, which later explodes into a global expression of 
dissent. When plans for the Women’s March got off the ground following Trump’s 
election in November 2016, I recognized the same elements at play: a loose network of 
activists working without institutional backing used social media platforms to spread the 
word and mobilize local protests around the world.  
In this chapter, I pair MTERC with the Women’s March, two street protest 
actions that are similar in form but different size and reach, to study how this networked 
organizing logic unfolds at different scales. My goal is to isolate, in the context of 
networked feminism, what Couldry (2012) “the specific regularities in our actions related 
to media and the regularities of context and resources that make certain types of media-
related actions possible or impossible, likely or unlikely” (p. 78). In other words, by 
comparing these two case studies, I aim to identify commonalities in the practice of 
networked feminism across the spectrum of local and translocal campaigns and in the 
contexts of its practitioners, so as to begin drawing connections between contemporary 
feminists’ media tactics and their political goals.  
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While not ethnographic, my methodological approach for studying the Women’s 
March also centered practitioners’ voices. I was unable to gain access to either the 
planning committee behind the local Women’s March in Philadelphia or what came to be 
known as the “National Committee” behind the original Women’s March on Washington 
and its global expansion. Instead, I developed my own archive of Women’s March-
related media, paying particular attention to news coverage that included interviews with 
participants and organizers; editorials, blog posts, and tweets in which participants and 
organizers reflected on or critiqued the marches; and statements published by the 
National Committee on their website (www.womensmarch.com) and various social 
media accounts. I also attended the Women’s March on Philadelphia and recorded 
observations through photos, videos, and field notes. As with MTERC, I coded these 
materials for emergent themes. 
I went on to compare the themes found in both studies. At this stage, a number of 
theoretical resources informed my analysis. Given that my object of analysis is a 
specifically activist media praxis, I drew on the analytics for interpreting media as 
political practices outlined in the Introduction. These theoretical resources help illuminate 
the two elements at the heart of political activism: power — how practitioners imagine 
both the systems of power against which they organize and the forms of empowerment 
they seek — and resistance — how, with this understanding of power in mind, 
practitioners developed tactics for combating oppression and achieving empowerment. 
Following this approach, I deploy Foucault’s (1991) concept of discourse to parse U.S. 
feminists’ longstanding understanding of politics, power, and oppression as deeply 
personal matters embedded not just in the walls of state institutions, but within everyday 
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life. I then pair de Certeau’s (1984) notion of tactics with Collins’ (2000) concept of 
rearticulation to illuminate how resistant feminist media practices might create change at 
both the individual and structural levels within this everyday, everywhere system of 
power. Together, this theoretical framework brings into view a feminist activist praxis, 
which in turn helps highlight shared concerns, methods, struggles, and successes between 
my two case studies and, as I argue, across feminist movements more generally. 
Findings and Discussion 
Do-it-Ourselves Feminism, an Activist Media Praxis 
When studied side-by-side, the global Women’s March movement and 
Philadelphia’s local March to End Rape Culture appear very different in scale, media 
attention, and impact. Upon closer inspection, however, an array of similarities connect 
the organizational logic behind both protest events. The Women’s March and MTERC 
both share a common media praxis, a recursive combination of political values and media 
tactics, that reflects contemporary feminists’ goals. I call this praxis do-it-ourselves 
feminism (DIOF). In this section, drawing on observations from and media related to both 
protests, I describe the core features of DIOF, laying the groundwork for later chapters, 
which will explore how activists navigate the affordances and limitations of this praxis 
within particular contexts.  
Do-it-ourselves feminism is everyday, working from a conceptualization of power 
as personal and, instead of forming highly structured organizations, appropriating the 
media platforms we use on a daily basis to launch protest actions. The everyday quality 
of DIOF makes it a fairly accessible, participatory mode of activism, open to anyone 
with the time, interest, and literacy in the digital tools that power it and personalizable 
according to participants’ experiences and concerns. This stands in stark contrast with the 
101101 
campaigns of previous generations, whose messages were framed and filtered by 
movement organization leaders and gatekeepers. This shift toward networked activism 
emerges from contemporary feminists’ values and concerns. DIOF’s emphasis on 
personal expressions networked through collective actions enables feminists to make the 
personal political and its participatory nature paves the way toward more intersectional 
organizing practices. But while these features help feminist activists achieve their 
particular goals, DIOF’s turn away from formal structures and centralized messaging also 
leaves feminist movements precarious, lacking the organizational capacity to respond to 
internal and external challenges. DIOF, however, is also a reflexive praxis that entails 
constant ongoing reflection and self-critique. Feminist activists are not only aware of 
their own precarity; they are actively creating strategies for coping with the shortcomings 
of networked activism while also taking advantage of the affordances that come with 
engaging in resistance on their own terms. Do-it-ourselves feminism is a difficult praxis, 
one that requires a great deal of time, energy, and creativity. But the activists behind both 
the Women’s March and the March to End Rape Culture know that, like any DIY project, 
crafting movements in line with their values takes a lot of hard work, even more 
perseverance, and a fair share of audacity. 
DIOF is Everyday 
A defining feature of do-it-ourselves feminism is its everydayness. This emphasis 
on the everyday is twofold: DIOF practitioners politicize everyday life and appropriate 
everyday media tools and resources to mobilize political actions.  
The activists behind both the Women’s March and the March to End Rape 
Culture work from a conceptualization of power as diffuse, inescapable, everyday, 
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everywhere — suffused through all aspects of personal life. Their political visions extend 
what Young (1997) describes as U.S. feminists’ “longstanding focus on domination and 
resistance at the level of daily life” (p. 14), not just centralized in state institutions, as 
captured in the second-wave slogan, the personal is political. This approach to 
understanding power parallels Foucault’s (1991) concept of disciplinary power; whereas 
sovereign power involves a top-down model of control in which a single authority wields 
absolute power over the population through physical coercion, disciplinary power is 
enacted through a bottom-up model of control in which power is dispersed throughout the 
social fabric and enacted between people on a micro-social level through the everyday 
performance and enforcement of behavioral norms. According to Foucault, discourse, 
dominant interpretive frameworks for thinking, taking about, and responding to particular 
topics, is the primary vehicle for the diffusion and wide acceptance of a particular set of 
norms at a given time and place. In her work on black feminist thought, Collins (2000) 
describes disciplinary power manifesting as a discursive “matrix of domination” (p. 18), a 
composite of intersecting oppressions along multiple axes of race, gender, sexuality, and 
class and the particular sociopolitical practices, from government policies to mass media 
imagery, used to maintain those oppressions at a given point in history. Contemporary 
feminists continue the movement’s decades-long work of uncovering these quotidian 
experiences of oppression so that they might become sites for resistance. While 
intersectional theory may have expanded their analysis to prioritize anti-racism and 
economic justice alongside gender equality, this broad view of power remains a key 
“mobilizing thread” (Rodino-Colocino, 2014, p. 1114) cutting across generational 
“waves” of U.S. feminism.  
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This expansive conceptualization of power as an everyday phenomenon can be 
found in the Women’s March’s public platform. The Unity Principles, a guiding vision 
for the movement authored by the ad hoc “National Committee” that initially launched 
the Women’s March on Washington (2017a), offers an “ambitious, fundamental and 
comprehensive agenda” (p. 1) that links state-based rights and power with everyday life. 
The document includes demands for legislative and policy changes, including an end to 
police brutality and mass incarceration, equal pay for equal work, paid family leave, 
workplace protections for undocumented laborers, voting rights, environmental 
protections, and the passage of an Equal Rights Amendment. Its authors also argue, 
however, that these changes must take place alongside transformations in daily life. The 
Committee calls for respect for women’s right to live free from everyday forms of 
physical violence, such as domestic abuse and sexual assault. They link this freedom to 
the end of discursive forms of violence, such as oppressive “gender norms, expectations, 
and stereotypes” (p. 3) and the awarding of power “disproportionately to masculinity to 
the exclusion of others” (p. 3), both of which take away from women’s “power to control 
our bodies” (p. 3). The document goes on to also name specific everyday sites where this 
“matrix of domination” plays out, like the devaluation of women of color who work in 
the care and service industries, discrimination against non-heteronormative families and 
families of color in the housing market, and prejudice in healthcare facilities against 
individuals in the LGBTQIA community. When the Committee refers throughout the 
Unity Principles to “women’s rights,” they are pointing toward this multidimensional 
platform for social, legislative, and economic empowerment.  
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The March to End Rape Culture mobilizes around an equally expansive 
conceptualization of power, one that captures both everyday and institutional systems of 
oppression, summed up in the event’s title — rape culture. The annual event, however, 
began under a different name as SlutWalk Philadelphia, the city’s local chapter of an 
international movement sparked in January 2011, when a Canadian police officer told an 
assembly of York University students that “women should avoid dressing like sluts” in 
order to prevent rape (Mendes, 2015). Around the world, SlutWalk organizers used social 
media to call for protests, inviting participants to dress “like sluts” in order to both 
challenge the discourse surrounding sexual violence victims’ clothing choices and to 
reclaim the word “slut” to support women’s sexual agency (Mendes, 2015). In 2013, 
SlutWalk Philadelphia changed their annual protest’s name to the March to End Rape 
Culture in solidarity with women of color activists who, noting that reclaiming 
oppressive language requires a certain degree of sociocultural privilege, found 
SlutWalk’s mission to be negligent of black women’s historical experiences with norms 
regulating gender and sexuality (Murtha, 2013). The “slut” in SlutWalk, the organizers 
argued, centered the sexual agency of white cisgender women, who had privileged access 
to the term’s binary and correlative opposite — the pure virgin. The virgin/slut double 
bind did not resonate with less privileged women, whose marginalization under white 
male supremacy depends in large part on their wholesale classification as sexually amoral 
and available. “Rape culture,” the organizers explained in an open letter published on 
their Facebook page, captures a more intersectional vision of oppression beyond white 
women’s experiences: "the concept of 'rape culture' has been one that has been identified 
in many forums and communities to describe the cultural forces which conspire to make 
105105 
it so that sexual violence occurs so often, and with so few of the perpetrators being held 
accountable for their actions” (qtd. in Murtha, 2013). The bystander card organizers 
distribute to onlookers every year throughout the protest includes a litany of these 
cultural forces: “There are many different aspects of society that contribute to rape 
culture including victim blaming, rape jokes, transphobia, slut shaming, keeping 
survivors in silence, racism, the use of bodies as sexual objects, the sexualization of 
violence, lack of education around consent, intimate partner violence, homophobia, sexist 
media message, the list is never ending.” As an entry point for analyzing oppression, the 
term rape culture suggests that “rape” and “culture” are inseparable and visualizes an 
interlocking system of physical an discursive violence that manifests in both everyday 
and institutional life.  
In both sites, feminists’ understanding of power could be described as networked. 
Rather than being centralized within the state or a set of institutions, power reaches 
indefinitely in all directions across any array of interconnected nodes, the same webbed 
image of power at the heart of Foucault’s (1991) “carceral network” (p. 298) and Collins’ 
(2000) “matrix of domination” (p. 18). It follows that do-it-ourselves feminists mobilize 
networked modes of activism in a struggle to meet this everywhere, everyday networked 
form of power step for step. While contemporary feminists share their antecedents’ 
understanding of power as diffuse and personal, their networked tactics of resistance set 
them apart.  
Neither the Women’s March nor the March to End Rape Culture followed the 
trajectories of previous feminist movements or protest actions. In past generations, as 
Tufekci (2017) argues, a large, organized march or protest would typically “be seen as 
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the chief outcome of previous capacity building by a movement” (p. xiv). In “the 
networked era,” however, the march or protest “should be looked at as the initial moment 
of the movement’s bursting on the scene…the first stage in a potentially long journey” (p. 
xiv). Activists no longer require the capacities or resources of a formally structured 
movement organization, which can take months to build, to launch direct actions. Instead, 
as in the case of both the Women’s March and MTERC, a handful of people using social 
media platforms can ignite global dissent within a matter of hours. 
In January 2011, Toronto resident Heather Jarvis was browsing Facebook when 
she stumbled upon a link to an article published in The Excalibur, York University’s 
student newspaper, recounting the campus assembly on sexual violence in which a police 
officer blamed rape on women’s clothing choices (Mendes, 2015). Infuriated at the 
officer’s perpetuation of dangerous rape myths, Jarvis shared the article on her personal 
Facebook page, which in turn initiated a conversation among friends about what steps 
they could take in response (Mendes, 2015). Jarvis and her friend, Sonya Barnett, decided 
that a protest was necessary and, after one of Barnett’s colleagues joked that they should 
call their march a “slut walk,” the global movement was born (Mendes, 2015). Jarvis and 
Barnett created a website, Facebook page, and Twitter account, calling on supporters to 
join them for a “SlutWalk” from Queen’s Park in Toronto to the city’s police 
headquarters (Mendes, 2015). Several thousand protesters, some dressed provocatively to 
challenge the discourse surrounding sexual violence victims’ clothing choices, joined 
SlutWalk Toronto three months later on April 3, 2011 (Mendes, 2015). In the lead-up to 
and following the march, SlutWalk went viral; popular feminist blogs covered the event 
and word continued to spread through international news media. By the end of the year, 
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SlutWalks popped up in more than 200 cities and 40 nations, from North America to Asia 
(Carr, 2013). While the global movement eventually slowed, annual marches would 
gather in many cities for years to come, including Philadelphia.  
The first SlutWalk Philadelphia took place in August 2011 and would continue to 
convene yearly until 2013, when organizers changed the event’s name to the March to 
End Rape Culture and continued the annual protest tradition under a revamped mission. 
Over time, in the aftermath of SlutWalk’s initial bursting onto the scene, MTERC has 
gathered some of the organizational “capacities” (p. xi) Tufekci (2017) describes. While 
the planning committee’s membership changes from march to march, and even from 
meeting to meeting, a small group of steady volunteers has developed the specialized set 
of skills and knowledge required to get a public event of this scale off the ground in 
Philly. They have learned through trial and error, for example, how to manage a budget 
and track expenses, how to file a permit for a rally in a public square that includes 
performers and merchants, how to secure a certified ASL interpreter to translate 
speeches, and how to write a press release and land news coverage.  
But five years since its debut, the march remains, at its core, a networked, do-it-
ourselves effort, fueled by organizers’ commitment, makeshift creativity, and digital 
media savvy. Throughout my fieldwork, the committee would start off each planning 
year with little or no budget to cover what typically amounted to approximately $3,000 
worth of expenses, including rental fees for tables, chairs, audio equipment, and 
accessibility ramps, honorariums for speakers and artists, upfront costs for producing t-
shirts and other merchandise, and printed promotional materials. Organizers set up 
crowdfunding websites and tapped into their personal and professional connections to 
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link up with organizations and businesses willing to donate money, supplies, or venues 
for fundraising events. The same improvisational approach characterized their 
recruitment practices. A small group of about 10 people consistently showed up to march 
meetings, but a much larger team was necessary to make the event a reality. Every year, 
open calls for volunteers were spread online through Facebook and in person, at any 
relevant local event whose host granted us a bit of table space, until the committee had 
enough people-power to work through its often overwhelming to-do list. Like the broader 
SlutWalk movement, MTERC organizers also relied on social media to spread the word 
about the protest. While organizers would tape or tack printed flyers to light poles and 
cafe community boards across the city, it was undeniably their Facebook profile and 
event page, along with their official website, that drew the largest numbers to the march. 
Digital media also functioned as the planning committee’s core structure. Without an 
official membership, a formal leadership structure, or a central meeting place, the 
planning committee effectively consisted of whoever joined the MTERC listserv, private 
Facebook group, or Slack, where in-person meetings were scheduled and where 
discussions and decision-making between meetings took place. Just as MTERC mobilizes 
around a conceptualization of power as diffuse and everyday, it also mobilizes through a 
diffuse network of volunteers and supporters, connected through everyday media tools 
and platforms.  
Alongside the 1997 Million Woman March, SlutWalk in many ways pioneered 
networked feminist activism, emerging at a moment when other movements, including 
the Arab Spring, Indignados, and Occupy, were using social media platforms to reach 
global audiences. Five years later, the Women’s March would follow suit.  
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After watching Trump win the presidency, Theresa Shook, a retired grandmother 
living in Hawaii, created a Facebook event on election night, November 8, 2016, inviting 
her friends to a protest in Washington, D.C. scheduled for the day after the inauguration 
(Stein & Somashekhar, 2017). The next morning, Shook woke to more than 10,000 
RSVPs (Stein & Somashekhar, 2017). The event quickly spread to Pantsuit Nation, a 
Facebook group where Hillary Clinton’s supporters connect, share stories, and plan 
actions (Women’s March on Washington, 2016). Similar events started appearing across 
Facebook and thousands of users began making plans to attend protests in Washington 
(Women’s March on Washington, 2016). New York-based fashion designer Bob Bland, 
who recently had risen to prominence through her anti-Trump t-shirt line, proposed a 
“Million Pussy March on Washington” in a Facebook post dated November 10 (Bland, 
2016). Once Bland discovered that she was not alone in her desire to march, she worked 
with others to consolidate the events into a unified effort, represented by a single 
Facebook page (Women’s March on Washington, 2016). Initially, the protest was 
organized under the name, Million Woman March, a reference to the 1997 Philadelphia 
protest. At the time, however, Bland’s organizing team for the 2017 march was composed 
entirely of white women, leading women of color and their allies to raise concerns on 
social media about appropriation and inclusivity (Women’s March on Washington, 
2016). In response to these criticisms, Bland and her team recruited three women of color 
activists to serve as co-chairs of the march on Washington — Tamika Mallory, Carmen 
Perez, and Linda Sarsour — who, together in 2015, led a march from New York City to 
D.C., walking for 250 miles to demand an end to mass incarceration (Women’s March on 
Washington, 2016). By December, their team grew into a National Committee of nearly 
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90 organizers, intentionally recruited for their leadership within diverse communities 
(Women’s March on Washington, 2016; 2017a). The Committee changed the protest’s 
name to the Women’s March on Washington, in homage to the 1963 March on 
Washington, where Martin Luther King delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech, with the 
blessing of King’s daughter (Felsenthal, 2017). As Bland wrote in a post to the official 
Facebook event page, “Now voices including Asian and Pacific Islanders, trans women, 
Native Americans, disabled women, men, children, and many others, can be centered in 
the evolving expression of this grassroots movement” (Women’s March on Washington, 
2016).  
Word of the march spread globally through Facebook, Twitter, and the official 
Women’s March on Washington website. By the eve of Trump’s inauguration, at least 
one march was planned on all seven continents, most with a Facebook event page 
directing participants to their nearest town square and a localized Twitter hashtag 
providing updates on logistics and speaker lineups. A march even took place on 
Antarctica, where an international group of about 30 people hosted a small demonstration 
on an expedition ship off the coast of the Antarctic Peninsula (Bowerman, 2017). 
Although dispersed geographically, protesters around the world were connected through 
a digitally networked communications infrastructure established by the National 
Committee, consisting of Twitter lists, aggregated social media streams, photo and video 
archives, and a collection of hashtags active in before, during, and after Inauguration 
Day, including #WhyIMarch, #WomensMarch, and #WomensMarchGlobal (Women’s 
March on Washington, 2018a). Following the Inauguration Day, the National Committee 
would continue to grow and even formalize into an official “Board,” led by co-presidents 
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Tamika Mallory and Bob Bland, and a “National Team,” composed of nonprofit 
directors, entrepreneurs, field and communications strategists, and web developers, who 
would go on to launch other resistance projects (Women’s March on Washington, 
2018b). But it was ultimately a dispersed network of passionate activists improvising 
with social media tools, not a formally structured movement or organization, that sparked 
a global day of protest in January 2017. 
Do-it-ourselves feminists’ use of everyday media tools to resist everyday, 
everywhere systems of oppression fit de Certeau’s (1984) definition of tactics, the 
countless quotidian practices through which “individuals already caught in the nets of 
‘discipline’” (p. xiv) circumvent systems of power. For de Certeau, “strategies” are the 
domain of the powerful, “the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that 
becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a 
scientific institution) can be isolated….it is an effort to delimit one’s own place in a 
world bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other” (p. 35-36); in other words, through 
strategies, those in positions of power define the Other’s everyday resources and 
surrounding environment in order to maintain the boundaries protecting their own 
privilege. A tactic, on the other hand, “is a calculated action determined by the absence of 
a proper locus…The space of a tactic is the space of the other” (p. 37). Through everyday 
tactics, the weak “make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the 
surveillance of the proprietary powers” (p. 37). Whereas strategic operations of power 
occupy a space from which discourse can be generated and relationships delineated, 
tactical practitioners do not have the privilege to see the whole field of relationships from 
their own base of operations. Instead, “a tactic depends on time – it is always on the 
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watch for opportunities that must be seized ‘on the wing’” (p. xix). While, as Foucault 
argues, the “’grid’ of discipline” (de Certeau, 1984, p. xiv) cannot be escaped, for de 
Certeau, tactics allow the oppressed to creatively “make do” (p. 66) with the materials at 
hand.  
Do-it-ourselves feminism, in other words, is a rebellious, bottom-up, extra-
institutional practice that, like other DIY projects, subverts the producer/consumer, 
expert/amateur binaries and rejects the slow grind of bureaucracies and institutional 
politics (Ratto & Boler, 2014). Instead, its practitioners, who often have little prior 
experience in political organizing, make use of everyday networked media platforms and 
find creative ways to take action now. A similar networked sensibility can be found at 
play in other types of movements (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). For contemporary 
feminists, however, finding everyday opportunities for resistance stems from a deeply 
rooted historical emphasis on the everyday as a site of power.  
DIOF is Participatory 
The everyday quality of do-it-ourselves feminism makes the praxis available to 
anyone with the time, interest, access to, and basic literacy in the media and platforms 
that fuel it. Through its use of everyday tools like Facebook and Twitter and its emphasis 
on extra-institutional voices and engagement, DIOF shares what is often referred to as the 
“DIY ethos” (Ratto & Boler, 2014, p. 10) that underlies other creative amateur practices. 
DIOF prioritizes open accessibility and participation, regardless of one’s previous 
experiences or financial resources. Teresa Shook, the retiree whose Facebook event 
eventually grew into the Women’s March on Washington, had no prior experience in 
activist organizing, had not been politically active before Trump’s campaign, and had 
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none of the financial backing or people-power of a traditional movement organization 
(Stein, 2017). But she had a Facebook account with broad network connections extended 
through the Pantsuit Nation group, which at the time had nearly three million members 
(Collins, 2016), and some friends had taught her how to make and share a Facebook 
event (Stein, 2017). Similarly, while Heather Jarvis and Sonya Barnett had participated in 
political activism before, they only needed a few social media accounts to launch the 
international SlutWalk movement (Mendes, 2015); the March to End Rape Culture 
continues this do-it-ourselves tradition every year in Philadelphia. The result of this 
feminist generation’s DIY ethos is an activist praxis that is fundamentally participatory, 
open to nearly anyone looking to channel political outrage into a social movement. 
Scholars have documented a similar degree of accessibility and participation in 
other movements’ shift from traditionally organized collective action toward what 
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) call connective action. Connective action unfolds when 
personal action frames, or “easily personalized ideas” (p. 37) are linked together through 
digital networks, as exemplified in the case of hashtag activism (Clark, 2016). Without a 
formal organization keeping a firm grip on a movement’s message framing, connective 
action allows protesters to express themselves more freely and personalize their 
participation according to their specific experiences and concerns, all while still take part 
in a collective, solidary action. Ratto and Boler (2014) observe the participatory nature of 
connective action at work in other types of DIY political projects, and researchers have 
cited Bennett and Segerberg’s work to theorize protester’s involvement in the Arab 
Spring (Howard & Hussain, 2013), Indignados (Anduiza, Cristancho, & Sabucedo, 2014) 
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and Occupy movements (Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & Albacete, 2013), among many 
others.  
Less clear, however, is how the participatory nature of connective action might 
map onto a movement’s politics. While new media platforms facilitate connective action 
and make this organizing logic available to activists, their existence alone does not 
guarantee that activists will choose to engage in networked activism over traditionally 
organized campaigns by default. Rather, following the media-as-practice approach, 
connective action likely emerges from a combination of activists’ goals, values, needs, 
resources, and contexts. My case studies illustrate that, for contemporary feminist 
activists, the shift toward a more participatory, connective organizational logic stems 
from a particular sociotechnical assemblage of activists’ politics and media savvy at the 
core of do-it-ourselves feminism. 
The participatory nature of networked activism maps directly onto two goals 
specific to U.S. feminist activism.  
First, and perhaps most importantly, the accessibility of DIOF enables more 
intersectional feminist organizing practices, which in turn creates more inclusive feminist 
protest actions. Within the traditional collective organizing more characteristic of second-
wave feminism, movement leaders performed a gatekeeping function, choosing whose 
voices and concerns shaped feminist public platforms. While the movement claimed to 
fight for the rights of all women, this filtering process often privileged white women, 
whose stories and experiences were more likely to resonate with the mainstream press. 
For example, in her analysis of feminist activism against domestic violence throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, Rothenberg (2002) demonstrates that personal narratives were 
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crucial to the construction of the “battered woman” as a victim deserving of social and 
legal support. The narratives highlighted during these decades, however, painted a narrow 
portrait of who qualifies as a deserving victim. Feminist anti-domestic-violence media 
published during this time focused exclusively on violence against white, middle-to-
upper class heterosexual women, erasing the realities of victims of color and of lower 
socioeconomic status, as well as queer victims. DIOF’s networked organizing logic 
eliminates gatekeepers, creating space for activists standing at various intersections of 
difference to participate in and shape feminist platforms. 
This played out most clearly in the lead-up to the Women’s March when the 
National Committee set to drafting the movement’s Unity Principles. While the National 
Committee was tasked with coordinating the logistics of the march on Washington and 
developing an infrastructure of support for sister marches around the world, the Women’s 
March was largely decentralized, its expression of dissent shaped and refined through 
constant feedback from activists via social media. Critiques circulated through Facebook, 
Twitter, and the feminist blogosphere about the composition of the organizing team and 
the event’s name had altered who the marches represented, and would later influence 
what message the marches communicated. The National Committee published an initial 
draft of the Unity Principles on January 12, 2017: “Recognizing that women have 
intersecting identities and are therefore impacted by a multitude of social justice and 
human rights issues, we have outlined a representative vision for a government that is 
based on the principles of liberty and justice for all” (Women’s March on Washington 
2017a, p. 1). Soon after its publication, activist bloggers and Twitter users highlighted 
major gaps in the document, including support for the rights of sex workers (Rowntree, 
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2017) and people with disabilities (Ladau, 2017), while others critiqued the organizers for 
not taking a clear stance in support of access to safe and affordable abortion services 
(Graham, 2017). By Inauguration weekend, the Unity Principles were updated to include 
an expression of solidarity with sex workers’ rights movement, multiple references to 
disability as a social justice issue, and a clear demand for reproductive freedom for all. 
National Committee members combined their commitment to intersectionality and 
openness to critique with the participatory nature of social media platforms to foster an 
expression of dissent unfiltered by any one leader or organization. As march organizers 
wrote on Twitter, “The leadership of the Women’s March on Washington are not experts 
on every issue — but we are committed to being bridge-builders and amplifiers of shared 
values” (womensmarch, 2017). 
Second, the participatory nature of DIOF enables protest actions that are both 
individual and collective. Bennett’s and Segerberg’s (2013) concept of “personal action 
frames” (p. 37) helps visualize this dynamic. Personal action frames are personalizable; 
activists can connect their specific interests or concerns to the message framework. At the 
same time, they are also collective; by virtue of building on the same action frame, 
activists are participating in a mass movement. The hashtag is perhaps the clearest 
example of this concept in action. Millions of activists took part, for example, in the 
#MeToo campaign, many sharing their own personal stories of surviving sexual violence. 
While each story was unique to its author, these narratives were connected into one direct 
action campaign through the networking functions of the hashtag.  
Of course, this same individual/collective dynamic can be found in other types of 
movements. Tactics like hashtag activism, which connect personal expressions of dissent 
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into one powerful, collective outcry, are not unique to U.S. feminists. Networked 
activism’s bridging of the individual and the collective, however, parallels their emphasis 
on politicizing the personal and uncovering how power operates in everyday life, making 
the practice uniquely suited to contemporary feminist activists’ goals and values. U.S. 
feminists have historically drawn on consciousness-raising practices, or what Collins 
(2000) calls rearticulation, a process through which individual women identify 
similarities across their repeated personal experiences of injustice, affirm one another’s 
private outrage, foster collective strength, and, working together, develop new responses 
to these experiences. Here, what were previously cast as private and therefore 
nonpolitical concerns are “rearticulated” as systemic injustices requiring collective 
action. Today, networked feminist activism carries on this practice for a new generation, 
drawing connections across personal experiences to illustrate how systems of oppression 
shape everyday life. 
The individual/collective, personal/political dynamic unfolds every year at the 
March to End Rape Culture. MTERC organizers advance a core action framework for 
their march through their web presence and through printed materials distributed at the 
event; the purpose of the protest is, as its name indicates clearly, to end rape culture. As 
discussed in the previous section, however, the definition of “rape culture” the organizers 
advance is broad, encompassing a spectrum of violent experiences and an expansive 
matrix of interlocking oppressions. This creates space for protesters to incorporate their 
own personal expressions of dissent into the march. Every year, the protesters who gather 
in Thomas Paine Plaza express themselves via a huge variety of performances channeled 
through their posters, clothing, and bodies. Some of these performances recount their 
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experiences of sexual assault, which often takes place behind closed doors. At every 
march that I attended, several participants carried signs stating that they were wearing the 
same clothes they wore when they were raped, undermining news media’s and litigators’ 
tendency to blame sexual violence on victims’ choices and behaviors. Others reenacted 
the victim-blaming discourses they were confronted with following their assaults. One 
particularly striking poster that an organizer carried at both the 2015 and 2016 march 
depicts a ghostly white feminine silhouette standing against a dark backdrop of common 
victim-blaming discourse: “She can’t say ‘no’ if she is drunk! Only sluts get raped. Were 
you drunk? Why would she go by herself? She was asking for it. What were you 
wearing? She was sending mixed signals!” Another protestor at the 2016 march carried a 
poster that included the question people posed to her when she spoke out about her sexual 
assault: “Why didn’t you just push him off?” Yet another poster listed common excuses 
for assailants’ actions: he was just a “nice guy,” who was “hot and bothered.” Still others 
used their bodies to make explicit the dominant discourses that normalize and excuse 
sexual violence, writing phrases like, “I am not asking for it,” in paint or marker across 
their chests, legs, and arms while waiting in the plaza for the march to begin. The 
similarities across these protesters’ experiences, connected through their expression at the 
annual protest, shed light on rape culture as a matrix of domination otherwise normalized 
into invisibility.  
At MTERC 2014, the first march I attended, one protester’s performance 
encapsulated the political importance of do-it-ourselves feminism’s participatory nature.  
The protester, who was topless, approached me within minutes of my arrival to 
the plaza. She handed me a red permanent marker and, without formal introduction, 
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recited a line I would hear her repeat to other protestors in the crowd waiting for the 
march to start: “Hi. Will you write a trigger word on me?” She exuded confidence. “What 
do you mean by a ‘trigger word?’” I asked.“Words that hurt you, that people have used to 
tear you down because you’re a woman, or you’re queer, or you’re dressed a certain way, 
or you’re assertive.” The task made me nervous. The marker’s ink would be difficult to 
wash off and no one else had written on her yet. The thought of inscribing her body with 
hate speech was unnerving. These uneasy feelings, I realized, were exactly the point of 
the exercise. I uncapped the marker and moved to stand behind her. Taking her prompt 
seriously, I thought for a moment about words people have selected to purposefully 
trigger my insecurities as a woman. I pressed the felt tip to her shoulder blade and wrote 
in capital letters, BITCH. The act was cathartic, as if by writing the word on her back, it 
became her burden to bear. I gave the marker back and thanked her. “No, thank you,” she 
said, before moving on to ask someone else to participate in her embodied art experiment. 
We didn’t cross paths again and I never caught her name, but a photo of her surfaced on 
the protest’s Facebook event page the next day. By the end of the march, her upper body 
was covered in trigger words and phrases: bitch, bossy, hoe, shawty, slut, skank, whore, 
floozy, femi-nazi, yo mama, how you doin’, hey baby, smile honey. The epithets and jeers 
scribbled across her skin made visible the violence they inflict, like so many open 
wounds left untreated. 
Dozens of protesters had expressed, through a series of individual words or 
phrases written across this woman’s body, their personal, everyday experiences with the 
violent discourse — the insults, catcalls, and slurs — meant to reify their powerlessness. 
The epithets jotted across her skin made visible the ways in which women’s bodies are 
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culturally inscribed with discourses of ideal femininity and disciplined, as Foucault 
(1991) argued, into “docile bodies,” whose sights are directed inward and whose energies 
are too drained from constant self-criticism to critique the networks of power that 
subjugate them. Women, queer people, and people of color encounter such verbal 
harassment so frequently, that these microaggressions have become a taken-for-granted 
component of everyday life. But through their collective expression via this protester’s 
body, the systems of oppression behind these words and the damage they inflict become 
perceptible, rearticulating a personal encounter as a political one and laying the 
groundwork for transformation at both the individual and collective levels of society. 
This translation of the personal into the political is at the core of the do-it-ourselves 
feminist praxis and made possible by the participatory nature of networked feminist 
activism. 
The “DIY ethos” (Ratto & Boler, 2014, p. 10) of networked activism — its open, 
participatory nature — shares a unique resonance with feminists’ political values and 
goals. The same logic of connective action that undergirds DIOF characterizes a number 
of other contemporary movements and campaigns. My case studies suggest, however, 
that feminists’ turn away from traditionally organized collective action and toward 
networked activist campaigns emerges from a particular set of concerns, including a 
desire for more intersectional movements and an ongoing search for protest forms that 
allow the open expression of personal experiences with injustice. This generation’s use of 
digitally mediated tactics represents a particular feminist praxis, an ever expanding 
repertoire of practices informed by a specific set of goals, values, and needs that can scale 
up from grassroots projects like MTERC to global movements like the Women’s March.  
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DIOF is Precarious 
The praxis of do-it-ourselves feminism has, in many ways, revolutionized gender 
justice activism for the twenty-first century. Pairing media tools and platforms with their 
personal politics and intersectional values, contemporary feminists have spearheaded 
movements and campaigns that include a diversity of experiences while still fostering the 
solidarity necessary to transform systems of power. But the same features that grant 
DIOF its social and technical affordances — its everydayness and participatory nature — 
have also made it precarious.  
Unlike previous generations of activists, do-it-ourselves feminists launch actions 
without first building the capacities of a formal organization. This allows a more diverse 
range of actors, who, due to a range of structural barriers, may not have access to 
organizational resources or public platforms, to make their voices heard. At the same 
time, however, DIOF’s lack of a clear infrastructure raises concerns about long-term 
sustainability. While rebellious and artful, without the financial support or reliable 
people-power of a big-name organization or nonprofit, feminists’ tactical improvisation 
can become a drain on their time, energy, and, eventually, their mental health.  
This activist “burnout” was apparent among MTERC organizers, particularly 
during toward the end of my fieldwork, as they struggled to maintain the energy and 
commitment required to fund and launch the event year after year. Often, I would watch 
as, at the beginning of MTERC’s planning year, dozens of interested activists would 
show up to the first meeting to begin laying the groundwork for that year’s march. Then, 
as months passed, attendance dwindled and important tasks fell to Chelsea, an activist 
involved in multiple feminist projects throughout the city and the march’s unofficial lead 
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organizer.2 When, after volunteers failed to follow through on key day-of responsibilities 
for MTERC 2015, Chelsea kicked of the planning year for MTERC 2016 with a speech 
about accountability:  
You know, it’s great that so many of you are here and that so many people want 
to volunteer every year, but it is incredibly frustrating when people who 
volunteered to take on particular tasks at the march just don’t show up. You might 
think your job is small, like directing protestors along the march route, but if no 
one shows up to do that job, then I have to scramble to find someone else to do it 
or else everything goes to shit. If you’re gonna sign up, you need to show up, 
that’s all I’m saying. 
 
But showing up is often easier said than done. Making time not only for 
scheduled monthly meetings but for on-the-fly problem-solving and crisis response took 
its toll on many MTERC organizers, who also worked full-time or multiple part-time jobs 
and who, in many cases, were also struggling to cope with their own trauma related to 
sexual violence. Even Chelsea, who had been a key figure on the planning committee 
since the protest’s name change in 2013, announced her plans to take a step back after 
MTERC 2016, following a particularly difficult year balancing personal life issues with 
her growing list of march responsibilities. Others, frustrated with the committee’s 
informal leaders making decisions without group consensus, stopped attending meetings 
following internal disagreements. Without a formalized structure for leadership and 
decision-making, the planning committee lacked the means to address infighting and 
disputes. If, as Tufekci (2017) argues, the trajectory of social movements begins with, 
rather than culminating in, a large protest action, the question becomes how to create a 
support system for keeping activists engaged in the struggle while also maintaining their 
energy and building capacity for tactical innovation in response to new obstacles. 
																																																								
2	Throughout this study, I used pseudonyms to protect participants’ identities. Exceptions 
were made for some zine authors, who wanted to maintain attribution for their work.  
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Without one in place, DIO feminists risk limiting their political engagement to attention-
grabbing actions, like global street protests or viral hashtag campaigns, that do not grow 
into sustainable movements. The Women’s March offers a potentially helpful 
counterexample, as the National Committee pooled resources to formalize the protest into 
an ongoing struggle for women’s rights that took the form of national voter registration 
tours and campaigns for progressive women candidates for office (Power to the Polls, 
2018). But with its formalization and growing profile came critiques that the National 
Committee had fallen out of touch with its support base’s intersectional values (e.g., 
Pagano, 2018). Do-it-ourselves feminists must struggle with the competing goals of 
fostering open, accessible, intersectional movements and establishing the infrastructure 
necessary to carry movements forward. 
The participatory nature of DIOF enables protesters to personalize their 
participation and express their own perspectives, experiences, and concerns without 
having their voices filtered by a centralized gatekeeper. But the openness and flexibility 
of the praxis can make articulating a clear platform with definitive political values and 
commitments difficult. This challenge came to the fore in the debates concerning white 
women’s overwhelming presence at Women’s Marches across the U.S. While the 
National Committee had, in collaboration with activists voicing their concerns over social 
media, authored a set of Unity Principles with intersectionality at its core, women of 
color described feeling uncomfortable or unwelcome around white, liberal, feminists who 
had not turned out in equal numbers to support anti-racist efforts like the Black Lives 
Matter Movement or condemn state violence against black and brown bodies (Dupuy, 
2018). Others expressed a feeling of distrust for white women, the majority of whom 
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(53%) voted for Trump, and a disappointment in their failure to mobilize friends and 
family members against his racist campaign (Dupuy, 2018). Reports from local protests 
of white women thanking police officers for safeguarding the march (Chen, 2017), 
chanting loudly over black feminists’ speeches (Xiao, 2017), or spending more time 
taking selfies with friends in pussyhats than engaging in speakers’ calls to action (Obie, 
2017) only exacerbated these frustrations. Following the 2017 marches, participants and 
commentators struggled to balance the desire to offer the uninitiated a gateway to more 
radical activism through the Women’s March with their frustration with “white 
feminism’s” complicity in systems of violence. Scholar and activist Keeanga-Yamahtta 
Taylor (2017), writing for The Guardian, urged activists of color and more experienced 
organizers to join forces with their white allies, even those with less radical views, in 
order to build a strong movement ready to struggle for the long haul: “There are literally 
millions of people in this country who are now questioning everything. We need to open 
up our organizations, planning meetings, marches and much more to them. We need to 
read together, learn together, be in the streets together and stand up to this assault 
together.” But when, in January 2018, activists organized anniversary marches to mark 
the end of Trump’s first year in office, women of color expressed frustration that the 
movement had yet to better center marginalized communities’ voices and concerns. For 
example, S.T. Halloway (2018), a black feminist attorney, activist, and mommy blogger, 
explained why, in an editorial for Huffington Post, she would not attend her local 
anniversary protest despite having marched in 2017: “Until OUR issues become all of our 
issues, I cannot continue to lend my voice, my strength and my power to a movement or a 
brand of feminism that seeks to end the oppression of some of its members, while some 
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of its members continue to aid in the oppression of others.” In opening its arms to 
anyone, from the liberal center to the far left, who wanted to participate, the National 
Committee behind the Women’s Marches brought massive turnouts for protests held 
around the world. But, at the same time, they also laid the groundwork for a movement 
whose politics, particularly when it comes to racial justice, were less clear in practice 
than in writing, leaving feminists of color feeling unheard and unsupported. Moreover, 
when paired with DIO feminists’ focus on everyday life, the lack of a definitive platform 
can make the path toward creating long-lasting institutional change, such as policy 
reform, unclear. 
Lastly, DIO feminism’s politicization of everyday life and emphasis on open 
participation leaves movements vulnerable to cooptation and backlash. As Banet-Weiser 
and Portwood-Stacer (2017) argue in their analysis of “the traffic in feminism” (p. 886), 
the personalized, individual aspects of networked feminism are easily transmuted into 
“marketplace feminism” (Goldman, Heath, & Smith, 1991; Zeisler, 2016). When, for 
example, the Women’s March captured the world’s attention, marketers used rhetoric 
associated with the global movement and the broader anti-Trump resistance to sell their 
products. Popular clothing brands even mass-produced t-shirts with march slogans (Hess, 
2017b). While the practice might have further amplified the movement’s messaging, it 
also risked, as feminist journalist Amanda Hess (2017b) put it in an article for The New 
York Times, “leading audiences away from the hard work of political action and civic 
organization and toward the easy comfort of a consumer choice.” The same media tools 
that led the Women’s March to become both a worldwide political action and a pop 
culture phenomenon also opened activists up to harassment. Two days before 
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Inauguration, the hashtag #RenameMillionWomenMarch began trending on Twitter, 
flooding the platform with sexist messages targeting feminists’ appearance and 
intelligence (Harvard, 2017). Without a tightly structured organization with the capacity 
for issuing collective or innovating tactics, DIOF movements can struggle to issue 
collective responses to cooptation, backlash, and other obstacles.  
Do-it-ourselves feminists, then, face a particular set of challenges. Their activist 
media repertoire is doubly entangled in both the “redoing” (Baer, 2016, p. 19) and 
“undoing” (McRobbie, 2004, p. 255) of feminist collective politics for the networked era. 
Today’s generation of feminists must face an important question if feminist movements 
are to continue to grow and thrive: how can activists take advance of networked 
activism’s social and technical affordances, while also navigating its shortcomings? 
DIOF is Reflexive 
The answer to this question begins with a final defining feature of do-it-ourselves 
feminism — the contemporary feminist praxis is reflexive, an element that stems at least 
in part from activists’ intersectional values. As a movement-building praxis, 
intersectionality directs activists to reflect critically on their organizing practices at every 
stage. This constant, ongoing, reflexivity has become central a feature of contemporary 
feminist activism, as illustrated by the ongoing internal debates regarding the inclusivity 
and politics of the Women’s March. Critics have cautioned that today’s feminist 
movements risk losing time and newcomers through the infighting that self-critique can 
generate. Some have even gone so far as to accuse feminists of color who critique white 
feminists’ racial politics of engaging in a “toxic feminism” that creates unnecessary 
divisions (e.g., Goldberg, 2014). My case studies demonstrate, however, that while self-
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critique often produces difficult conversations within feminist movements, this practice 
of reflexivity has helped activists navigate the double entanglements of networked 
activism. While their movements may lack the structure and capacities of more 
traditionally organized forms of collective action, do-it-ourselves feminists engage in a 
reflexive praxis, constantly evaluating whether their tactics align with their goals and 
changing course as necessary. 
Anyone keeping tabs on the development of the Women’s March through social 
media and news coverage could witness this reflexivity at play, particularly in the internal 
discussions and responses to concerns regarding the event’s name and Unity Principles. 
But as a participant observer working with the March to End Rape Culture, I was able to 
witness firsthand how feminist activists grappled with the challenges and precarity that 
come with engaging in networked activism. 
Throughout my fieldwork, two aspects of this process became apparent. 
The first is that DIO feminists are aware of their own precarity. Critiques of 
activists’ tactics in general and feminists’ media practices in particular are often written 
with the assumption that the practitioners in question are not aware of the challenges they 
face or of their own shortcomings. This was not the case among MTERC organizers, who 
intentionally made time to highlight and address the planning committee’s organizational 
struggles. For example, throughout the planning process for MTERC 2016, a number of 
in-group disputes made it evident that the planning committee members’ politics were not 
completely in line with one another. One particularly heated debate focused on whether 
white people in the group should, whenever possible, take a step back from central 
responsibilities so as to better center the perspectives and interests of people of color. 
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After several organizers on both sides of the debate left MTERC, committee members 
came together to draft what they refer to as their “Points of Unity,” a mission statement 
explicitly laying out the group’s shared values, beliefs, and goals. Two organizes wrote 
an initial draft of the statement with guidance from other Philadelphia-based feminist 
collectives who had recently authored their own Points of Unity. The draft was then 
posted on the committee’s Slack, where members could comment on it and suggest 
revisions, which were incorporated into the document through a consensus-based process. 
The final version, which was shared publicly through the MTERC website, outlines a 
vision for intersectional organizing, including an explicit statement in support of 
prioritizing participants of color, among other practices:  
This organizing committee is guided by principles of intersectionality, anti-
oppression and combating rape culture. All members must be open to learning 
about these ideas and reflecting on their own biases. We understand that 
unpacking and unlearning our own biases and privileges allows us to create space 
for the various experiences of survivors of all different backgrounds & narratives 
and the ways they experience rape culture and other violence. 
 
The Points of Unity document became a touchstone for navigating debates in any 
decision-making process. When, for example, a committee member shared a viral letter 
calling out cisgender people who expected trans people to disclose their identity on dates 
on the official MTERC Facebook page, other members expressed concerns that the post’s 
language was too radical and would alienate more moderate supporters. The post had 
sparked a heated exchange in the comments section, which included transphobic 
language, raising concerns that, in addition to potentially offending followers, it may 
have also hurt trans supporters of MTERC. For the planning committee, the question 
became whether or not the post should be deleted. After reviewing our Points of Unity, 
the committee collectively decided that the post was in keeping with MTERC’s mission 
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to support trans people and that its tone and language mapped onto the march’s own 
radical politics. Members then went about responding to or deleting comments that did 
not reflect MTERC’s values. For the MTERC planning committee, the Points Unity 
document offered a solution to DIOF’s precarious and often unsustainable structure. A 
collectively agreed upon mission statement offered a way for members to systematically 
make decision and keep one another in check without also sacrificing their emphasis on 
open participation.  
The second follows from the first. Not only are do-it-ourselves feminists aware of 
their precarity, they are often emboldened by it.  
During the planning year for MTERC 2016, organizers briefly considered 
applying to the IRS to obtain 501(c)(3) status and incorporate the group as a nonprofit 
organization. In addition to potentially increased credibility, becoming a nonprofit 
offered a number of potential benefits, including the ability to apply for grants restricted 
to 501(c)(3) organizations and give donors tax deductions when they make charitable 
gifts. But after some exploratory research, the idea was squashed. Incorporating as a 
501(c)(3) would make the group accountable to the government and legally restrict their 
ability to engage in partisan politics at any level or speak out against candidates with 
oppressive agendas.3 Organizers were also concerned that incorporating would shift the 
group’s focus toward professionalization; they feared they would become more caught up 
in the bureaucratic ins and outs of keeping a nonprofit organization afloat and lose sight 
of their mission to dismantle rape culture and support local survivors. Plus, organizers 
worried that as a nonprofit organization, they would have to tone down the march’s 
																																																								
3	See INCITE! (2007) for activists’ perspectives on the shortcomings of nonprofit 
organizations when it comes to pursuing revolutionary political agendas. 
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radical politics and generally “edgy” nature in an effort to maintain a professional public 
appearance. “But,” I asked Chelsea once at a meeting, “wouldn’t incorporating make 
fundraising much easier?” She just smiled at me and said, “We will raise our own funds. 
We always get people to donate supplies even without the tax deduction. We’ll just keep 
doing it ourselves, and then the march can keep being what we want it to be.”  
For these activists, DIOF’s precarity was at times a hazard, but it was also a 
strength and even a source of pride. Starting the march every year from scratch was 
strenuous. The committee’s struggle to retain more than ten members at one time has 
been a testament to that fact. But the flexible, improvisational nature of do-it-ourselves 
feminism enabled MTERC organizers to craft a protest event that, in process and product, 
reflected their values and the concerns of their supporters. The reflexivity activists build 
into this praxis allows them to recognize and grapple with both the political possibilities 
and limitations of networked feminist organizing.  
Conclusion 
The Women’s March on Washington and the March to End Rape Culture offer 
clear evidence of a paradigm shift in U.S. feminist organizing that has been building, 
gradually, throughout recent history. Feminist movements no longer orbit around highly 
structured organizations, with clearly defined leaders and tightly controlled messages. 
Instead, feminist media-makers and platform users stand at the center of the complex, 
multifaceted terrain that is U.S. feminism. Their creative, extra-institutional activism 
constitutes a new organizing logic that I call do-it-ourselves feminism. 
In many ways, the pink pussyhat, which became the signature look of the 
Women’s March, offers the perfect metaphor for DIOF. Riffing on Trump’s leaked 2005 
conversation with Access Hollywood host Billy Bush, in which he claimed his celebrity 
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status allowed him to “do anything to women,” including “grab them by the pussy” 
(Fahrenthold, 2016), friends and artists Krista Suh and Jayna Zweiman shared the pattern 
for a cat-eared hat online (Walker, 2017). Countless feminist knitters soon joined the 
Pussyhat Project (Walker, 2017). While each individual hat carried the personal touches 
of its creator, making, wearing, and exchanging pussyhats became collective acts of 
protest and community-building. Feminists hosted virtual and in-person knitting circles, 
shared photos of their hats alongside their particular political concerns via social media 
platforms under the hashtag #PussyHatGlobal, and distributed hats to fellow protesters 
(Pussyhat Project, 2017). Hundreds of thousands of handmade pussyhats appeared at 
marches around the world, each a visually striking signifier for the movement and, as The 
New Yorker put it, “a personalized act of labor dedicated to communal protest” (Walker, 
2017). 
Like the pussyhat, contemporary feminism in the U.S. is a network of self-
starting, participatory, open access movements, improvising protest actions “on the wing” 
(de Certeau, 1984, p. xix) through the tactical appropriation of everyday media tools and 
resources. Channeling their dissent through the social media platforms we browse on a 
daily basis, this generation of activists has built movements and campaigns open to just 
about anyone with internet access and some spare time. Importantly, without the 
gatekeepers of a formally structured organization, this networked feminist activism 
allows participants to express themselves freely, play a role in directly shaping 
movements’ public platforms, and even launch campaigns around their personal 
experiences of oppression. Just as the pussyhat offered an outlet for self-expression while 
simultaneously linking participants in shared act of protest, feminists’ rebellious, bottom-
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up approach to political action enables an activism that is both personal and collective, 
that both honors the particularities of individual experiences and fosters solidarity across 
intersections of difference. While U.S. feminism’s history of exclusions haunted the 
Women’s March, its organizational style enabled a set of Unity Principles built around 
women as a complex, multifaceted class, rather than a monolith defined solely by gender. 
As one journalist quipped, “A new image of feminism ― intersectional, DIY, 
unapologetically pink ― was solidified” (Brooks, 2017). Above all, like the pussyhat, 
today’s feminist movements have gained a striking degree of visibility across U.S. media 
culture, offering a bright glimmer of hope after decades of anti-feminist backlash and in a 
political moment where civil rights are under attack.  
But the pussyhat protest tactic was not without its shortcomings. Trans women 
and women of color critiqued the hat for centering through its symbolism the bodies of 
white cisgender women (Compton, 2017). The hat was also easily mass-produced and 
sold for profit, turning feminist dissent into a commodity and upholding capitalist values 
that run counter to feminist collective politics. As a low-risk personal fashion statement, 
some critics charged that the pussyhat gave participants a false sense of accomplishment, 
as if, by donning the hat, they had done something to affect the status quo, which could in 
turn lull them into complacency. Perhaps more than any other action taken at Women’s 
Marches around the world, the pink, cat-eared caps sparked a flurry of internal discord 
within feminist communities. 
The do-it-ourselves activist media praxis behind contemporary feminist 
movements faces a similar array of problems. Without clear movement structures, DIO 
feminists lack a means through which to hold one another accountable for following 
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through on their intersectional principles. Their turn away from a centralized leadership 
and toward open, personalizable participation can even make establishing a platform with 
a well-established set of political values and commitments difficult. The individualized 
nature of DIOF leaves it vulnerable to commercial cooptation, and when its message is 
distorted or commodified or activists face backlash, it is often missing the organizational 
capacity necessary to issue a collective response. The networked media praxis also faces 
a sustainability problem. Millions of marchers may have made and worn pussyhats, but 
what happens after the viral protest action’s media attention comes to an end? Networked 
feminist actions can disperse just as quickly as they come together. A key question for 
today’s feminist organizers is how to keep activists engaged in long-term struggles for 
social justice, even when feminism is not making headlines.  
But the pussyhat controversy illustrates a final key feature of do-it-ourselves 
feminism. In the weeks leading up to and following the Women’s March, feminists’ 
critiques of the tactic flooded social media platforms and editorial pages. These 
discussions and debates stand as a testament to the reflexivity of today’s feminist 
activists, who consistently evaluate whether their actions align with their politics and 
revamp their tactics accordingly. The case studies taken up in this chapter and the 
emerging scholarship on contemporary feminist movements suggest that networked 
activism is doubly entangled in both the “undoing” and “redoing” of feminist politics for 
the twenty-first century. Through their reflexive media praxis, DIO feminists actively 
confront the double-edged nature of networked activism and negotiate between their 
political goals and media resources. 
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This project offers an in-depth, practitioner-focused exploration of how feminists 
are building a repertoire of activist media tactics that reflects their values and how the 
choice to “do it ourselves” is changing the face of U.S. feminism. In this chapter, 
grounded in case studies of the global Women’s March movement and Philadelphia’s 
local March to End Rape Culture, I set forward a robust description of do-it-ourselves 
feminism as an activist media praxis reshaping contemporary feminist movements. The 
following two chapters trace how activists, drawing on the DIOF praxis, use media to 
pursue two longstanding goals of U.S. feminism — bringing visibility to personal 
experiences of oppression and cultivating safe, inclusive communities — while 
navigating the challenges of the current context and the structural constraints of media 
platforms, all without the capacities or resources of formal organizations. In naming and 
describing the organizing logic that connects these political projects — do-it-ourselves 
feminism — my goal is to create space to identify and reflect on activists’ best practices 
and shared struggles, so that we might continue crafting a praxis of resistance up to the 





CHAPTER 3 – “I hear you, I see you, I believe you, I stand with you.” 
Networked Feminist Visibility: A Case Study of #MeToo 
 
In 1997, Tarana Burke was working as a counselor at a youth summer camp, 
when a young camper asked to speak to her in private. The camper disclosed to Burke 
that she had been sexually abused. Heartbroken and caught off guard, Burke sent the 
camper to another counselor. The exchange haunted Burke, who is also a sexual violence 
survivor: “I didn’t have a response or a way to help her in that moment, and I couldn’t 
even say ‘me too,’” Burke told The New York Times (Garcia, 2017). In 2006, Burke 
founded Just Be Inc., a Philadelphia-based nonprofit organization focused on the 
wellbeing and growth of young women of color. Remembering that camper, Burke used 
the organization to launch the “me too Movement,” aimed at creating “empowerment 
through empathy” (Just Be Inc., 2013) for girls and young women who have endured 
sexual abuse, assault, or exploitation.  
More than a decade later, those two simple words — “me too” — spread like wild 
fire across social media. On the evening of October 15, 2017, actor Alyssa Milano 
tweeted, “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted, write ‘me too’ as a reply to this 
tweet”.4 Inspired and infuriated by the wave of allegations against Hollywood producer 
Harvey Weinstein, which had emerged in the weeks prior, Milano sought to expose the 
																																																								
4	Contrary to most journalistic coverage of the hashtag, Milano was not the originator of 
the hashtag component of the “me too” movement. Amy Siskind, president of the 
women’s advocacy organization The New Agenda, started the hashtag campaign, 
#WomenWhoRoar in the morning of October 15, in response Twitter suspending the 
account of actor Rose McGowan, a prominent voice in bringing Harvey Weinstein down. 
That afternoon, several people, the earliest including author and activist Nancy Gruver 
and attorney Careen Shannon, began tweeting #MeToo alongside #WomenWhoRoar to 
signal that they had faced sexual harassment or assault (Busch, 2017). Milano’s tweet did 
not come until later that evening; however, her celebrity status and millions of followers 
played a pivotal roll in amplifying #MeToo and catalyzing its global diffusion.  
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pervasiveness of sexual violence beyond the film industry (Sayej, 2017). Milano woke 
the next morning to 55,000 replies, to more than 17,000 retweets of her original message, 
and to #MeToo as the top trending hashtag on Twitter (Sayej, 2017).  
#MeToo was not the first instance of hashtag feminism. This form of networked 
feminist activism, mobilized through Twitter’s metadata tags for marking, organizing, 
and linking posts on a particular topic, has become a core component of the do-it-
ourselves feminist repertoire and dozens of feminist hashtags concerning gender justice 
issues have taken off in recent years.5 Even so, feminists are not the first or only activists 
to appropriate the hashtag form to pursue their goals. Some of the earliest activist 
hashtags include the 2009 #IranElection campaign, in which activists on the ground in 
Iran connected with allies around the world in the aftermath of that year’s fraudulent 
presidential election (Mottahedeh, 2015); the 2010 #G20report campaign, in which 
activists reported on the protests at the G20 Toronto summit (Poell, 2014); and the 2011 
#OccupyWallStreet campaign, in which activists around the world reported on 
happenings at their local occupations throughout the Occupy movement (Ferrari, 2016). 
Hashtag feminism is just one tactic in the broader activist repertoire of what I call 
networked visibility campaigns, or protest actions that draw on the social and technical 
affordances of digital platforms to draw attention to a particular issue, experience, or 
cause. #MeToo’s viral diffusion, however, exponentially outpaced many of its 
predecessors. Prior to #MeToo, 2014 campaigns #WhyIStayed and #YesAllWomen, two 
of the earliest feminist hashtags, were the most visible Twitter campaigns against sexual 
																																																								
5	See Feminist Media Studies 14(6), 15(1), and 15(2) for essays documenting some of the 
earliest and most visible feminist hashtag campaigns. See also Bonilla & Rosa (2015) for 
a thorough overview of Twitter hashtags’ forms and functions.  
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violence; in one day, they were tweeted more than 46,000 times and 61,000 times, 
respectively (Grinberg, 2014; Main, 2017). By comparison, within 24 hours, #MeToo 
was used in 109,451 tweets (Main, 2017) and referenced in more than 12 million posts 
and comments on Facebook (Park, 2017).  
At the time of her original Tweet, Milano was unaware of Burke’s grassroots “me 
too” movement. Women of color journalists and activists, wary of white women 
appropriating black women’s labor and dominating the conversation surrounding sexual 
violence, quickly took to Twitter to call out the erasure of Burke’s work (Hill, 2017). 
Two days after the hashtag went viral, Milano publicly credited Burke with having 
founded the movement a decade earlier and the two joined forces, taking media 
interviews together to promote the movement’s message (Hill, 2017). 
In the weeks after the campaign first went viral, #MeToo outlived the fleeting 
temporality of most hashtags and grew into a powerful, transnational movement against 
sexual violence. The hashtag was quickly translated into its French 
(#BalanceTonPorc/“call out your pig”), Spanish (#YoTambien/“me too”), Italian 
(#QuellaVoltaChe/“that time”), Hebrew (#גםאנחנו/“us too”), and Arabic 
(#AnaKaman/“me too”) counterparts, among others (Lekach, 2017; Levy, 2017); the 
Chinese equivalent, #MiTu, translates into the seemingly innocuous nonsensical phrase, 
“rice bunny,” to circumvent government censorship (Lake, 2018). Variants of the original 
hashtag, including #MosqueMeToo, #ChurchToo, #MeTooPhD, #MeTooK12, 
#MeTooCongress, #MeTooMilitary, and #AidToo, soon took off, calling attention to 
sexual misconduct across multiple sites and industries within and beyond the U.S. 
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context. By the end of 2017, the still-active hashtag had been used on Twitter in 85 
countries and posted on Facebook nearly 90 million times (Sayej, 2017).  
The hashtag has had a number of ripple effects, which are still unfolding as of this 
writing.  
The same month the hashtag went viral, journalist Moira Donegan anonymously 
created and circulated the “Shitty Media Men” list, a shared Google spreadsheet that 
allowed anyone to document warnings about men in media industries who had allegedly 
committed sexual misconduct. While Donegan deleted the spreadsheet after it went viral, 
copies spread across the internet, naming more than 70 men as perpetrators of sexual 
assault and harassment (Grady, 2018). Olympic gymnast McKayla Maroney used the 
hashtag to publicly disclose that USA Gymnastics team doctor Larry Nassar had 
molested her while she was in his care; following Maroney’s lead, 156 other victims 
came forward and Nassar was sentenced to life in prison (Correa, 2018; Park & Perrigo, 
2017). In November, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, herself a survivor of sexual assault 
as a young congressional staffer, introduced a bill to streamline the process for reporting 
sexual harassment on Capitol Hill (Serfaty, 2017).  
The following month, Time Magazine named the movement’s “Silence Breakers,” 
from celebrities like Milano to grassroots organizers like Burke, as its 2017 Person of the 
Year (Zacharek, Dockterman, & Edwards, 2017). In the aftermath of the hashtag’s 
diffusion and the public condemnation of Weinstein, who now faces 81 different 
accusers, allegations of sexual misconduct were made against dozens of high-profile men 
in entertainment, politics, journalism, sports, the arts, and more (Almukhtar, Gold, & 
Buchanan, 2018). On January 1, 2018, inspired by #MeToo, 300 actors, agents, writers, 
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directors, producers, executives, and lawyers published an open letter in The New York 
Times announcing the launch of Time’s Up. The initiative, which has its own hashtag 
campaign, includes a $13 million legal defense fund for underprivileged survivors, a call 
for new legislation against sexual harassment, and a formal effort to reach gender parity 
at film and TV studios and talent agencies by 2020 (Buckley, 2018). One week later, at 
the 2018 Golden Globe Awards, Time’s Up mobilized its first symbolic action as 
celebrity supporters dressed in all black, donned pins bearing the initiative’s name, 
addressed sexual violence in interviews, and brought grassroots activists as their guests to 
draw attention to gender justice issues beyond Hollywood (Weaver, 2018). Similar forms 
of red carpet activism would punctuate the rest of the 2018 awards season (North, 2018). 
As it became more and more visible, a commercial market sprang up around 
#MeToo and the campaign’s slogan was used to brand not only celebrities, but also 
clothing, accessories, makeup, and even a spate of mobile applications and start-up 
companies (Dwoskin & McGregor, 2018; Hampton, 2018; Salo, 2017). Once #MeToo 
became almost inescapable across social media platforms, news outlets, and consumer 
culture, dozens of think pieces concerning gender, sex, and power emerged and some, 
like the hashtag, went viral, further extending the campaign’s relevance beyond any one 
news cycle.6 Perhaps most importantly, #MeToo has sparked everyday conversations 
about consent at dinner tables, in classrooms, and on college campuses (Bennett, 2017; 
Crowley, 2018) and has emboldened record numbers of individual survivors to seek 
support through crisis centers and hotlines (Koerth-Baker, 2018; Lambert, 2018; 
McCammon, 2017).  
																																																								
6	See Traister, 2018 for an overview of the editorials #MeToo inspired. 
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In three months’ time, what started out as a grassroots initiative and, later, a tweet 
exploded into a global, multimedia movement against sexual violence.  
*** 
Following its meteoric rise, #MeToo faced two diametrically opposed critiques. 
Conservative critics charged that the campaign had gone ”too far,” destroying the lives 
of those publicly accused and straining personal and professional relationships between 
men and women (e.g., Chattopadhyay, 2018; Kipnis, 2018; Richardson, 2018).7 #MeToo, 
these commentators argued, had the potential to change everyday life through its globally 
networked visibility, and not necessarily for the better. But others, particularly feminist 
activists and academics, wondered whether #MeToo had gone far enough, or if the 
hashtag was merely a media spectacle, a superficial performance incapable of 
dismantling a system of oppression that extends well beyond its celebrity spokeswomen 
(e.g., Banet-Weiser, 2018b; Faludi, 2017; Kipnis, 2018). For these commentators, the 
																																																								
7	Some news outlets described the critique that #MeToo had gone “too far” as the outcome 
of a feminist generational divide. According to this perspective, while younger #MeToo 
feminists advocated for an expansive conceptualization of sexual violence that charts a 
spectrum of injuries from street harassment to rape, older “second-wave” feminists, 
commentators took issue with the younger generation’s subsumption of such a variety of 
experiences under the label of “assault” and their portrayal of women as victims (e.g., 
Bennett, 2018; Crary & Lush, 2018; Edwards, 2018; Harding, 2018; Livingstone, 2018; 
Richardson, 2018). But, as longtime feminist writer Katha Pollitt points out in an 
interview with Slate (Chotiner, 2018), the most prominent voices in the “#MeToo has 
gone too far” camp were not feminists at all, let alone activists who helped mobilize the 
movement’s second wave. Moreover, as Pollitt and feminist blogger and author Lindy 
West (2018) have argued, this generation’s more expansive conceptualization of rape 
culture has roots in feminist thought from the Civil Rights Era. In keeping with my 
practitioner-focused methodology, I apply these feminists’ perspectives on the #MeToo 
debate here and classify the “too far” critique as a conservative one. It is also worth 
noting that, as feminist social movement researchers have documented, journalists and 
other commentators have frequently deployed the trope of the generational divide, often 
characterized as a mother-daughter quarrel, to discredit U.S. feminist movements 
throughout history (Henry, 2004; Whittier, 2010).  
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hashtag campaign had made some progress by drawing awareness to sexual violence, but 
visibility alone was not enough; #MeToo’s popularity was too easily coopted by 
corporate media and Hollywood interests to bring about the social revolution its 
participants called for. Both critiques echo questions at the center of debates concerning 
hashtag activism: Can hashtag activism cause “real” social change beyond its viral 
visibility? What happens after the hashtag takes over news media? Or, as a PBS 
docuseries inspired by the campaign asked, #MeToo, Now What? 
Much existing research and discourse surrounding networked visibility tactics like 
hashtag campaigns circle around these questions, with polarizing results. So-called 
“techno-optimists” have argued that the internet can indeed create real social change. 
Social media platforms, they argue, democratize access to the tools and information 
required to build movements and stage protests, thereby lowering the cost of participation 
and, in the process, revolutionizing the public sphere, such that political organizing no 
longer requires the resources of political institutions (e.g., Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2011, 
2015; Shirky, 2008). From this more utopian standpoint, digital forms of protest, such as 
hashtag feminism, enable a diversity of actors to gain visibility and mobilize collective 
action around underrepresented issues. “Techno-pessimists,” however, have made the 
case that networked activism is merely “slacktivism,” a risk-free performance of virtue-
signaling that feels satisfying but has little impact, that distracts from “real” activist 
organizing, that opens activists up to surveillance, that directly benefits social media 
corporations, and that is incapable of building the strong community ties of sustainable 
movements (e.g., Carr, 2012; Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011). For these tech-dystopian 
critics, sharing a personal story through a feminist hashtag only creates the illusion of 
142142 
doing activism, while simultaneously upholding capitalist systems of exchange and 
directing attention away from structures of power. Viewed through the lens of these 
bifurcated debates, #MeToo seems to offer a case study for testing whether or not social 
media platforms can create social change. 
In this chapter, however, I work from a different line of inquiry.  
While Western news media have demonstrated a sizable appetite for think pieces 
and sound bites that scorn or hype the power of the internet (Tufekci, 2017), either/or 
questions about whether or not networked activism works restrict our understanding of 
digital protest tactics. The binary structure of the “activism versus slacktivism” debate 
oversimplifies the multiple dimensions of a case like #MeToo. The campaign has 
simultaneously taken the forms of a grassroots organization, a hashtagged support 
network, a community conversation, a personal revelation, a coalition of actors and 
media-makers, and a push for stronger legislation, as well as an individualistic celebrity 
self-branding mechanism, a capitalist marketing campaign, a superficial fashion 
statement, and more. The social, cultural, and political lives of #MeToo are numerous, 
and the campaign’s impact cannot be wholly dismissed nor uncritically celebrated. 
Asking either/or questions of activist hashtags overlooks the possibility that the answer 
might be both/and, that hashtag feminism, in its many dimensions, might be both 
politically transformative and politically problematic. In fact, that such polarizing 
tensions exist in empirical research and popular discourse concerning hashtag activism 
suggests that each side of this debate may be telling one part of a far more complex story. 
To borrow McRobbie’s (2004) phrase, competing opinions on hashtag activism suggest 
that the tactic is doubly entangled in both liberatory politics and systems of oppression. 
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As Tufekci (2017) argues, research questions that reject false dichotomies and embrace 
this complexity are needed to develop a fuller understanding of hashtag activism. 
Moreover, the technodeterminist assumptions behind these debates — the notion 
that technology alone drives social change — leave little room for feminists’ voices and 
agency and the complex negotiations they have historically made between their political 
goals and contexts when developing tactics. Though digital platforms may be new, for 
U.S. feminists, the struggle to balance both the compelling, highly visible drama of 
protesting personal experiences of injustice with the difficult, backstage work of 
collective organizing is not. Susan Faludi (2017) argues that feminist activism in the U.S. 
has, dating back to the nineteenth century temperance movement, taken two forms: one is 
expressions of anger at the abuses of individual men, who provide unambiguous targets 
for activists’ righteous outrage, and the other is the “less spectacular but essential” work 
of dismantling structures of inequality and building more equitable systems in their 
places. These two forms of protest can productively intersect, but “fighting the patriarch” 
is easier and often far more electrifying than “fighting the patriarchy,” making the former 
more widely practiced and more easily digestible within mainstream media. Historical 
accounts of U.S. feminist activism like Faludi’s (2017), in other words, suggest that 
digital media have intensified and complicated, rather than caused, feminists’ struggles to 
sustain strong and effective movements over time.  
To sum up, the instrumentalist approach of the “activism vs. slacktivism” debate 
frames social media as tools that may or may not cause real social change and, as such, 
lacks the capacity to hold at once both the possibilities and limitations of hashtag 
feminism and the history of organizing struggles that preceded it. With a handful of 
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important exceptions (Barassi, 2015; Gerbaudo, 2012; Keller, 2016; Keller, Mendes, & 
Ringrose, 2018; Tufekci, 2017; Yang, 2009; Zayani, 2015), existing scholarship on 
hashtag activism and other digital protest tactics also tends to focus exclusively on 
campaigns’ effects and qualities, rather than the perspectives and experiences of the 
activists behind them. The result is that activist-practitioners’ understandings of the 
strengths of digital protest tactics and efforts to counterbalance their shortcomings remain 
undertheorized.  
Here, I take up the media-as-practice framework described in Chapter 1 to 
develop a more expansive, bottom-up, practitioner-focused look at feminist hashtag 
campaigns. When digital media platforms are framed not as tools but as spaces for 
political participation, where activists develop repertoires of contention, the 
contradictions of networked activism and the strategies practitioners use to navigate them 
come into view. Instead of asking about hashtag feminism’s effects, a line of inquiry that 
demands definitive answers to what are in reality complex questions, I ask about 
feminists’ hashtag practices, starting with the political values that inform them. How do 
feminist activists imagine the role visibility, through networked discourses and 
performances like hashtag campaigns, plays in political liberation? What, from their 
points of view, are the political affordances and limitations of networked visibility 
campaigns? And how do they navigate these double entanglements of networked 
visibility? My goal is to contribute practitioners’ perspectives on hashtag feminism and 
illuminate the processes through which activists develop their tactics while working 
within particular sociotechnical constraints. This grounded, processual approach toward 
understanding hashtag feminism is especially key as do-it-ourselves feminists work to 
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build a feminist praxis that reflects their values and responds to the challenges of the 
current political context and media landscape.  
To explore these questions, I applied the media-as-practice framework to 
#MeToo, the most popular feminist hashtag campaign against sexual violence to date. I 
conducted a textual analysis of a large sample of meta-tweets — or tweets in which 
activists use a hashtag to reflect on it or call attention to it — from the campaign. 
Through an inductive coding approach, I identified participants’ reasons, both personal 
and political, for joining #MeToo as well as where they saw hashtag feminism falling 
short of their goals or contradicting their values. Importantly, I also documented what 
strategies activists developed to course correct and redress hashtag activism’s 
shortcomings, while making the most of its perceived affordances.  
Drawing on this primary source material alongside existing scholarship 
concerning visibility, performance, and discourse, I argue that hashtag feminism is a type 
of contentious performance that enables activists to politicize the personal — a 
longstanding goal of U.S. feminist movements — by making it visible. #MeToo 
aggregated personal stories into a networked visibility campaign, bridging the individual 
with the collective and illustrating the systemic nature of sexual violence. As the activists 
in my sample report, however, making the personal visible on a globally networked 
media stage posed a variety of challenges for both individual participants and the 
movement as a whole, from re-traumatization to the erasure of those most marginalized 
survivors. To negotiate between the affordances and limitations of hashtag activism, 
#MeToo participants developed performance maintenance practices over the course of 
the campaign’s first several months. Through these ongoing remedial strategies, 
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participants evaluated the campaign’s shortcomings and advanced solutions informed by 
their goals and values, taking steps toward a specifically feminist approach to hashtag 
activism. Their reflections and efforts to improve the campaign point toward hashtag 
feminism as a complex, interactional, recursive process aimed at achieving an 
intersectional, transformative politics of visibility.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I review ongoing scholarly and 
popular debates concerning the political significance and shortcomings of networked 
visibility as a feminist protest tactic through the lens of the #MeToo fallout. These 
debates are largely divided between two poles: those who see hashtag feminism as 
engaging in a politics of visibility, capable of creating social change by spreading 
alternative interpretations of social injustices, and those who see hashtag feminism as 
ensnared in an economy of visibility, where political action begins and ends with 
representation in consumer media culture. One contribution of this chapter is to build a 
comprehensive review of existing research concerning hashtag feminism, which has been 
steadily growing and converging around similar findings and tensions since 2014, so as to 
highlight new questions and challenges for feminist media studies scholars moving 
forward. Second, I outline my theoretical and methodological approach for analyzing 
hashtag feminism as a contentious performance, whose actors must grapple with both the 
possibilities and shortcomings of networked visibility campaigns. In this section, I detail 
a strategy for conducting a practitioner-focused textual analysis of Twitter data, which I 
call a meta-tweet analysis. Third, grounded in my sample of meta-tweets, I map, from 
#MeToo participants’ perspectives, the possibilities and shortcomings of hashtag activism 
as a feminist protest tactic. I then go on to document the performance maintenance 
147147 
practices they used to juggle both. Finally, I conclude by considering the implications of 
my findings for existing scholarship on hashtag feminism and online activism and 
organizers mobilizing protest movements in the digital age.  
Literature Review 
Hashtag Feminism and Making the Personal Visible  
The #MeToo debates illustrate, at a smaller scale, broader debates concerning 
hashtag feminism and the role visibility plays in feminists’ conceptualization of political 
liberation. Existing research on hashtag feminism largely leans toward one of two sides: 
Some scholars, drawing on theories of discursive power and performance, frame hashtag 
feminism as a powerful practice in the politics of visibility, a form of activism focused on 
shifting how we represent, interpret, and, in turn, respond to marginalized groups and 
issues. But others have argued that while the tactic is helpful for raising awareness, 
hashtag feminism is often complicit in what Sarah Banet-Weiser (2015a; 2018a; 2018b) 
calls an economy of visibility, a form of activism that begins and ends with performance 
and does little to transform structures of inequality. With the polarized reactions to 
#MeToo as a reference point, I consider both sides of this tension in the literature below. 
This review lays the groundwork for my exploration of a set of research questions that 
works from the assumption that scholars at both ends of the spectrum may be correct. 
Instead of asking whether or not hashtag feminism works, I push toward a practitioner-
centered understanding of what it means to grapple with both the affordances and 
limitations of hashtag feminism.  
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Hashtag Feminism, a Politics of Visibility 
Despite their often anti-feminist sentiments, conservative critics implicitly 
acknowledged that the testimonies published under #MeToo had the potential to not only 
topple individual perpetrators, but to materially alter the social fabric as we know it. They 
frequently referred to the hashtag campaign as a “witch hunt” (e.g., Collective, 2018; 
Magness, 2018; Walsh & Blackwell, 2018), a “hysterical” rush to judgment that risked 
ruining lives and careers fueled by, in one director’s words, a “new man-hating 
puritanism” (Nyren, 2018). Beyond irreparable damage to the accused’s reputation, 
others argued that #MeToo, as the New York Post put it, “lumped the trivial in with 
legitimate sexual assault” (Peyser, 2017). The hashtag, in other words, triggered a “sex 
panic” that could sap the fun out of workplace banter, flirting, romance, dating, and 
casual hookups for men and women alike (Merkin, 2018; Sommers, 2017), an ironic 
reversal of the feminist Sexual Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s (Gessen, 2017). Still 
others ridiculed #MeToo supporters for enabling a “culture of victimhood,” which casts 
women as helpless and irresponsible for their individual actions or personal successes and 
silences anyone who challenges its logic (Phillips, 2018; Roiphe, 2018). 
Embedded in these critics’ fears about the campaign’s long-term effects on 
everyday life was the tacit understanding that #MeToo engages in a politics of visibility, a 
representational struggle aimed at exposing power so that it might be transformed (Banet-
Weiser, 2015a). Within a politics of visibility, the collective articulation of oppressive 
experiences, such as sexual violence, challenges social norms that silence and excuse 
such experiences and, when successful, transforms the structures of inequality those 
norms support. As Banet-Weiser (2015a) explains, identity-political movements have 
long practiced tactics geared toward making historically marginalized political categories 
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like gender visible. The demand to be seen, recognized, and valued has been a key 
component of feminist, anti-racist, queer and trans, labor, and humanitarian movements’ 
fight for the expansion of rights for underprivileged communities (Chouliaraki, 2006; 
Hall, 1996; Taylor, 1997). For U.S. feminist movements dating back to the 1960s, 
engaging in a politics of visibility has often involved making the personal political, or 
calling attention to the taken-for-granted gender norms that constrain everyday life so that 
they might be denaturalized and deconstructed (Hanisch, 1969). Put differently, U.S. 
feminist activists have historically drawn on tactics that make the personal visible , from 
street protests and speak outs to the alternative media networks that preceded hashtag 
feminism, such as the second-wave underground press of the 1960s and 1970s (Hogan, 
2016; Young, 1997).  
The political implications of making the personal visible can be best understood 
through theories of discourse, performance, and power.  
Stacey Young (1997) draws on Foucault’s (1991) conceptualization of discourse 
— speech, writing, and actions that appear across a variety of sites, texts, and institutions, 
govern the way a topic can be talked and thought about, and, consequently, influence 
behaviors and practices — to describe feminist media practices that engage in a politics 
of visibility as discursive activism. Discursive activism is a form of collective action 
directed at “promoting new grammars, new social paradigms through which individuals, 
collectivities, and institutions interpret social circumstances and devise responses to 
them” (p. 3). Through this tactic, feminist media activists, past and present, have 
endeavored to make visible and deconstruct those hegemonic discourses that, on a daily 
basis, marginalize some bodies while privileging others. In their place, feminists 
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collectively construct and broadcast new interpretive frameworks for representing 
marginalized identities, understanding oppressive experiences, and responding to 
systemic injustices. As Patricia Hill Collins (2000) argues, this process of feminist 
“rearticulation” (p. 32) speaks power into visibility so that its very foundation can be 
challenged, deconstructed, and replaced with alternative epistemologies, formed from a 
feminist standpoint. Here, speech is performative, but not in the colloquial sense of being 
inauthentic or superficial, a critique some commentators have leveled against hashtag 
activism. Rather, speech is performative in the sense that Judith Butler (1990), drawing 
on speech act theory, deploys the term to describe gender as a “stylized repetition of 
acts,” constrained by historically specific gendered discourses, which “founds and 
consolidates the subject” (p. 140). Speech, in other words, is productive, constituting 
subject positions and creating material effects for the speaker and listener beyond its 
transmission. And while discursive frameworks governing normative behaviors and 
identities conscribe a speaker’s agency, the act of articulating and rearticulating, or, to 
use Butler’s (2011) term, “reiterating” (p. xviii) these dominant discourses presents an 
opportunity to creatively challenge and revise gendered scripts. Feminist politics of 
visibility are a performative politics, with the potential to produce change by highlighting 
the instability of the discursive formations shaping everyday actions and by modeling 
alternative ways of being.  
Sustained social movements engaged in performative politics often develop their 
own repertoires of what Tilly and Tarrow (2015) call “contentious performances” (p. 11), 
a standardized array of tactics for one set of political actors to make claims on another, 
staged for proximal or distant audiences, repeated over time and adapted for particular 
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causes, which draw on familiar scripts with room for improvisation. Following Jeffrey 
Alexander’s (2004) definition of performance, through these tactics, political actors 
appropriate shared cultural scripts and codes to “display for others the meaning of their 
social situation” (p. 529). Effective performances convince onlookers that the meanings 
actors convey are true and foster solidarity between actors and their audiences, thereby 
facilitating the type of discursive activism Young (1997) describes. In addition to in-
person actions like street protests, sit-ins, and speak-outs, across their history, U.S. 
feminist movements have drawn on a repertoire of contentious, mediated performances. 
From 1960s-era manifestos on women’s liberation (Lyon, 1999; Young, 1997) to today’s 
viral hashtags, feminists’ media practices have not only brought visibility to the social 
situations of women and other marginalized communities, but have, through their 
production and circulation, challenged assumptions surrounding whose voice matters.  
While their tactical emphasis on visibility through discourse and performance 
predates the internet, as #MeToo has demonstrated, in the digital age, feminists take the 
contentious performances of discursive activism to a new level with networked visibility 
campaigns. Through practices like hashtag feminism, activists appropriate social media 
platforms’ everyday accessibility and participatory nature, their convergence with 
traditional news and entertainment media outlets, and their transnational reach to 
collectively politicize the personal and articulate demands for recognition on a global 
scale. In previous generations, political actors’ ability to gain a large audience depended 
upon their ability to gain news media attention, which in turn depended upon their 
organizational capacities and resources (Koopmans, 2004). Today, a compelling and 
timely Tweet can provide activists with immediate access to a sprawling network of 
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audience members, who can actively support and even join the performance by sharing a 
Tweet or posting a message under a hashtag, at little or no expense. This features make 
hashtag activism a tactic-of-choice for DIO feminists. Conservative critics’ concerns 
about #MeToo’s implications for the status quo of gender relations suggest that, beyond 
lowering the cost of mobilization, networked visibility offers an effective means to an 
end, a political performance with the potential to produce effects beyond visibility itself.  
Much existing research demonstrates the positive sociopolitical impact, real or 
potential, of hashtag feminists’ performative politics of visibility.  
Scholars have, for example, begun documenting the role hashtags, through the 
diffusion of affectively compelling stories and images, can play in the pursuit of justice 
for a sexual violence survivor (Powell, 2015; Powell & Henry, 2017; Wood, Rose, & 
Thompson, 2018). But while these individual cases of “viral justice” (Wood, Rose, & 
Thompson, 2018) often raise important questions for law enforcement and policy makers, 
scholars have also drawn on theories of discursive power to identify hashtag feminism’s 
implications for the structural level of society. What Yang (2016), in his study of 
#BlackLivesMatter, calls the “narrative agency” (p. 14) of the hashtag form enables 
participants to not only share their own personal narratives, but to collectively challenge 
the discursive frameworks shaping interpretations of and responses to social issues. 
Feminist media studies scholars have demonstrated how, through their narrative agency, 
feminist hashtag campaigns offer an especially effective tactic for challenging norms and 
myths that enable sexual violence (Barker-Plummer & Barker-Plummer, 2017). 
Campaigns like #NotOkay, #WhyIStayed, and #YesAllWomen invite survivors to not 
only share otherwise silenced experiences, but to simultaneously rewrite the commonly 
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accepted narrative that victims are to blame for their own assaults, thereby shifting 
responsibility and shame onto the shoulders of offenders (Clark, 2016; Jenkins & Mazer, 
2017; Lokot, 2018; Maas et al., 2018; Stenberg, 2017; Williams, 2015). Others, such as 
#StopStreetHarassment and #SafetyTipsForLadies, critique discourses that enable sexual 
violence and, in the process, limit women’s autonomy and agency in public spaces, often 
through direct address to the predominantly male perpetrators of sexual assault and 
harassment (Eagle, 2015; Rentschler, 2015).  
When feminist hashtags converge with traditional media outlets, their interpretive 
frameworks take on an even higher degree of visibility and resonance, amplifying their 
ability to have lasting effects on everyday discourse. This dynamic is especially evident 
in the case of hashtag campaigns targeting sexist and racist representations in news, 
advertising, and entertainment media (Clark, 2014; Horeck, 2014; Meyer, 2014; Stache, 
2015). As I have argued in previous work, once a feminist hashtag goes viral, it becomes 
newsworthy, and, in the most successful cases, news media outlets adopt the interpretive 
framework the campaign advances (Clark, 2016). This was the case, for example, when 
journalists and news broadcasters adopted the #WhyIStayed campaign’s narrative that 
domestic violence survivors should be supported, rather than blamed, a reversal of the 
longstanding victim-blaming narratives that have characterized news portrayals of rape 
and assault survivors (Clark, 2016; O’Hara, 2012). In another instance, following the 
viral 2014 #NotBuyingIt campaign, which targeted the traditionally sexist commercials 
that air during the Super Bowl, there was marked turn in advertising toward 
“femvertising,” or advertisements that bend gender norms or offer positive depictions of 
women and girls (Clark, 2014; McGregor, 2017). In a similar fashion, others have 
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identified hashtag feminism as an effective tactic for challenging anti-feminist rhetoric 
and offensive stereotypes of feminists, as in the case of the #IAmAFeminist campaign 
(Lane, 2015; Kim, 2017).  
The virality of a hashtag is typically short-lived, making each campaign described 
above seem more like what Tarana Burke, when articulating her concerns about the 
#MeToo campaign’s sustainability, has described as a “moment” rather than a 
“movement” (NBC News, 2017). But feminist media studies scholars have argued that 
these hashtag campaigns have had three major long-lasting effects, for both feminist 
politics and society at large. 
For one, hashtags have provided platforms for launching intersectional 
interventions into contemporary feminist politics and popular discourse. Jessie Daniels 
(2016) argues that while systems of oppression persist online and “white feminism” 
continues to manifest within feminist networks, Twitter offers new opportunities for 
activists to broadcast intersectional critiques of exclusionary feminist actions and 
movements. As black feminist blogger and author Mikki Kendall observes, “Twitter is 
changing everything. Now, people are forced to hear us and women of color no longer 
need the platform of white feminism to have their own microphones” (qtd. in Vasquez, 
2013). Kendall, herself, used Twitter as a microphone to critique white liberal feminists’ 
failure to address racism and support women of color when she ignited the hashtag 
campaign, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, which grew into a watershed moment for 
online feminism (Kendall, 2013; Loza, 2014). Others, such as Tynes, Schuschke, and 
Noble (2016), Brown et al. (2017), and Kuo (2016), have demonstrated how racial justice 
hashtags like #BlackLivesMatter, #SayHerName, #IfTheyGunnedMeDown, and 
155155 
#NotYourAsianSidekick enable a “digital intersectionality” (Tynes, Schuschke, & Noble, 
2016, p. 22). Hashtag networks create an opportunity for people standing at the 
intersection of multiple, overlapping oppressions to build coalitions and deconstruct 
interlocking systems of power (Loza, 2014; Rodino-Colocino, 2014). The shift that 
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) describe from collective to connective action, from the at-
times exclusionary organizations of 1960s-era feminist movements to the networked, 
participatory, open access nature of networked feminism, has created new possibilities 
for intersectional feminist critique. This, in turn, has led to productive, though at times 
difficult, public discussions concerning who feminism is for and what it means to be a 
feminist, contributing to the work of developing a feminist politics for the current 
political moment.8 
Second, in addition to shaping a more intersectional feminist praxis, the 
interpretive frameworks feminist hashtags advance can inform responses to social 
injustices long after an individual campaign has reached peak visibility. Samantha Thrift 
(2014) argues that hyper-visible hashtags like #YesAllWomen take on the qualities of a 
“feminist meme event” (p. 1091), or a widely shared cultural reference. While 
#YesAllWomen was sparked by a particular event — the 2014 killings in Isla Vista, CA, 
in which 22-year-old Elliot Rodger killed six people and injured fourteen others to punish 
women for rejecting him — it quickly grew into a reference point for “how we 
																																																								
8	When feminist hashtags first began going viral around 2013 and 2014, a number of 
trending news stories described those that critiqued exclusionary feminist discourse and 
actions as “toxic.” For example, in the most prominent of these pieces, Michelle 
Goldberg, writing for The Nation, described “Feminism’s Toxic Twitter Wars.” These 
pieces sparked a debate over whether hashtags featuring feminists of color “calling out” 
white feminists were productive or divisive. For an overview of these debates, see 
Thelandersson (2014) and Risam (2015).  
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conceptualize and choose to narrate misogynist aggression and gender violence in 
American culture” (Thrift, 2014, p. 1091). Beyond conceptualizing gender violence, 
hashtag feminism can also influence how we respond to it. Carrie Rentschler (2017) 
argues that hashtag feminists, through acts of “networked feminist witnessing” (p. 565), 
model intersectional interventions into everyday experiences of oppression. In particular, 
Rentschler’s analysis focuses on hashtag campaigns like #YouOkSis, which promote an 
anti-carceral, transformative justice approach to bystander intervention into gendered and 
racialized street harassment, one that seeks to support survivors and raise public 
consciousness rather than perpetuate further racialized violence by calling on the state to 
punish perpetrators. Their “activist pedagogy” informs not only individual responses to 
everyday encounters with street harassment, but has also pushed anti-street harassment 
organizations to adopt an intersectional approach that centers communities of color when 
addressing this issue. In their ethnographic work, Keller, Mendes, and Ringrose (2018) 
demonstrate that the act of circulating or participating in a hashtag campaign is a 
pedagogical experience in and of itself, in which women and girls learn to publicly 
document their encounters with sexual violence, so as to find support and develop 
collective responses to these injustices, as in the case of #BeenRapedNeverReported. 
Through their consciousness-raising work, feminist hashtags, these scholars suggest, can 
have a lasting material impact on participants and their audiences, reshaping how they 
interpret and react to everyday encounters with gender-based oppression well after any 
one campaign ends. Feminist hashtag campaigns, in other words, form a collective 
memory, a set of symbolic resources and scripts that can be utilized and invoked in the 
future.  
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Finally, the networking functions of feminist hashtags facilitate the formation of 
communal spaces and collective identities. Much existing scholarship on hashtag 
feminism describes hashtag networks as counterpublics (Drüeke & Zobl, 2016; Jackson 
& Banaszczyk, 2016; Kuo, 2018; Sills et al., 2016). Nancy Fraser (1992) first defined 
counterpublic spheres as “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated 
social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses , which in turn permit them to 
formulate opposition interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (p. 67). The 
invention and circulation of a hashtag’s counterdiscourse brings a counterpublic of 
hashtag practitioners and lurkers into being and within that space, participants 
collectively shape and refine a campaign’s message and reflect on its implications for 
their own personal lives and identities. For example, in their analyses of #YesAllWomen 
and its critical offshoot, #YesAllWhiteWomen, Sarah J. Jackson and Sonia Banaszczyk 
(2016) demonstrate how participants negotiate with one another “to define and redefine 
counterpublic narratives from their respective standpoints” (p. 392). In the case of these 
two campaigns, feminists of color and their allies worked to correct the original hashtag’s 
collapsing of womanhood along the axis of gendered oppression alone and to shed light 
on the particular ways in which women of color experience sexual violence. Feelings of 
solidarity, formed through affective ties, shared experiences, or a common identity, allow 
for this negotiation to take place without the counterpublic dissolving over disagreements 
(Barker-Plummer & Barker-Plummer, 2017; Khoja-Moolji, 2015; Kim, 2017; Williams 
& Gonlin, 2017). The counterdiscourses circulated through these networked communities 
and the bonds that hold them together outlive a hashtag’s moment in the limelight. Even 
after a hashtag loses its newsworthiness, the record of its counterdiscourses remain and, 
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in some cases, hashtag counterpublics with especially strong bonds can be mobilized to 
respond to new issues and to support members long after the campaign’s initial diffusion 
(Kim, 2017).  
Taken together, much existing scholarship helps explain why a hashtag campaign 
like #MeToo, a tactic that some have dismissed as “slacktivism,” could so deeply disturb 
conservative critics. #MeToo, through the global reach of its performative politics of 
visibility, has the potential to not only change the way we talk about sexual violence, but 
to equip us with the intersectional feminist epistemologies necessary for better addressing 
harassment and assault and supporting survivors. Such a social transformation could 
overturn patriarchal systems of power. 
Hashtag Feminism, an Economy of Visibility 
But feminist #MeToo critics questioned whether the hashtag’s unprecedented 
degree of visibility did more to harm the movement than to strengthen it.  
#MeToo and its spinoffs exposed the prevalence of sexual misconduct across a 
variety of different sectors and industries and, in the process, had taken down a number 
of offenders. As Faludi (2017) laments, however, the hashtag and its accompanying 
media coverage overemphasized the stories of individual survivors and perpetrators, 
which, while important, undermined the campaign’s ability to transform a system of 
gender-based oppression. Feminist critics like Faludi have charged that the most visible 
strands of #MeToo — the viral hashtag, the celebrity activists, the news cycles dedicated 
to the latest exposure of a high-profile perpetrator — limit engagement with these 
complicated issues to performance alone. Doreen St. Félix (2017), for example, describes 
the “theatre of accountability” that emerged within the television news industry following 
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the viral diffusion of #MeToo. When perpetrators like Matt Lauer and Charlie Rose were 
exposed, the accused’s female co-anchors were tasked with publicly embodying 
networks’ shock, grief, and shame, an emotional performance with the power to distract 
audiences from the structural inequalities that have plagued the industry for decades (St. 
Félix, 2017). Amanda Hess (2018) argues that the film industry has similarly transmuted 
#MeToo’s politics of visibility through performance, using celebrity spokeswomen’s red 
carpet activism to skirt “a conversation about its culture of harassment in favor of one 
about what an amazing job it is doing combating that harassment.” Critics like Hess also 
point out that once #MeToo was “fed through the Hollywood machine,” the campaign’s 
collective action against sexual violence was commodified into individualistic acts of 
consumption and self-styling.  
Others have asked who benefits from the campaign’s pop culture currency and 
whose suffering is given space on the #MeToo stage. Women of color and women in 
low-wage jobs face higher rates of sexual assault and harassment than white women, but 
their experiences and activism have been overlooked within media coverage of the 
campaign (Lockhart, 2017). Meanwhile, the experiences and activism of conventionally 
beautiful, white, heteronormative, affluent, and educated women have dominated the 
#MeToo-related media coverage (Lockhart, 2017; White, 2017). This differential access 
to visibility played out most clearly as media coverage of white celebrity activists 
eclipsed the grassroots organizing efforts of Tarana Burke; the movement’s founder was 
omitted from Time Magazine’s “Person of the Year” cover image in favor of white 
celebrities Ashley Judd and Taylor Swift.  
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Still other feminist commentators weighed the negative consequences of 
#MeToo’s hypervisible performance of feminist politics against any possible benefits. 
Rather than turning attention exclusively toward perpetrators, the campaign placed the 
burden of visibility on survivors, who relived traumatic experiences as they shared and 
read stories through the hashtag (LaMotte, 2017) and who faced harassment and trolling 
with the onslaught of “the #MeToo backlash” (Gianino, 2017; Tolentino, 2018).  
For these critics, #MeToo’s politics of visibility too often slip into what Banet-
Weiser (2015a; 2018a; 2018b) calls economies of visibility, neoliberal systems of 
exchange underpinned by the marketplace logics of individualism and monetization in 
which representation in consumer media culture is positioned as the height of 
empowerment. Whereas, within a politics of visibility, representation and recognition are 
parts of a collectively organized struggle to achieve political goals, within an economy of 
visibility, political action begins and ends with representation. This system has far 
sweeping implications our everyday social, political, and economic practices that are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. But importantly for my purposes here, it dovetails 
neatly with U.S. feminists’ longstanding demands to be seen and recognized in laws, 
media, the workplace, and other institutions, making feminist movements particularly 
vulnerable to absorption within it. As Fraser (1995), in her critique of Butler’s work, 
argues, feminists’ tactical emphasis on the symbolic power of discourse and performance 
leaves them highly susceptible “to commodification, recuperation, and depoliticization — 
especially in the absence of strong social movements struggling for social justice” (p. 
163). The viral Twitter hashtag, which promises easy access to large audiences without 
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the resources of a highly organized movement but which is simultaneously embedded in 
a corporately owned platform, appears especially open to this cooptation.  
Certain aspects of the #MeToo movement illustrate Banet-Weiser’s and Fraser’s 
point. The most visible forms of #MeToo flow through the “attention economy” of 
commercial media, where clicks, likes, ratings, and ad revenues are the primary goals and 
where experiences as complex as sexual violence are easily simplified and commodified 
(Banet-Weiser, 2018a). This mainstreaming makes feminist discourse accessible to broad 
audiences, but it simultaneously constrains feminist politics. Economies of visibility 
restrict political engagement to representation in the marketplace; within its monetized 
logic, seeing or buying feminism is equated with doing feminism, with acting to 
transform patriarchal structures of power (Banet-Weiser, 2018b). Following Banet-
Weiser’s argument, the hypervisible, commodified strands of #MeToo obscure and, 
worse still, enable systems of inequality by limiting activism against sexual violence to 
individualistic performance, spectatorship, and consumption, rather than collective 
organizing.  
Moreover, because systems of inequality structure access to representation in the 
marketplace, economies of visibility compound intersecting oppressions by further 
marginalizing underprivileged actors, as seen in white women’s domination of #MeToo. 
Like the TV and film industries’ performances of remorse in response to #MeToo, 
economies of visibility drain the “politics” from the politics of visibility, such that 
addressing social injustice begins and ends with performance, leaving behind-the-scenes 
structures of inequality intact. In a similar fashion as the postfeminist sensibility 
described in Chapter 2, economies of visibility turn the feminist politics of visibility on 
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its head; rather than making the personal political, economies of visibility constrain 
political action to an individual’s performance of self in consumer culture. In this way, 
economies of visibility also reflect and warp the do-it-ourselves ethos of contemporary 
feminist actions and movements. Rather than encouraging the collective, extra-
institutional actions of DIOF, economies of visibility emphasize individually focused and 
enacted performances. If feminist politics of visibility are performative in the sense of 
being productive, economies of visibility are performative in the sense of being 
individualistic, superficial, inauthentic, and politically ineffectual.  
While most existing scholarship takes a celebratory approach toward hashtag 
feminism’s political potential, more critical research identifies economies of visibility at 
work in other recent feminist hashtag campaigns.  
Hashtag campaigns trade on short but compelling narratives told in 140-280 
characters or less, which risks, as some scholars have argued, oversimplifying and even 
replicating structural inequalities. Caroline Dadas (2017) argues that hashtag activism 
“simultaneously draws attention to a cause and obscures important facets of the cause 
such as historical background or socio-political context” (p. 18). This has been especially 
evident in hashtag campaigns that address non-Western contexts but are dominated by 
Western participants. For example, in the case of the 2014 #BringBackOurGirls 
campaign, which followed the abduction of nearly 300 Nigerian school girls by the 
extremist group Boko Haram, the hashtag’s attempts to promote women’s rights in the 
Global South were undermined by its possessive, paternalistic, and imperial language 
(Berents, 2016; Dadas, 2014; Khoja-Moolji, 2015; Loken, 2014; Maxfield, 2016).  
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Others have argued that the hypervisibility of hashtag feminism inevitably leads 
to backlash in the form of online trolling and harassment (Banet-Weiser, 2015b; Cole, 
2015; Drüeke & Zobl, 2016; Woods, 2014). While U.S. feminist movements have 
historically faced backlash, hashtag campaigns, due to their emphasis on viral 
performances rather than sustained organizing, do not possess the capacity to collectively 
address harassment and the Twitter platform’s reporting mechanisms often fail to cut 
harassment off at the source.  
Relatedly, scholars have expressed concerns that the performative qualities of 
hashtag feminism — the satisfaction that comes with participation and the illusion of 
having “done something” — might lead to the erroneous belief that offline activism is not 
necessary, while its hypervisibility can mask any offline organizing that is taking place 
(Maxfield, 2016). Plus, as scholars of postfeminism have argued, when a feminist 
movement is limited to a hashtagged performance, it is easily coopted for non-feminist 
purposes; the act of posting a hashtag, for example, can be morphed into a self-branding 
strategy (Pruchniewska, 2017) or even hijacked by trolls (Ganzer, 2014).  
Lastly, hashtag feminism’s networked visibility can exclude those most 
marginalized communities. Not only is representation in economies of visibility 
structured by race and class, but access to and literacy in the technologies necessary to 
participate in networked visibility campaigns requires a certain degree of economic and 
cultural capital (Latina & Docherty, 2014).  
Critical feminist media studies scholarship points toward the political limitations 
of hashtags as a feminist protest tactic. When read together with more celebratory takes, 
this body of research suggests that hashtag feminists’ viral performances may edge news 
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media and popular culture toward more feminist discourse, but their emphasis on 
symbolic power risks leaving structural systems of domination — patriarchy, white 
supremacy, capitalism — untouched.  
Methods, Data, and Theoretical Resources 
At the heart of the hashtag feminism and #MeToo debates are a number of 
questions concerning the efficacy of networked visibility and performance as protest 
tactics. Is the hashtagged performance compelling and convincing? If so, does it go 
beyond moving its audience to transforming systems of power? Or does it sacrifice 
structural analyses in favor of poignant sound bites? Which actors are given time in the 
spotlight and which are ignored? What risks come with making one’s experiences of 
trauma and injustice visible on a globally networked stage? And does the performance 
proceed smoothly, or is it interrupted or coopted by others with ulterior motives?  
The tensions in both the polarized responses to #MeToo and the existing 
scholarship on hashtag feminism indicate that these questions lack straightforward 
answers. A viral hashtag’s performance cannot easily be categorized as successful or 
unsuccessful, given its many reverberations throughout media, its audiences’ multiple 
and competing interpretations, and its simultaneous uptake in both the political arena and 
consumer culture. In what follows, rather than offering a critical reading of the #MeToo 
performance, its qualities, and its effects, I draw on theories of visibility, discourse, and 
performance to interpret activists’ perspectives on the political affordances and 
limitations of hashtag feminism and their strategies for juggling both.  
As an analytical entry point, I follow the lead of Alexander (2004), who, in his 
theory of cultural pragmatics, describes performance not as a text that speaks for itself, 
but as a communicative process, whose meaning unfolds through interactions among 
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actors, audience members, and their physical and social contexts. In order for political 
performers to effectively communicate their message, the activist-actors must create what 
Alexander calls a moment of “fusion” (p. 534) with their audience: “The aim is to create, 
via skillful and affecting performance, the emotional connection of audience with actor 
and text and thereby to create the conditions for projecting cultural meaning from 
performance to audience” (p. 547). Performance, in other words, is an agentive practice, 
one that requires actors to flex not only their dramaturgical skills, but their ability to 
strategically navigate the constraints of their sociopolitical settings. Here, I take up 
Alexander’s analytical focus on political actors’ agency and context to explore how 
feminists imagine and employ the political affordances of networked visibility campaigns 
like #MeToo. Only, in my case, the mise-en-scène of a hashtag network, unlike a stage in 
a theater, reaches indefinitely in countless directions and even beyond the Twitter 
platform. Given the complex terrain of a hashtag network, I add to Alexander’s original 
formulation an empirical emphasis on the strategies actors use to course correct when 
they lose control of their performance, when audiences misinterpret their message, or 
when their performance inadvertently undercuts their political goals. This processual 
approach to performance helps highlight simultaneously the promises and perils of 
networked visibility as a discursive activism tactic and how practitioners respond to both.  
In sum, this chapter takes up two questions regarding the do-it-ourselves feminist 
practice of networked visibility and performance through viral hashtag campaigns: 1) 
how do feminists understand the political affordances and limitations of hashtag 
activism? And 2) what strategies do they use to take advantage of the tactic’s strengths, 
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while coping with its weaknesses? Given its extremely high degree of global visibility, 
#MeToo offers a critical case study for this line of inquiry (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
To explore these questions, I conducted a textual analysis of two subsamples of 
#MeToo tweets, drawn from a larger master sample. #MeToo tweets published between 
October 15, 2017 and January 15, 2018 — the first three months of the hashtag’s 
existence — were selected for inclusion in the master sample using the Annenberg 
Twitter Project at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for 
Communication. Since August 2012, the Annenberg Twitter API has archived, through a 
semi-random sampling mechanism, approximately one percent of all public tweets.9 The 
search for #MeToo tweets returned an output of 27,419 tweets, excluding duplicates or 
retweets.  
From this master sample of tweets, I first coded and extracted a subsample of 
meta-tweets published during the campaign’s first 24 hours of existence, a critical period 
in a hashtag’s diffusion. I define meta-tweets as tweets in which activists comment on a 
hashtag campaign, directly address hashtag participants and readers, reflect on their own 
experiences participating in the hashtag, and/or encourage others to participate in the 
hashtag campaign. As scholars who have taken a dramaturgical approach to studying 
collective action and social life have documented, any performance includes a variety of 
																																																								
9	Researchers working with Twitter data have two options for collecting their sample: the 
Twitter Firehose, which provides full access to all public tweets at a premium price, or 
the Twitter Streaming API, which provides access to approximately one percent of all 
public tweets at no cost. The Annenberg Twitter Project is connected to the Twitter 
Streaming API. I use the phrase “semi-random” to describe the Streaming API because 
there is no public documentation on the sampling mechanism behind it. González-Bailón 
et al. (2014) and Morstatter et al. (2013) provide an overview of the selection biases in 
the data returned by the Twitter Streaming API. Because my goal here is to develop a 
sense of #MeToo activists’ experiences and perspectives, rather than a representative 
network map of the campaign, these biases should have limited impact on my analysis.  
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“characters,” each with a particular role to play (Snow, Zurcher, & Peters, 1981). In the 
case of a hashtag campaign, meta-tweeters play an active supporting role from the wings, 
talking about, analyzing, and calling attention to the campaign’s central performance 
while also providing encouragement and reinforcement for the campaign’s main 
performers. #MeToo meta-tweeters amplified the campaign and its participants but did 
not necessarily participate in the performance at the center of the campaign – publicly 
sharing sexual violence and harassment narratives. Using this definition as a guide, I 
manually identified 737 meta-tweets from the first day the hashtag went viral.  
This subsample of meta-tweets provided primary source material for 
reconstructing activists’ perspectives on the political affordances and limitations of the 
hashtag as a protest tactic. I draw on this textual analysis approach rather than other 
participatory research methods, such as ethnographic observations and interviews, for 
several reasons.  
For one, observing hashtag campaigns poses a number of logistical issues. Twitter 
is a large, public-by-default, social networking platform, making it difficult to bound the 
platform as a field site or determine who or what should be included in an ethnographic 
study (Marwick, 2013). While scholars have proposed delineating Twitter field sites by 
tracing hashtag networks (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015; Marwick, 2013), a rich, contextual 
understanding of hashtag uses and meanings requires going beyond individual 
campaigns, tracing its connections throughout the media landscape, and following 
practitioners long after the campaign has stopped trending. This longitudinal work, while 
important, is beyond the scope of my project here.  
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Interviewing hashtag participants comes with similar practical concerns. 
Recruitment can be challenging, as potential recruits may ignore requests from strangers, 
which in turn makes developing a representative sample of participants difficult 
(Marwick, 2013). Moreover, interviewing someone about their participation in a hashtag 
campaign may involve asking them to reflect on an experience long after it happened, 
raising concerns about not only about the quality of their recollections, but also about the 
passage of time altering their perspectives on the campaign.  
A meta-tweet analysis helps circumvent these issues by providing a large sample 
of activists’ commentary on a hashtag campaign, articulated and published while the 
campaign was still unfolding. Although it is not ethnographic, this type of data allows the 
researcher to observe in-group discussions of protest tactics, as activists’ tweeted 
commentaries on hashtag campaigns are often directed at fellow activists. This method 
also comes with the added benefit of not requiring activists to repeat themselves in 
interviews and reproduce labor they have already performed, but still enabling an 
analysis grounded in their perspectives. While scholars have used “meta-tweets” as a 
coding category in content analyses of hashtag campaigns (e.g., Schrading et al., 2015), 
no existing scholarship has taken up meta-tweets as primary source material for analysis. 
One contribution of this chapter is the development of this method as a practitioner-
focused, qualitative approach for studying hashtag activism.  
I took an inductive coding approach to my subsample of meta-tweets (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). First, I coded the meta-tweets for emergent themes. I 
analyzed approximately half of my sample of meta-tweets and recorded themes that 
emerged from feminists’ commentary on the hashtag campaign. Next, I identified 
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connections across these themes and grouped them into four major categories: 1) hashtag 
participants’ understandings of the political potential of #MeToo, 2) their takes on the 
tactic’s political limitations along with their attempts to redress these shortcomings, 3) 
their concerns regarding whose voices and what experiences are included in the hashtag’s 
interpretive framework, and 4) their efforts to support the campaign and protect its 
survivor-participants. Then, I analyzed the entire sample of meta-tweets and coded them 
according to these four categories.  
To supplement my subsample of commentary on the hashtag, I also ran a search 
on the entire three-month sample of #MeToo tweets for posts that contained keywords 
relevant to existing critiques of the campaign or controversial flashpoints in the 
campaign’s trajectory, including “celebrities,” “women of color,” “white women,” 
“Tarana,” and “Golden Globes,” among others. These keyword searches yielded 
approximately 2,400 tweets, some of which overlapped with my subsample of meta-
tweets. My goal in using this keyword sampling technique was to identify how hashtag 
feminists responded to specific representational struggles that emerged as the networked 
visibility campaign grew.  
In addition to this keyword-based subsample, I also continued to follow Tarana 
Burke’s tweets to keep tabs on her reflections on #MeToo in the months beyond my 
sample time frame. 
As is the case in many feminist hashtag campaigns, the tweets included in my 
subsamples and quoted throughout the remainder of this chapter often contain deeply 
personal and potentially compromising stories of trauma, abuse, and recovery. Analyzing 
this material consequently calls for a feminist ethic of care (Edwards & Mauthner, 2002). 
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Following the Association of Internet Researchers’ (2012) recommendations for ethical 
decision making, I chose to take a contextual approach to #MeToo participants’ privacy 
to limit any risk to those quoted throughout this chapter. While all of the tweets captured 
by the Annenberg Twitter API were publicly available when archived, I recognize that 
#MeToo participants have not consented to publicizing their tweets and identities within 
other contexts beyond the Twitter platform. With this in mind, throughout this chapter, I 
use pseudonyms in place of Twitter handles or omitted handles altogether. I also made 
minor alterations to participants’ word choices, such that their tweets retain the same 
meanings but cannot be traced back to the authors through a Google search. Exceptions 
have been made in the cases of nonprofit organizations, celebrities, and public figures.  
Drawing on theories of visibility, discourse, and performance, I argue that hashtag 
feminism is a type of performance that enables activists to bridge two levels of visibility 
— the individual and the collective — in order to make the personal political and 
advance new interpretations of everyday experiences of oppression. Within this practice 
in the politics of visibility, the latter is not possible without the former; in the case of 
#MeToo, for sexual violence to be made visible as a systemic injustice, individuals 
needed to publicly perform their status as survivors or their allies. The process of 
building up from an individual to a collective performance of visibility, however, 
introduces a variety of different personal and political vulnerabilities. Grounded in my 
sample of meta-tweets, I highlight what I call the performance maintenance strategies 
feminists developed to negotiate between the affordances and limitations of hashtag 
activism and to push toward an intersectional, transformative politics of visibility.  
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Findings and Discussion 
The Radical Act of Saying “Me, Too” 
For many #MeToo participants, simply tweeting the two-word phrase was a 
radical act. Across my sample, participants frequently described sharing stories of 
survival under #MeToo as a “brave” and even “revolutionary” practice in “breaking 
silence,” “standing up,” “speaking out,” and shining a “light…in the darkness.” These 
activists’ reflections suggested that to tweet #MeToo was to take an action akin to 
protesting in the streets, to speak power into visibility, and to loudly call attention to 
sexual violence such that it can no longer be ignored:  
@Spreading_L0ve: To all of those bravely sharing their stories of sexual 
 assault/harassment using #MeToo: we stand with you and by you. (October 15, 
 2017, 8:16pm) 
 
@colecat06: Me too. There shouldn't be so many of us, but there are. Let them 
 hear us, we're silent no more. #MeToo (October 15, 2017, 9:21pm) 
 
@Amy_Siskind: I have never seen anything so amazing as what we started today 
 with #MeToo. This is the beginning of a revolution. Strength and compassion. 
 (October 15, 2017, 10:54pm) 
 
@AVAproject: To all those who are speaking out with #MeToo. Your collective 
 roar is more powerful than you can imagine. Thank you! (October 16, 2017, 
 8:07am) 
 
As these tweets make clear through their use of direct address and plural pronouns — “all 
of those,” “us,” “we,” “collective,” “you” — the revolutionary power of #MeToo 
stemmed from the sheer volume of people publishing their stories under the hashtag. The 
hashtag created a platform for hundreds of thousands of survivors, who, through their 
networked assembly, demanded recognition of sexual violence as a global, systemic, 
social injustice. 
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But before there could be a plural “we,” the campaign needed to start with the 
singular “me.” While a hashtag’s influence is often described in terms of its mass and 
spread, #MeToo’s initial spark and viral diffusion depended upon individual activists, 
who made the personal decision to participate in the campaign. Prior to #MeToo, many 
participants reported that they had rarely, if ever, spoken about their trauma in public. 
Some even gave voice to experiences they had repressed for decades; as one participant 
wrote, “60 years old and I still have trouble saying it out loud. #MeToo (October 15, 
2017, 8:02pm).” The hashtag’s semantic structure made taking this potentially painful or 
terrifying step somewhat easier. The phrase, “me, too,” stands on its own as a complete 
statement that, when read within the context of the viral hashtag campaign, requires no 
further elaboration or explanation. This meant that participants could speak out and stand 
in solidarity with other survivors without necessarily having to detail traumatic 
experiences. While some tweeted #MeToo and nothing else, others offered reflections on 
their experiences participating in the campaign that shed light on the power of its 
simplicity:  
@LJonasDaughter: #metoo tried to figure out how to explain it with the character  
restriction. Decided #metoo said enough (October 15, 2017, 8:28pm) 
 
@LieutenantDainty: #MeToo because while I’m not ready to share my story, I 
 can be strong enough to admit that it happened. (October 16, 2017, 7:15pm) 
 
@iamhelene: I don't think I'll ever be comfortable enough to talk about it publicly 
 but #MeToo (October 15, 2017, 8:43pm) 
 
To tweet #MeToo, regardless of the rest of the message, was to perform a public demand 
for recognition on behalf of the staggering number of sexual violence survivors 
worldwide. 
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The relationship between the “me” of #MeToo and the hashtag’s “collective roar” 
indicates that there are two types of visibility at play in the campaign. First, individuals 
needed to make themselves visible as survivors of sexual violence. When aggregated and 
connected through Twitter’s hashtag function, their individual performances became the 
building blocks for the campaign’s collective visibility. This relationship between the 
individual and the collective is a key characteristic of any activist hashtag campaign. 
Activist hashtags can be understood as what Bennett and Segerberg (2012) call “personal 
action frames” (p. 744), or “easily personalized ideas” (p. 744), which unite many 
activists under a common interpretive framework while also leaving room for individuals 
to share their specific reasons for participating in a protest action. The social and 
technical processes behind the spread of a hashtag’s personal action frame bridge the 
individual and the collective. #MeToo’s personal action frame, for example, invites 
individuals to share their particular stories of survival while joining a mass movement of 
people posting the same hashtag. The same individual/collective dynamic has unfolded 
through all of the major activist hashtag campaigns of the past decade. 
For U.S. feminists, however, the hashtag’s ability to network individual 
performances into collective protest is an especially key political affordance. A hashtag’s 
aggregation of individual expressions under a collectively shared framework parallels the 
feminist practice of making the personal political. Through public performances and 
personal storytelling, feminists have, since the Civil Rights Era, identified commonalities 
in women’s experiences in order to call attention to gendered systems of power (Hanisch, 
1969). Hashtag feminism digitizes this process, rejuvenating feminist activism for the 
internet age and re-politicizing the personal in the age of neoliberalism (Baer, 2015). The 
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feminist hashtag not only marks and organizes a particular topic, but symbolically 
indexes a set of personal experiences that, while varied in their specific details, are rooted 
in a shared context of oppression (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). In this way, hashtag feminism 
engages in a performative politics of visibility, in which one person’s narrative, when 
shared and connected with many others, makes power visible so that it might be 
deconstructed and challenged. Like the discursive activism of previous generations, 
hashtag feminists’ performative speech popularizes alternative epistemologies for 
interpreting and responding to injustices.  
Tweeting #MeToo, in other words, produces a generative visibility, a 
performance that, beyond asking for attention, has material effects for the performer and 
her audience. Much of the activist commentary in my sample argues that, just as #MeToo 
bridges individual and collective levels of visibility, its performative politics can spark 
change at both the personal and structural levels of society.  
At the level of the individual, the sheer volume of #MeToo tweets elicited intense 
emotional responses from those watching the campaign unfold, ranging from shock, 
anger, and sadness to relief and even pride, suggesting that the hashtag’s performance 
resonated deeply with many audience members. For some, seeing friends, family, and 
colleagues using the hashtag made the magnitude of the problem hit home, gave sexual 
violence statistics a human face, and inspired them to take action:  
@JennyS38: #MeToo brings so many emotions right now...But one 
 overwhelming emotion is admiration towards the people who have stood up and 
 shared their experiences so that the everyone will realize this problem is real and 
 can’t be buried and ignored. (October 16, 2017, 8:08pm) 
 
@hmetal250: #MeToo as a man I am so shocked this has been happening to so 




@BolderSpeed: Every #MeToo tweet in my timeline is a kick to my stomach. I 
 have no words. Sad. Angry. Not surprised. Keep speaking out (October 16, 2017, 
 8:17am) 
 
For others, seeing their social media feeds filled with survivors’ stories, paired with 
words of support from allies, removed the shame associated with being a victim of sexual 
violence and encouraged them to speak out about their own experiences. The process of 
retelling their stories, from their perspectives and in their words, enabled survivors to 
simultaneously wrest agency over their own narratives away from dominant frameworks 
for interpreting sexual violence, facilitating a personal transformation. One participant 
framed her decision to share as a refusal to feel shame or guilt for her own assault: “I 
struggled with posting publicly. So, I made myself do it, because that's the point. It isn’t 
my shame. It wasn't my fault. #MeToo” (October 15, 2017, 8:17pm). Others described a 
therapeutic feeling of catharsis that came with reading #MeToo tweets or participating in 
the campaign: 
@BonnieLMann: Being a voice in the silence tears down walls and brings 
 healing. #MeToo (October 15, 2017, 10:29pm) 
 
@topreject: #MeToo It took me many years to be able to cope. In the end I 
 decided talking about it removed all of its power (15 October 15, 2017, 9:27pm) 
 
While much commentary on the campaign focused on its implications for 
individual survivors, some #MeToo participants took up the hashtag to directly address 
individual perpetrators and bystanders and, more specifically, to ask men to take action 
against sexual assault and harassment. In response, individual male allies used the 
hashtag to document how #MeToo had changed their perception of sexual harassment 
and assault and what steps they were going to take to combat misogyny and sexual 
violence in their everyday lives. When read alongside survivors’ reflections on 
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participating in the campaign, their tweets evidence a shift at the individual level in who 
carries the burden of shame for sexual violence, from victims to perpetrators and 
bystanders:  
@oughthere: The #MeToo hashtag is heartbreaking but not surprising. I have 
 definitely harassed women before. I must do better. We must do better. (October 
 15, 2017, 8:11pm) 
 
@Tejano2200: Reading stories of sexual harassment makes me feel ashamed of 
 my gender for staying quiet. We need to speak out against injustice. #MeToo 
 (October 15, 2017, 7:20pm) 
 
These reactions and reflections from #MeToo participants suggest that the campaign 
created what Alexander (2004) calls a moment of emotional “fusion” between the 
hashtag’s performers and individual audience members. Survivors’ #MeToo stories 
moved their readers to reevaluate their perspectives on sexual violence and take actions 
against it, either by coming forward with their own experiences or by making a 
commitment to change their behavior and challenge that of others.  
As the hashtag campaign grew from individual survivors coming forward to a 
collective protest that spanned the globe, so, too, did #MeToo’s ability to implement 
change a the structural level of society.  
Repeatedly throughout my sample, activists identified the hashtag campaign’s 
virality as a powerful tactic for illustrating the pervasiveness of sexual violence. One 
sentence frequently copied and pasted throughout the campaign’s first few days described 
the hashtag’s power in numbers: “If all who have been sexually harassed or assaulted 
posted #MeToo, people might understand the magnitude of the issue.” While each 
narrative shared under the hashtag is unique, the “too” in #MeToo’s discursive framing 
explicitly points toward sexual violence as a repeated and systemic, rather than private or 
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personal, issue. The hashtag’s ability to network a large variety of sexual violence 
narratives under a common interpretive framework enabled activists to politicize personal 
encounters with harassment and assault, contextualizing participants’ individual stories 
against the shared backdrop of the gendered systems of oppression that enable sexual 
violence to persist. In turn, #MeToo helped survivors to break through the shameful 
alienation that often comes with sexual violence and mobilize around their shared trauma. 
One activist described the feeling of collective solidarity and power that #MeToo 
generated: “My entire feed is filled with survivors saying #MeToo. Something powerful 
is happening. We're everywhere, and together, we’re unstoppable” (October 15, 2017, 
7:18pm).  
The hashtag’s aggregation of survivor stories combined with its eventual takeover 
of mainstream media called attention to sexual violence such that it can no longer be 
ignored or normalized into invisibility. As one activist put it early on in the campaign, 
“Willful blindness will no longer excuse our silence. #MeToo” (October 15, 2017, 
6:54pm). But beyond bringing visibility to the issue, #MeToo’s emphasis on the 
pervasiveness of sexual violence also busted the victim-blaming myths that have come to 
dominate discourse surrounding harassment and assault (O’Hara, 2012). The hundreds of 
thousands of stories compiled under the hashtag implicitly challenge the notion that 
sexual violence results from a one-off encounter with a “bad guy” or from a victim’s 
irresponsible choices. In a common sentiment shared among activists reflecting on the 
campaign, one survivor tweeted, “#MeToo, just like most other women” (October 16, 
2017, 6:45am), framing sexual violence as an issue that is deeply rooted in gendered 
systems of power and that cuts across all industries, sectors, and cultures. Others 
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emphasized this point more explicitly, using the hashtag as an opportunity to take up 
common victim-blaming myths and debunk them: “It's not your clothing. It's not your 
politics. It's not your education. It's your assailant. #MeToo” (October 15, 2017, 
10:50pm). The activists in my sample frequently made connections between #MeToo’s 
discursive activism and its potential to create material changes at the structural level of 
society. By pushing against the discourses that excuse sexual harassment and assault, the 
hashtag campaign might just “stop the cycle” of sexual violence “for future generations.”  
From many participants’ perspectives, #MeToo was far more than just another 
trending hashtag. As personal stories grew into a movement, the hashtag became a 
collective demand for recognition that, through its very performance, had far reaching 
implications at both the individual and structural levels of society. The American Civil 
Liberties Union summed up this sentiment succinctly in a tweet: “This is how change 
happens, one brave voice at a time. #MeToo” (October 16, 2017, 9:52am). 
The Challenges of Saying “Me, Too”  
At the same time, those who participated in the campaign recognized that hashtag 
feminism is not without its limitations. Relying on visibility as a protest tactic opened 
#MeToo participants up to a number of different vulnerabilities, from targeted 
harassment and re-traumatization to celebrity cooptation and representational exclusion. 
These shortcomings map on to the same individual/collective, personal/political dynamic 
that makes hashtag activism so conducive to U.S. feminist goals and values. Taken 
together with their vision of hashtag feminism’s political affordances, participants’ views 
on the tactic’s pitfalls point toward the double entanglements of networked visibility 
campaigns for feminist activists.  
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Existing scholarship and commentary on hashtag activism often frame digital 
protest as a tactic that is generally less dangerous than street protest, making it an 
especially appealing practice for those for who, because of their identities or political 
context, cannot safely practice public dissent (Eagle, 2015; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Yang, 
2009). Repeatedly throughout my sample, however, #MeToo participants highlighted the 
personal risks that came with choosing to make oneself visible as a survivor of sexual 
violence on a globally networked platform like Twitter. As the tweets quoted in the 
previous section emphasize, posting #MeToo with or without a detailed narrative 
required “bravery” and “strength,” precisely because the poster opens herself up to a 
number of different risks. Publicly performing the identity of a survivor in a cultural 
context where sexual violence victims are shamed and doubted leaves one vulnerable to 
personal attacks. Activists in my sample were quick to remind those commenting on the 
remarkable reach of the campaign that, in one participant’s words, “There’s so much 
shame around sexual abuse/assault/harassment. What you see publicly here is just a sliver 
#metoo” (@MeghanEMurphy, October 15, 2017, 2:21pm). For many, the difficulty or 
danger of having friends, family members, the general public, and possibly even their 
abusers see their #MeToo stories likely outweighed the benefits of participating in the 
campaign: 
@EzerRising: Too many women are unable to say #MeToo because they are 
 being silenced by abusers and fear being called a liar. (October 15, 2017, 8:31pm) 
 
@jennyanthro: A reminder — #MeToo might not appear on all your social media 
 feeds because survivors might still be virtually connected to their abusers 
 (October 16, 2017, 2:28pm) 
 
@bnack: if you see some women not posting #metoo they’ve probably been 
 harassed but feel silenced by a society that often punishes the woman who was 
 harassed and not the man who harassed her (October 16, 2017, 8:00am) 
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Those who chose to engage with the hashtag described a range of negative 
personal outcomes.  
While some survivors found comfort in the campaign, for others, seeing #MeToo 
trending across their social media feeds was distressing. Tweets in my sample repeatedly 
described #MeToo as a “triggering” campaign that required survivors to “relive their 
trauma.” One participant found the campaign “brutal” and “overwhelming”: “Sometimes, 
knowing you are not alone isn’t inspiring. It’s tragic. When the world screams they’ve all 
been through the same thing, it can make a survivor feel like there is no safe place and 
every person they pass, every dark alley or bar, could be the next rape” (@Grace_Durbin, 
October 15, 2017, 6:34pm). For audience members less familiar with the reality of sexual 
violence, the stories of survival shared under #MeToo were emotionally stirring and 
inspiring. But for many survivors who saw their stories reflected back at them in the their 
social media feeds, #MeToo became a nearly inescapable reminder of their personal 
trauma.  
Participants were also subjected to harassment. My sample includes several 
instances of people appropriating #MeToo to launch attacks against the campaign’s 
participants, promulgate rape myths and jokes, accuse participants of lying and “attention 
seeking,” and, in a painfully ironic testament to the campaign’s relevance, sexually harass 
and threaten participants with rape. As one participant put it bluntly, “Twitter is NOT a 
safe space” (October 15, 2017, 1:13pm), particularly for women, who are more likely 
than men to face sexual violence online and off (Casteel, Wolfe, & Nguyen, 2017; 
Duggan, 2017). In turn, those who shared their #MeToo stories risked being doubly 
victimized, first by their assailants and again by Twitter “trolls.” To make matters worse, 
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when participants reported harassment to Twitter Support, the platform often failed to 
adequately address the problem: “While #MeToo goes viral and everyone is outraged 
about Weinstein, @TwitterSupport does not consider rape taunts a violation of their 
Terms of Service” (@danibostick, October 20, 2017, 2:54pm). At the same time Twitter 
benefitted from the traffic generated by #MeToo, it failed to address sexual violence on 
its own platform.  
Just as individual visibility lays the foundation for collective visibility, for 
#MeToo participants, these personal vulnerabilities quickly scaled up into political 
vulnerabilities.  
Noting the personal risks and strain that went along with posting #MeToo, many 
campaign participants questioned why the hashtag asked survivors, rather than 
perpetrators, to disclose their status and personal trauma:  
@CatherineShu: #MeToo...but I also ask, why is the onus for change once again 
 placed on victims reliving their trauma? (October 15, 2017, 9:05pm) 
 
@chescaleigh: solidarity counts for something. but this shouldn't be our problem 
 to fix #MeToo (October 16, 2017, 1:58am) 
 
@krisboid: Why isn’t there an "I'm sorry" tweet for every #MeToo tweet? 
 (October 16, 2017, 5:36am) 
 
As the hashtag’s popularity suggests, #MeToo stories resonated deeply with audiences 
around the world, but some activists worried that the campaign asked too much of 
survivors while doing too little to hold their assailants accountable or target the systems 
of oppression that enable sexual violence to persist. For these participants, #MeToo 
joined other campaigns like #WhyIStayed and #YesAllWomen in encouraging sexual 
violence victims to publicly reflect on their experiences without explicitly pushing 
perpetrators to examine their own behavior. The result, they feared, was yet another 
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emotionally charged hashtag campaign that might capture the short attention span of 
news cycle but would do little to actually change the status quo:  
@shannonclaire9: I’m sick of seeing hashtags like #MeToo every couple of 
 months. It’s yet another effort to get people to believe us. How many hashtags 
 will it take to make people see that sexual violence is a systemic issue? (October 
 16, 2017, 10:35am) 
 
@LinLibrarian: #MeToo and, yes, you, too. But I already knew that since we did  
#YesAllWomen three years ago. Now I need to know what men are doing to 
 change this. (October 15, 2017, 11:15pm) 
 
@DebStanish: Men, we've been here before. We reported, we avoided, we did  
#YesAllWomen and #MeToo. We've DONE our share, what have you done? 
 (October 16, 2017, 8:33am) 
 
Other activists were more apprehensive about whether the #MeToo movement 
provided an inclusive platform for all victims of sexual assault and harassment. In the 
days and weeks after #MeToo first took off, feminists of color used the hashtag to call 
out white celebrity women’s appropriation and domination of the campaign and its 
accompanying media coverage: 
@chisuleyman: As important as #MeToo has been, remember the movement only 
 took off when rich white women spoke out. Women of color have been vocal for 
 a long long time but no one cared. Realize what that says about your 
 communities. (November 11, 2017, 8:11am) 
 
@VenkaylaH: A black woman launched this movement & white women tried to 
 take credit for it until people made it clear that Tarana Burke was the creator. 
 #MeToo is supposed to center the marginalized, not the privileged who have 
 access to adequate resources. (December 6, 2017, 8:13am) 
 
@FwdTogether: We can't have a full conversation about gender-based violence if 
 cis white women are the only ones heard. #MeToo #UsToo (December 1, 2017, 
 9:16am) 
 
Similarly, others pointed out that most discourse surrounding the campaign worked from 
the assumption that sexual violence is an issue that only affects cisgender, heterosexual 
women:  
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@ItsNathanielT: It’s interesting that people assume that no men have #MeToo 
 stories. We have also experienced these things. (October 16, 2017, 3:47am) 
 
@JinPossible1: I feel uncomfortable adding my #MeToo because I am not a 
 woman, but trans and non-binary people need a voice, too, so here I am. (October 
 16, 2016, 1:14am) 
 
@LindseyManson1: Men are not the only ones who assault. I rarely share my 
 story because of the embarrassment that my attacker was a woman #MeToo 
 (October 15, 2017, 6:38pm) 
 
And, as celebrities became the movement’s most visible spokespeople, #MeToo 
participants also questioned the movement’s neglect of working class survivors of sexual 
violence, as well as survivors who may not have the resources necessary to participate in 
online activism: 
@arjunsetti82: #MeToo will be on full display tonight at the Golden Globes. But 
 will celebrities remember & include undocumented women & those from 
 communities of colors who toil in factories, restaurants, homes, and elsewhere? 
 (January 7, 2018, 10:07am) 
 
@akdwaz: This hashtag is just tip of the iceberg. There are millions without a 
 computer or access to the internet who have experiences abuse on a daily basis 
 (October 16, 2017, 2:59am) 
 
@christiesland: There are women whose stories will never be heard. Women who 
 slip through the cracks, consigned to silence from poverty and circumstance. 
 #MeToo (October 16, 2017, 1:55pm) 
 
While a diverse range of narratives were aggregated under the hashtag, those most 
retweeted and reported stories of survival involved women who fit the longstanding trope 
of the “ideal victim,” the demographic most likely to have their allegations of sexual 
violence taken seriously: affluent, white, cisgender, heterosexual, and conventionally 
attractive women (Lockhart, 2017; Randall, 2010). #MeToo, these activists argued, 
needed to better center and amplify the experiences of those most marginalized victims in 
order to dismantle rape culture and its intersections with racism, classism, heterosexism, 
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and transphobia. Their critiques highlight a major limitation of viral visibility as a 
political tactic — a hashtag may enable broad participation, but access to mainstream 
media representation continues to be structured by race, sexuality, and class.  
In addition to concern over who was included in #MeToo, activists also 
questioned what issues and experiences fell under the hashtag campaign’s broad 
umbrella. The simplicity and flexibility of the phrase, “Me, too” — two words that can 
gloss a wide range of experiences — made the campaign compelling, easy to join even if 
sharing the complete details of one’s story could be difficult, and especially conducive 
for success on Twitter, where brevity is key. But the hashtag’s ambiguity, combined with 
the tendency for accounts of more severe instances of sexual violence to gain more 
retweets, led some participants to feel apprehensive about whether or not their narratives 
fit within the #MeToo framework: 
@MadisonLesc: I have been debating whether or not my experiences were bad 
 enough to warrant a #metoo tweet. (October 15, 2017, 11:07pm) 
 
@ChefTorrie: When you post #metoo & immediately debate taking it down 
 because you feel embarrassed & figure your harassment wasn't bad enough to 
 count. (October 15, 2017, 9:03pm) 
 
@laurphelps: Something messed up about #metoo — I feel like being groped 
 several times is too mundane to mention & not “real” assault (October 16, 2017, 
 1:32am) 
 
Combined with conservative critics’ charge that the hashtag lacked a clear platform 
(Peyser, 2017), #MeToo participants’ concerns over whether their story “counts” suggest 
that the same degree of flexibility that enabled the hashtag to go viral may leave the 
movement’s core message somewhat unclear.  
Above all, participants feared that the ease with which one could support the 
campaign, alongside #MeToo’s news media takeover, would create the illusion that no 
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further work was necessary and lull the public into inaction. They shared Banet-Weiser’s 
(2018b) and other feminist critics’ concern that a protest tactic that prioritizes visibility 
and representation through performance risks limiting action to performance alone. If 
participation in the #MeToo movement was equated with performing solidarity through 
symbolic actions like sharing a hashtag or dressing in all black for a red carpet event, 
anyone could feign support for survivors or appropriate the campaign for their own profit 
without actually taking steps to end sexual violence: 
@arnajain1: To the “woke men” now expressing their sympathy for #MeToo on 
 social media, I say this — if you consider yourself an ally, you need to do more 
 than just post a hashtag. (October 16, 2017, 11:07pm) 
 
@KellyIceSkates: If you're a male celebrity you should be doing a hell of a lot 
 more than just wearing a black suit you were going to wear anyway. Plus there 
 were known sexual assaulters participating. #MeToo (January 8, 2018, 6:45pm) 
 
@isaakvall: celebs wearing black for #MeToo at the golden globes don’t deserve 
 to celebrated. it’s an empty gesture without actual actions and words to back it up. 
 (January 11, 2018, 3:54pm) 
 
For these activists, the media spectacle of a viral hashtag campaign, while an effective 
tactic for raising awareness and initiating important conversations, was not enough on its 
own to transform structures of power or hold others accountable for taking action. As 
several #MeToo participants put it simply, “We must do more.”  
The Maintenance of #MeToo 
Participants who voiced critiques of #MeToo often began by acknowledging the 
movement’s real or potential impact before lamenting its limitations, starting their tweets 
with a celebratory tone but following quickly with a caveat. As one participant, 
commenting on the toll the campaign was taking on survivors, put it: “#MeToo is 
important & powerful but I’m getting tired of women having to bare everything for ppl to 
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consider sexual violence a systemic issue” (October 15, 2017, 7:58pm, emphasis added). 
The challenge, then, for hashtag feminists becomes how to attain collective visibility 
while circumventing these tactical shortcomings.  
Throughout my sample, #MeToo participants engaged in a number of what I call 
performance maintenance practices to balance the affordances and limitations of hashtag 
feminism, as described in the previous sections. Participants developed these practices to 
support #MeToo storytellers, correct erasures in the campaign, maintain narrative control 
over audience’s interpretations of #MeToo, and model actions audiences could take after 
the hashtag’s viral performance came to a close. In other words, performance 
maintenance practices helped ensure the successful transmission of meaning from actors 
to audiences, all while caring for those participating in the emotionally taxing 
performance and proposing actions to extend engagement beyond the performance itself. 
These strategic correctives mitigated the personal and political vulnerabilities of 
networked visibility campaigns and moved activists toward a hashtag activism practice 
that reflected their feminist values.  
By far the most widely practiced performance maintenance strategy involved 
offering support for those who shared their #MeToo stories as well as those who did not 
or could not. Often written in the form of direct address, hundreds of tweets in my sample 
included statements of recognition that acknowledged survivors, legitimated their 
experiences, and expressed solidarity with them: 
@TheJimmyWatson: I hear you, I see you, I believe you, I stand with you. 
 #MeToo (October 16, 2017, 8:43am) 
 
@kejames: My unconditional love, acceptance, and solidarity to everyone 
 tweeting #MeToo and to those who can’t yet, or ever. (October 15, 2017, 5:46pm) 
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@RachelTGreene: To everyone who has a #MeToo story whether you’re able to 
 share it or not — it's not your fault, you’re not alone, and you're not 
 “overreacting.” (October 16, 2017, 5:37am) 
 
Participants also frequently reminded #MeToo audience members that they were not 
obligated to share their story, especially if doing so would be painful or dangerous, and 
encouraged survivors to practice self-care: 
@petitecaitlin: as awesome as #metoo is PLEASE don't feel obligated to publicly 
 share your trauma if you don't want to, if you aren't ready, or if sharing will be 
 harmful for you (October 17, 2017, 4:47pm) 
 
 @karenkhdesigns: If #MeToo is triggering, it’s okay to log off. It’s okay to not 
 participate. It’s okay to not be okay. Remember to take care of yourself. (October 
 16, 2017, 10:02am) 
 
Others offered more tangible forms of support, such as a listening ear, links to resources 
for survivors online, and phone numbers for sexual assault hotlines. Through this 
outreach work, campaign participants embodied the original “me too” movement’s 
emphasis on “empowerment through empathy” (Just Be Inc., 2013) and performed 
emotional care labor for sexual violence survivors. Sharing stories of assault and 
harassment or reading others’ testimonies is often a difficult and even traumatic 
experience for survivors living in a culture that normalizes sexual violence and shames 
victims. But campaign participants’ interpersonal expressions of support and solidarity 
represented a collective effort to alleviate at least some of the personal strain that came 
with posting or reading #MeToo tweets.  
In another popular performance maintenance strategy, participants worked to shift 
#MeToo’s attention away from survivors altogether and refocus the campaign on those 
who commit sexual violence and those who have the power the stop it. A common trend 
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among participants was to suggest new hashtags that called on perpetrators and 
bystanders, rather than victims, to publicly reflect on their behavior: 
@LeenaVonD: We need more than #MeToo. We need #ididnt: “#ididnt listen,” 
 “#ididnt do enough when she asked for help,” “#ididnt support her” (October 15, 
 2017, 10:20pm) 
 
@photografiona: Instead of #MeToo, I want to see #ImSorry, #iUnderstand, 
 #ItWasMe, #IWasWrong, #iChanged, #iBelieveYou #iHelped (October 19, 2017, 
 4:50am) 
 
@patlibrarian: In the face of #MeToo, I say #MenWeMust step up, speak up, 
 listen up, and shut up (October 16, 2017, 6:09am) 
 
Taking a different approach, some participants encouraged the hashtag’s readers to view 
#MeToo as an indicator not only of the number of sexual violence survivors in their 
social networks, but also as an indirect measure of the number of perpetrators and 
enablers likely lurking among their network connections:  
@BillMcKendrick: hey dudes if you're shocked at how many women you know 
 are posting #metoo, realize what that means about the men you know (October 
 16, 2017, 1:36am) 
 
@danishacarterr: #MeToo can also be used to address how many men stay 
 silent or let others get away with assault because they're friends with the abuser. 
 (October 15, 2017, 7:08pm) 
 
Other activists reframed the purpose of #MeToo in terms that transferred the burden of 
responsibility to bystanders and allies, with a special focus on men, who are less likely 
that women to experience sexual violence, but more likely to be in a position to stop it. 
For these tweeters, the hashtag campaign’s most important work was not in creating an 
outlet for women to express themselves openly, but in demanding that men pause, listen, 
learn, and take action. In one highly retweeted post, for example, a participant called on 
“men everywhere to scroll through #MeToo, because ending sexual violence against 
women is ultimately on you” (October 15, 2017, 8:48pm). In each case, participants’ 
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tactics for recasting the campaign’s primary actors as men rather than women added a 
new element of accountability to #MeToo.  
#MeToo participants highlighted and corrected other gaps and exclusions in the 
hashtag campaign’s platform, especially its emphasis on white women’s activism and 
experiences. From the campaign’s earliest days, feminists of color amended the record 
and called out journalists who misattributed the origins of #MeToo to Alyssa Milano 
rather than Tarana Burke; my sample includes nearly 300 tweets that explicitly name 
Burke as the movement’s founder. For these activists, drawing attention to black 
women’s organizing labor was especially important given their historical marginalization 
in U.S. feminist movements:  
@blackfeministaa: Journalists who have written pieces on #MeToo — go back 
 and add the correction that Alyssa Milano did NOT start the movement. 
 @TaranaBurke did. (October 17, 2017, 12:24pm) 
 
@Luvvie: White women do not get to take credit for creating #MeToo. Yes, 
 credit matters b/c our work STAYS getting co-opted and our names erased. 
 (October 17, 2017, 12:25pm) 
 
Activists took this consciousness-raising work a step further by inserting intersectional 
analysis into #MeToo and articulating the ways in which rape culture has converged with 
other systems of oppression to produce particular experiences of sexual violence for 
marginalized communities:  
@Karnythia: We're not going to solve the problem of sexual violence by ignoring 
 that some victims are targeted because of their race. Or that racism means they are 
 less likely to get support. We need to address all of rape culture #MeToo 
 (November 19, 2017, 12:39pm) 
 
@monaeltahawy: #MeToo is not about white women. It’s about patriarchy — its 
 ubiquity, how it intensifies other oppressions such as racism, ableism, classism, 
 etc. It must not be exclusively about what powerful men do to white women nor 
 which white women say they’re ok w/powerful men’s “seduction.” (January 14, 
 2018, 11:07am) 
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@katypellinger: Women & girls face systemic harassment & violence for simply 
 existing. Add intersectionality & it gets worse. You're queer? Trans? Racialized? 
 Disabled? English isn't your first language? The violence intensifies. #MeToo 
 (October 16, 2017, 5:23pm) 
 
Through performance maintenance practices aimed at broadening #MeToo’s scope, 
participants advanced the intersectional analysis missing from news coverage of the 
hashtag. Above all, activists emphasized that, regardless of the specificities of one’s 
identity or experience, every survivor’s story is valid: “#MeToo. Whatever happened to 
you, whether it was rape or inappropriate jokes or groping, it counts. You count” 
(October 17, 2017, 7:28pm). These activists viewed the variety of narratives collected 
under #MeToo as evidence that rape cultural exists along a “continuum of violations” 
(October 16, 2017, 6:29am) from verbal harassment to physical assault, all of which are 
rooted within a common matrix of oppression. Rather than being vague or ambiguous, 
their intentionally expansive conceptualization of sexual violence productively 
highlighted the connections between verbal harassment and assault.  
In addition to expanding the hashtag’s interpretive framework, #MeToo 
participants developed strategies to maintain control of the campaign’s narrative and 
correct misinterpretations of its message. A large number of participants anticipated and 
addressed problematic audience responses to #MeToo, shoring up the movement’s 
message in the process: 
@hannahchoreo: To anyone saying #MeToo tweets are attention-seeking, you are 
 the reason women are afraid to speak up after being sexually assaulted. (October 
 15, 2017, 7:54pm) 
 
@jimmelville: If you are a troll mocking people posting #MeToo as "snowflake 
 liberals,” you need to recognize that you are part of the problem. (October 16, 
 2017, 12:29am) 
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Once mainstream news outlets began covering the viral Twitter hashtag, engaging in 
performance maintenance practices enabled #MeToo participants to keep a firm handle 
on the movement’s framing. This became especially key as commentators on the 
movement, ensnared in the media frenzy surrounding high-profile victims and 
perpetrators, lost sight of the movement’s original purpose:  
@arrenjj: In the wave of accusations against celebrities and politicians, it's easy to 
 forget the point of #metoo: sexual violence is widespread across all industries and 
 walks of life. (December 23, 2017, 9:32am) 
 
@TaranaBurke: This is a movement for and about survivors. If you let the 
 mainstream media define who the 'survivors' are then we will always only hear 
 about famous, white, cis-gendered women. But they don't own this movement – 
 we do. YOU DO. Survivors need to take ownership. #MeTooMVMT (March 21, 
 2018, 5:47pm) 
 
Unlike highly structured social movements, hashtag campaigns lack the organizational 
capacity to issue unified, collective responses to their critics. Even so, individual 
participants can make up for this limitation by using social media platforms to directly 
respond to and redress backlash and misconceptions about the campaign.  
Lastly, #MeToo participants proposed actions their audiences, especially male 
allies and bystanders, could take to support survivors and combat sexual violence in their 
everyday lives: 
@EzerRising: Men. Pay attention & follow #MeToo and please spare us the 
 #NotAllMen speech. Just listen & call out your bros who ARE part of the 
 problem. (October 15, 2017, 8:46pm) 
 
@DaniCaprielle: Men, your solidarity w/ #meToo means nothing unless you also 
 call out sexual assault & harassment, refuse to work w/ abusers, believe survivors, 
 demand your female coworkers are paid equally & hold other men accountable. 
 Don't just talk about it, be about it (January 7, 2018, 3:27pm) 
 
@MatthewELouis: Solidarity with everyone out there sharing #MeToo. Men, 
 teach your kids about consent & abuse of power, hold your peers accountable. 
 (October 16, 2017, 2:28am) 
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Their suggestions encouraged activism against sexual violence beyond simply sharing or 
reading the hashtag and laid out a roadmap for long-term engagement after the hashtag’s 
viral media moment had come to an end. There is, of course, no guarantee that audience 
members will follow through. Participants’ proposals, however, offered answers to a 
much-asked question in the aftermath off #MeToo — now what? — and challenged the 
assumption that posting a hashtag was enough to end sexual violence. Through these 
maintenance strategies, activists offered an antidote to the performative “slacktivism” of 
the economy of visibility in the form of action plans that audience members and allies 
could implement in their day-to-day lives.  
MeToo participants’ performance maintenance practices illustrate the creative 
strategies feminists have developed to juggle both hashtag activism’s affordances and 
limitations. From the simple act of expressing support for survivors who shared their 
stories to the more complex work of intersectional analysis, participants drew on a variety 
of tactics to reduce the personal costs and political shortcomings that came with 
participating in the #MeToo campaign. Their continual efforts to strengthen the campaign 
shed light on hashtag feminism as a reflexive performative practice, in which actors 
constantly evaluate and negotiate between their scripts, their audience, their goals, and 
their social and technical contexts. In the process, these activists pushed #MeToo toward 
a more inclusive, transformative politics of visibility, even as they wrestled with the 
pitfalls of performing protest actions on a globally networked media platform.  
Conclusion 
Following #MeToo’s unprecedented global diffusion, critics and commentators 
rehashed a debate that has haunted networked visibility campaigns since the first activist 
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hashtags surfaced on Twitter — can a hashtag create social change? Does tweeting 
“count” as protest? Will a viral trend distract us from the real issues? In this chapter, 
rather than considering these familiar debates through the lens of #MeToo, I work from 
the assumption that those standing on either end of these yes or no questions may be 
telling part of a much more complicated story about hashtag feminism. With this starting 
point in mind, instead of evaluating the effects and qualities of the #MeToo campaign, I 
pursued a different line of inquiry, aimed at understanding how practitioners perceive the 
possibilities and shortcomings of hashtag activism as a feminist protest tactic and what 
strategies they use to juggle both. Existing scholarship suggests that hashtag feminism is 
doubly entangled in both liberatory politics and systems of oppression. And yet, due to its 
ease of use, participatory nature, and low cost, the tactic remains central to the 
contemporary do-it-ourselves feminist repertoire. Understanding how practitioners 
navigate the contradictions of hashtag activism, then, is a key step toward theorizing 
feminists’ digital media practices and building a more feminist approach to networked 
activism. 
Drawing on a large sample of meta-tweets, I mapped, from #MeToo participants’ 
perspectives, the affordances and limitations of hashtag feminism and documented their 
strategies for taking advantage of the former while coping with the latter. I found that, for 
feminists, hashtag activism is a contentious performance, through which actors 
collectively articulate their individual experiences with oppression on a global stage. The 
networking functions of the hashtag bridge the personal and the political, recasting, in the 
case of #MeToo, sexual violence as a systemic, rather than private, issue and calling for 
structural changes in response. The activist commentary in my sample suggests that the 
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process of making the personal political and scaling up from individual to collective 
visibility can be transformative. A hashtagged performance can advance new 
interpretations of and responses to oppressive experiences like sexual assault and 
harassment, with material consequences for both individual victims and perpetrators and 
society as a whole. Participants also recognized, however, that relying on visibility as a 
protest tactic opened the movement up to a variety of different personal and political 
vulnerabilities, including re-traumatization, backlash, cooptation, complacency, and the 
exclusion of those most marginalized victims. In order to mitigate these shortcomings, 
#MeToo participants developed performance maintenance practices to correct erasures in 
the campaign, maintain narrative control over the hashtag, and model actions audiences 
could take beyond sharing the hashtag. Activists developed these remedial strategies 
through their observations of, reflections on, and conversations about the campaign to 
convey their message to a broad audience without sacrificing their personal wellbeing or 
feminist values. Over time, their efforts have led the movement toward a more 
intersectional and influential politics of visibility.  
The iterative process outlined in this chapter — initiating a hashtag, observing its 
strengths and limitations, developing strategies to intervene on its shortcomings — 
suggests that hashtag feminism is an interactional, reflexive process. The performance 
maintenance practices highlighted in this chapter do not address all the ways in which 
hashtag activism can be politically problematic. Notably, the activist commentary 
captured in my sample did not address the contradictions of performing feminist protest 
actions on a corporately owned platform, nor did they grapple with the data and privacy 
concerns that come with sharing one’s trauma on social media. My intention is not to 
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suggest that feminists have developed a politically pure practice of hashtag activism that 
includes, uplifts, and protects all participants at all times. Rather, my goal is to shed light 
on hashtag feminists as thoughtful, agentive actors who are just as incisive as their 
sharpest critics and just as aware of the pitfalls of networked visibility campaigns. 
Feminists engaging in this tactic often do so with great care, intentionality, and creativity, 
negotiating among their politics, the Twitter platform, and their audiences to craft a 
distinctly feminist practice of hashtag activism. Much existing scholarship on hashtag 
feminism in particular and digital protest tactics more generally focuses on either the 
affordances or limitations of networked visibility campaigns. Consequently, researchers 
often overlook the complexities of hashtag feminism as a practice with both strengths 
and weaknesses that involves reflection and remediation. Illuminating the strategies 
through which feminists navigate the contradictions of networked activism offers a more 
holistic view of hashtag feminism and opens up a new line of inquiry for feminist media 
scholars at a moment when this tactic is growing in popularity and significance.  
But more importantly, documenting and naming activists’ practices for building a 
more feminist approach to networked visibility stands to benefit all movements and 
organizers mobilizing for civil rights and social justice in the digital age. The media-as-
practice approach taken in this chapter centers feminist activists’ perspectives. Their 
voices are neglected resources for both academics and activists seeking to identify when 
and how social media platforms best serve social movements’ goals and what strategies 
might help mitigate their structural constraints. In light of the lack of accessible 
alternative outlets with comparable reach, the practitioners studied here model a feminist 
ethics for engaging in networked activism on platforms like Twitter and Facebook with a 
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critical sense of care and accountability. Though #MeToo may fade from news headlines, 
its participants’ organizational labor and knowledge-building work have long-lasting 
implications for future movements.  
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CHAPTER 4 – “Girls to the front!” 
Networked Feminist Communities: The Search for Safety Online 
 
Late one night in August 2015, a young mother published a post in a feminist 
Facebook group describing a series of harrowing events that had unfolded just hours 
prior. “Posting because i am sick of it and need to vent,” she began. Earlier that evening, 
she needed to make a trip to the supermarket to purchase medicine for her daughter. Her 
car would not start, so she strapped her daughter into her stroller and walked to the store. 
On the way there, she was catcalled three separate times. Once she and her daughter 
arrived at the supermarket, an older man followed her into the store and talked her while 
she shopped, all the way through the checkout line. When she made eye contact with him, 
he winked and licked his lips. She refused to exit the store until he left and waited an 
additional five minutes afterwards to begin her walk home, only to face two other street 
harassers on the way: “I hate that I have to explain what these men are doing to my 
daughter when she is old enough to understand (she is only 1 and a half). I am however 
so glad i didn't have to tell her this time why we had to stand awkwardly after we 
checked out because I was afraid of being raped.” In the comments section, about a dozen 
of the group’s more than 850 members offered empathy, expressing support and sharing 
their own experiences with catcallers. Others suggested strategies for coping with street 
harassment, ranging from talking back to perpetrators to carrying concealed weapons. 
Several members made plans to organize a self-defense class for the group. One member, 
a mechanic, even offered to fix her car. “Thank you for listening,” the mother commented 
toward the end of the thread, “i am glad im in this group and that I feel safe to talk about 




On an unbearably hot afternoon in the summer of 2015, approximately 50 zine-
makers, or zinesters, and distributers (distros) pack into the Rotunda, a university-owned 
community center in West Philadelphia, for the annual Philly Zine Fest, their handcrafted 
pamphlets and other homespun goods spread across a few dozen folding tables. In an age 
of the ubiquitous internet, the death of print, and the monopolization of commercial 
media, perusing an exhibitor’s photocopied and stapled paper magazines, typically 
exchanged through barter or trade, feels like a throwback to simpler times for activist life 
in the United States. The festival’s broad selection of feminist-inspired media, for 
example, harkens back to the Riot Grrrl punk zines of the late 1980s and 1990s, their 
historical roots stemming forth from the alternative presses of the Civil Rights Era and 
even reaching as far back as the pamphleteers of the suffrage movement. In fleeting 
moments, however, these age-old print media tactics converge with contemporary digital 
media platforms: zinesters use iPhones to snap photos and share their displays on 
Instagram; distros hand out business cards directing future costumers to their websites; 
organizers update the festival’s Facebook event page and Twitter hashtag in hopes of 
boosting attendance; unclickable URLs and email addresses printed across inside covers 
direct readers to connect with zinesters online. Later, an exhibitor explains to me that, 
without this digital outreach work, readers would struggle to get their hands on zines 
because zinesters often choose not to share electronic copies of their work online for 
safety reasons: “There are things that you can write about in zines, various hard things, 
that you don’t want Google-able, that you don’t want associated with your name.” 
Underlying the zine fest’s commitment to alternative print media and the face-to-face 
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encounters they foster are digital networks, whose virtual connective tissue serves as the 
glue that holds the zine community together.  
*** 
Kai, an organizer for Permanent Wave Philly (PWP), grabbed the mic after the 
opening act to speak on behalf of the collective: “Thank you so much to everyone who is 
here, and who's here to support spaces like this…The DIY community is only as strong 
as the people who come to support it. So let's continue to support spaces like this — safe, 
inclusive spaces.” About 100 people had crammed into the Philadelphia Mausoleum of 
Contemporary Art (or PhilaMOCA for short), an ex-tombstone-business-turned-
performance-space, for PWP’s first feminist punk show of 2015. The temperature had 
dipped well below freezing that January night and while the streets in North Philly were 
quiet for a Saturday, the collective’s handmade flyers, emailed newsletters, and Facebook 
event page had brought a decently sized crowd to the unconventional venue. Attendees 
were met at the door with a small poster that outlined the collective’s “Safer Spaces 
Policy”: “We aim, to the best of our abilities, to have all participants, organizers, and 
volunteers feel supported in our events: 1) Do not make assumptions about people’s 
identities. 2) Respect everyone’s physical and emotional boundaries. 3) Check in before 
discussing topics that might be triggering. 4) Respect the venue and its policies.” Dee, a 
PWP organizer who worked the door, admitted anyone willing to follow these guidelines 
and pay the $7-$10 sliding scale admission fee, stamping every newcomer’s hand with a 
purple Venus symbol. When The Shondes, a woman-led rock back from Brooklyn and 
the show’s headliner, take the stage, they invite people to dance and kick off their set 
with a song about “sexism in the music industry,” which the lead singer explains is only 
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appropriate for “this feminist night.” The audience shifts into a semicircle, forming a 
small pit in front of the stage, where a couple dozen women dance together, twirling, 
jumping, laughing, and holding hands. Rows of people behind the pit sway side to side 
and men in the audience step toward the back of the crowd. Looking on from Permanent 
Wave’s merchandise table, I was reminded of the Riot Grrrl mission to uplift punk 
musicians and fans who were not white men, summed up in the movement’s rallying cry, 
“Girls to the front!”10 This, I thought to myself, is what a feminist mosh pit looks like. 
*** 
These three vignettes — the outpouring of support in a Facebook group, the hustle 
and bustle of a zine festival, the scene at a DIY punk show — tell the story of a 
longstanding political quest for feminist activists — the search for community.  
Starting with the rise of “second wave” feminism in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. 
feminists have consistently valued community-building as a radical intervention into a 
sociopolitical context that marginalizes and alienates women, queer people, and people of 
color. Feminist communities take on a variety of forms and focal points, but they have 
historically shared a common goal — safety, or the ability to speak, act, and move freely, 
unfettered by repressive ideologies and the material and symbolic violence they enable. 
In separatist safe spaces, second-wave feminists distanced themselves from both the men 
in their lives and patriarchal thought to openly discuss shared experiences of gender-
based oppression and to begin building platforms for organizing against sexism (Kenney, 
2001). The Women’s Liberation Movement grew out of meetings held behind closed 
doors, where women met to safely explore and deconstruct the ways in which systems of 
																																																								
10 See Marcus (2010) for a historical overview of the Riot Grrrl movement and what 
bringing “girls to the front” looked like in practice.  
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power had shaped their personal lives (Kenney, 2001; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). A 
network of underground press publications sustained second wave communities between 
meetings, helped reach those without access to feminist collectives, and provided 
supportive outlets for women to formulate the collective identity frameworks that would 
later function as the bases for public protest actions (Farr & Harker, 2015; Hogan, 2016; 
Young, 1997). For this generation of feminists, in other words, finding safety in 
community was a means to an end. 
In today’s context, where public platforms for launching feminist critiques and 
actions abound but misogyny continues to shape discourse and policy, safety has become 
a political end in itself for feminist activists. From digitally mobilized global protest 
movements like the 2017 Women’s March described in Chapter 2 to the feminist hashtag 
campaigns discussed at length in the previous chapter, social media platforms have given 
rise to an unprecedented degree of visibility for feminist figures, actions, ideas, and 
rhetoric (Banet-Weiser, 2015b). This “popular feminism,” however, has been met in 
equal measure with “popular misogyny,” a “misogynistic political and economic culture, 
where rape culture is normative, violent threats against women are validated, and rights 
of the body for women are either under threat or being formally retracted” (Banet-Weiser 
& Miltner, 2016, p. 172). The heightened visibility of feminist cultures, Banet-Weiser 
and Miltner (2016) argue, has triggered an anti-feminist backlash, ushering in “a new era 
of the gender wars” (p. 171). This backlash is especially rampant on social media 
platforms, where women face high levels of sexual harassment, death and rape threats, 
and doxxing attacks (Duggan, 2017). Just as social media have given feminist activists a 
new platform from which to broadcast their claims, they have also fed what Banet-Weiser 
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and Miltner (2016) call “networked misogyny,” a highly visible form of white male 
supremacy that works to block marginalized groups’ participation in online environments 
through threats of violence.  
Networked misogyny, alternatively referred to as “trolling,” “flaming,” 
“cyberbullying,” or “e-bile,” has been traced back to the earliest days of computer-
mediated communication in the 1980s (Jane, 2014; 2015). But Banet-Weiser and Miltner 
(2016) argue that “this particular historical moment is host to an especially virulent strain 
of violence and hostility towards women in online environments” (p. 171), as 
demonstrated by recent outbreaks of gender-based online harassment like the 2014 
#GamerGate controversy (Massanari, 2015) and the ongoing digital culture wars of the 
so-called “alt-right” (Marwick and Lewis, 2017). The damage networked misogyny 
inflicts is staggering. According to a 2017 Pew Research Center report, while roughly 
four in ten Americans have experienced some form of online harassment, women are far 
more likely to encounter gendered or sexualized forms of abuse; 21% of women between 
the ages of 18 and 29 report facing sexual harassment online, more than double the share 
among their male counterparts, and women are twice as likely as men to describe their 
most recent encounter with online harassment as extremely upsetting (Duggan, 2017). 
Online harassment has led women journalists, writers, and activists to leave their homes, 
cancel speaking events, retreat from online engagement, and even withdraw from public 
life altogether (Jane, 2014). Worse still, victims of harassment are often reluctant to speak 
out against networked misogyny for fear of appearing humorless, weak, and censorious, 
and consequently opening themselves up to more attacks (Jane, 2014). For users of color, 
queer and trans users, and disabled users, networked misogyny is compounded when it 
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intersects with racism, homophobia, transphobia, and ableism (Daniels, 2009; Nakamura, 
2013; Noble and Tynes, 2016; Shaw, 2014).  
Within this culture of popular misogyny, where bodies marked by gender face 
violence online and off, constructing safe feminist communities from the ground up has 
become an important self-care strategy and a political tactic for do-it-ourselves feminists, 
who operate without the support of formally structured organizations. Networked 
misogyny functions as what Cole (2015), drawing on Foucault, calls a “disciplinary 
rhetoric” (p. 356), a form of biopower that restricts women’s participation in the public 
sphere through threats of bodily harm. In response to this “silencing practice” (Shaw, 
2013, p. 94), contemporary feminists have cultivated enclaved communities, closed off 
from the disciplinary surveillance of popular misogyny through the privacy settings of a 
secret Facebook group or the symbolic boundaries of a safer space policy. Their goal is to 
create empowering communities where members can speak and act freely without facing 
threats of violence.  
“Community,” however, is and always has been a politically troublesome project 
for U.S. feminist movements. Repeatedly throughout history, feminists’ attempts to foster 
a sense of collective identity through shared experiences of gender-based oppression have 
fallen short when faced with the true complexities of “women” as a category. Critics of 
the 2017 Women’s March, for example, called out the movement’s prioritization of 
white, cisgender women over women of color and transgender women in its logistical 
execution, imagery, language, and mission (Bates, 2017). Their frustration carried the 
weight of more than a century of struggles for inclusive feminist communities. They 
echoed Sojourner Truth’s famous question, posed to white suffragists gathered at the 
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1851 Women’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio: “Ain’t I a woman?” They echoed the 
Combahee River Collective who, speaking on behalf of black lesbian feminists in their 
1977 statement, argued that “no other ostensibly progressive movement has ever 
considered our specific oppression as a priority or worked seriously for the ending of that 
oppression” (qtd. in Smith, 1983, p. 267). And more recently, they echoed feminists of 
color who shared their stories of exclusion from liberal feminist communities that center 
white, educated women, often dubbed “white feminism,” under the 2013 viral hashtag 
campaign, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen (Loza, 2014). At every turn, U.S. feminist 
community-builders have grappled with the need to both foster unity and account for 
difference.  
The social and technological affordances of digital networks, outlined in the 
introduction, present new possibilities for feminists striving to build their own safe, 
intersectional communities. But while, as I discussed in the previous chapter, scholars 
have shed light on the role the internet plays in mobilizing more inclusive, public-facing 
protests, (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Brown et al., 2017; Daniels, 2016; Kuo, 2016; 
Tynes, Schuschke, & Noble, 2016), little attention has been paid to the relationship 
between digital media and feminists’ practices for building more private, inward-facing 
communities. These less visible activist spaces are difficult to access and, in turn, to 
study. Consequently, scholars analyzing digitally networked feminist “communities” 
today tend to prioritize public-facing sites for discursive exchange, such as feminist blogs 
and hashtags, but overlook counterpublic “spaces of withdrawal and regroupment” 
(Fraser, 1992, p. 124). Scholars’ overemphasis on highly visible forms of feminist media 
activism parallels the bias in social movement research toward public performances of 
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contentious politics (Melucci, 1989). In both cases, scholars neglect to consider 
marginalized groups’ struggles to attain legitimacy within the public sphere and efforts to 
develop alternative modes of political engagement. Consequently, contemporary 
feminists’ digital media practices for internal community-building remain under-
theorized, despite the renewed importance of the enclaved safe space against the 
contemporary backdrop of networked misogyny. A search for “feminist” on Facebook, 
for example, reveals dozens of private groups, many with upwards of 2,000 members or 
more, that purport to offer “safe space” for marginalized users.11  
These inward-facing feminist communities are important objects of study for a 
number of different reasons. For one, they are often where publicly directed feminist 
actions are discussed, as demonstrated by the role Pantsuit Nation, a private Facebook 
group for Hillary Clinton supporters, played in mobilizing the Women’s March on 
Washington (Stein, 2017). But more importantly, they enable a fundamentally different 
social setting than public-facing sites, one removed from the misogyny and harassment 
that plague many deliberative spaces, online and off. In recent years, feminist media 
studies scholars have called on the field to build theoretical frameworks that help 
illuminate strategies for creating safe, inclusive online spaces (Rodino-Colocino, 2014) 
and push social media users to “reimagine how we use these spaces and by whom these 
spaces are used” (Shaw, 2014, p. 273). Reflecting critically on why and how feminists 
participate in these enclaved communities can shed light on the obstacles they face in 
more public arenas for political engagement and point toward methods for building safer 
																																																								
11 This does not include “secret” Facebook groups, which do not appear in Facebook 
searches, suggesting that the number of online feminist safe spaces hosted on Facebook is 
actually much higher. 
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online spaces. Feminists’ do-it-ourselves communities, which are intentionally crafted to 
fulfill particular political goals, prefigure their visions for a more inclusive public sphere 
and, in the process, reconfigure existing models for collective discourse and action. Their 
experiences have much to contribute to broader debates concerning what Jessa Lingel 
(2017a) calls “the durability of community” (p. 6) in the internet age, the capacity of 
digital media platforms to facilitate authentic and empowering social connections.  
In this chapter, to address this gap in existing scholarship and to contribute to 
ongoing activist and academic movements for safer online spaces, I explore feminists’ 
digital media practices for building and maintaining networked communities. Drawing on 
Nancy Baym’s (2000) work on early online communities, I define “communities” as 
social groupings “maintained through the ongoing practices of their members” (p. 31), 
who are collectively engaged in some common project. Here, I am interested specifically 
in internal communities, or purposefully closed-off, inward-facing social groupings, 
whose members share certain aspects of their identities, experiences and/or politics in 
common and who construct and maintain boundaries around the group. Like Coleman 
(2011), I use the descriptor “networked” to highlight both the technological and social 
affordances of digitally mediated communities and the sociotechnical practices feminists 
invest into their construction. Following Lingel (2017a), I also use “networked” to 
capture a “sociotechnical assemblage” (p. 15) of people, technologies, and practices that 
includes, but extends well beyond, digital media platforms. A “media landscape of online 
and offline tools” (Lingel, 2017b, p. 3) underpins networked communities, whose 
members connect with one another through a range of different channels and contexts. 
With “networked communities” as my entry point, I consider the following questions: 
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How do DIO feminists use digital media to build and maintain safe communities? What 
shape do these communities take and what political needs do they fulfill? How do 
feminist community-builders negotiate between their political visions and the structural 
constraints of digital media platforms? What struggles do feminists face in their search 
for safety and community online?  
To begin answering these questions, I analyze the practices of three feminist 
communities: 1) Girl Army, a secret feminist Facebook group; 2) U.S. feminist zinesters, 
a nationally dispersed network of alternative print media makers, who explore gender 
justice themes in their work; and 3) Permanent Wave Philly, a Philadelphia-based 
grassroots feminist arts collective. Each community takes on different networked forms. 
Girl Army moderators adapt the Facebook group interface to cultivate a separatist 
feminist enclave. Feminist zinesters use digital platforms to both promote and protect 
their countercultural community, spreading the word about their work on social media 
but keeping their zines in print, where they can express themselves freely without fear of 
online harassment. Permanent Wave Philly members use an email listserv to coordinate 
meetings and plan underground punk shows that center women, LGBTQ+ people, and 
people of color. But while their particular tactics vary, all three communities are 
networked — practitioners use digital media platforms to facilitate connection across a 
horizontally dispersed group of people — and media-oriented — members participate in 
each community by engaging with or producing media. All three communities are also 
partially enclosed, meaning that prospective members must cross certain barriers to entry 
in order to join these spaces. None of these communities is associated with a formally 
structured organization. Instead, they emerged from the do-it-ourselves media practices 
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of feminists who saw a need for a particular type of community and decided to make their 
own. And while historically, feminists have struggled to both define and achieve 
“community,” practitioners across all three sites use the term to describe their groups and 
to gesture toward their aspirations for these activist spaces. Above all, all three 
communities strive to bring, through a variety of practices, girls to the front, centering 
bodies and voices that, because they are marked by gender, are marginalized in the public 
sphere. Through participant observations and interviews with practitioners alongside 
theories of communities (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991; Joseph, 2002; Polletta, 1999), safe 
spaces (The Roestone Collective, 2014), and counterpublics (Fraser, 1992), I put these 
three unique case studies into conversation with one another. My goal is to highlight their 
shared political purposes and reflect on best practices for feminist community-building. 
Across these three communities, I argue, feminist activists engage in a common 
political project. They endeavor to create what I call networked safe spaces, or carefully 
bounded, inward-facing communities, closed off from popular misogyny and fostered 
through the technological and social affordances of digital media. Networked safe spaces 
do not fit traditional frameworks for understanding activist work, which define political 
engagement as highly visible, state-targeted, public performances (Tilly & Tarrow, 
2015). Drawing on the media-as-practice framework, however, I trace the connections 
among feminist practitioners’ contexts, goals, and digital community-building tactics to 
illuminate the distinctly political work networked safe spaces perform. In their search for 
safety, feminists in each community appropriate digital media platforms to enact three 
particular political interventions. First, they construct community boundaries intended to 
separate the group from the public at large and protect members from misogyny. Second, 
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inside these bounded spaces, feminists experiment with intersectional organizing 
strategies to center marginalized voices silenced within more mainstream arenas for 
political participation. Third and finally, feminists in each community endeavor to foster 
open expression among members, who often lack other safe outlets for their particular 
experiences and concerns. Ultimately, for these activists, the objective is not to grow 
networks that, like the hashtag or blogosphere, extend outward indefinitely in a multitude 
of directions and broadcast political claims far and wide. Instead, their technological and 
discursive practices produce counterpublic spheres that draw like-minded activists 
inwards, together, where they develop empowering modes of social engagement and 
create communities that prefigure the kind of society they seek to bring about. 
Community members’ participation within these networked safe spaces is often 
transformative at the individual and collective levels, challenging conventional notions of 
what “counts” as political work.  
Certain limitations, however, haunt feminists’ networked community-building 
practices. Networked safe spaces are the product of active negotiations between 
members’ feminist values and digital media platforms. In the push and pull of these 
negotiations, feminists’ efforts to cultivate safe spaces at times fall short. Through the 
technological and discursive boundaries they draw around the group, members of each 
community exclude multiply marginalized voices, reify power hierarchies, and silo 
feminist discourses. Platforms’ user interfaces and terms of service restrict feminists’ 
ability to ensure community members’ safety and to practice nonhierarchical organizing. 
Participation within these communities is predicated on digital media access and literacy, 
suggesting that membership is largely limited to younger, educated, middle-class 
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participants, who are accustomed to using these media forms. Moreover, the diffuse, 
informal nature of these communities raises concerns about activist burnout and 
sustainability over time. These shortcomings are due in part to both the structural 
constraints embedded in social media platforms and the always already incomplete state 
of all safe spaces. The story of each community illustrates the relational, fluid, partial, 
and imperfect nature of networked safe spaces and pushes toward a more robust 
conceptualization of what safety might look like online. 
Taken together, these three case studies indicate a need to treat “community” not 
as a closed object, but as a political practice that requires constant reflection and 
maintenance. As Miranda Joseph (2002) argues, “To invoke community is to 
immediately raise questions of belonging and power” (p. xxiii). Feminist activists must 
constantly revisit these questions as they build their own communities while navigating 
the political affordances and limitations of digital media platforms.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. I begin by contextualizing the 
networked safe space within a longer history of feminist tactics for cultivating 
community, online and in person. Then, taking up the three case studies in turn and 
drawing on participant observations and interview data, I explore how feminists in each 
community use digital media to create and maintain boundaries, center marginalized 
voices, and foster open expression, highlighting their successes and struggles in the 
process. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the lessons these three feminist 
communities offer researchers and activists grappling with community-building in the 




The Search for Feminist Community 
Contemporary feminists’ networked communities are rooted in a long history of 
activist organizing strategies. Alongside other “new social movements” (Melucci 1989) 
of the late twentieth century, whose participants prioritized identity politics over material 
inequalities, second-wave feminists pioneered tactics for cultivating communal safe 
spaces. These countercultural arenas granted women “a certain license to speak and act 
freely, form collective strength, and generate strategies for resistance” (Kenney, 2001, p. 
24). The archetypal feminist safe space was the separatist, women-only, consciousness-
raising group, where the license to speak and act freely was instated not merely for the 
therapeutic purposes of voicing personal experiences but also “to get to the most radical 
truths about the situation of women in order to take radical action” (Sarachild, 1978), to 
identify the systematic injustices women face in order to collectively organize for change. 
In this way, Civil Rights-era feminist safe spaces functioned as what social movement 
scholars have called free spaces, “small-scale settings within a community or movement 
that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups, are voluntarily participated 
in, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political 
mobilization” (Polletta, 1999, p. 1). Melucci (1989) identifies second-wave feminist safe 
spaces as “submerged networks,” where activists could meet outside the public eye to 
discuss social issues, develop frameworks for interpreting them, and organize collective 
action accordingly. While formal and informal impediments curtailed women’s 
participation in the public sphere, as Fraser (1992) argues, feminist safe spaces operated 
as subaltern counterpublic spheres, or “parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit 
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them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (p. 
67). Second-wave counterpublics required active maintenance; members had to work to 
expose and remedy obstacles to participatory parity in order to create a space conducive 
to free expression (Fraser, 1992). As such, Polletta (1999) argues that second-wave 
feminists cultivated these women-only, counterpublic communities to “prefigure the 
society the movement is seeking to build by modeling relationships that differ from those 
characterizing mainstream society” (p. 11). Whether conceptualized as safe spaces, free 
spaces, submerged networks, or counterpublics, second-wave feminist communities were 
built on the premise that women share common experiences of injustice and could 
develop a collective identity that would function as the basis for collective action (Taylor 
& Whittier, 1992).  
The cultivation of safe, communal spaces for free and open expression has 
remained a key political priority among feminists organizing in the age of digital media. 
Early scholarship on computer-mediated communication builds on Howard 
Rheingold’s (1993) groundbreaking work on “virtual communities” to provide rich, 
ethnographic accounts of how women and other marginalized users adapted some of the 
first web forums to foster communal bonds across time and space. Baym (2000), for 
example, demonstrates how the predominantly female members of a Usenet newsgroup 
for soap opera fans “dynamically appropriate a wide range of resources drawn from the 
structure of Usenet and the soap opera text and combine them with other resources in 
unpredictable yet patterned ways, ultimately constructing a social space that feels like 
community” (p. 24). While the newsgroup community was ostensibly organized around 
soaps, it also functioned “as a community in which traditional female concerns and 
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values are honored” (p. 16). Others describe women’s early struggles to cultivate safe 
communities online via bulletin board systems and listservs (Fredrick, 1999; Gajjala, 
2002) and the tactics these community members performed to keep trolls at bay (Herring, 
Job-Slider, Scheckler, & Barb, 2002; Phillips, 1996). Like the in-person consciousness-
raising groups of the second wave, these “cyberfeminists” (Plant, 1997) hoped to create 
communal spaces where women could connect with one another and speak openly about 
personal experiences with gender-based oppression.  
While much has changed in the nearly forty years since Usenet first became 
publicly available, more recent research reflects similar community-building practices as 
those Baym (2000) describes. Keller (2016), in her ethnographic study of girl feminist 
bloggers, argues that blogs function as an accessible “discursive space” (p. 14), where 
young women develop feminist identities and alternative feminist histories through 
personal reflections and interactions with one another, forming a “networked 
counterpublic” (p. 80). Drawing on danah boyd’s (2008, 2014) theory of networked 
publics, Keller explains that unlike second-wave counterpublics, the networked 
counterpublics of girl feminist bloggers are persistent, replicable, searchable, and often, 
participants can remain invisible to one another. Due to their networked nature, online 
feminist counterpublics also have a greater capacity for growth, which in turn amplifies 
their ability to launch interventions on the broader public sphere (Keller, 2016). Feminist 
counterpublics networked across a variety of online platforms have mobilized highly 
visible collective action campaigns against online and offline misogyny and have fostered 
transnational feminist communities. Rentschler (2014) highlights how digital feminist 
tactics, like hashtag feminism, feminist blogging, and the anti-street harassment app 
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Hollaback!, create “feminist networks of response-ability to rape culture” (p. 68), which 
foster the capacity for collective responses to sexual violence. In a case study that 
exemplifies this networked response-ability, Mendes (2015) traces how the networked 
counterpublic of the feminist blogosphere was crucial for sparking the global SlutWalk 
movement, described in Chapter 2. The same networks later became critical spaces for 
feminists to debate the inclusivity of the movement’s tactics and messages. Another study 
conducted by Rentschler and Thrift (2015) demonstrates how “networked community 
building” (p. 330) has unfolded through the viral spread of feminist memes, like the 2012 
Mitt Romney-inspired “Binders Full of Women” meme. By constructing and circulating 
memes, feminists not only engage in collective acts of political critique, but also foster 
communal ties through shared humor that cut across differences (Rentschler & Thrift, 
2015). Keller et al. (2016) refer to communal ties formed via social media among women 
and girls as “affective solidarities” (p. 29), or connections rooted in emotional responses 
to shared experiences, such as sexual violence. In her research on the Australian feminist 
blogosphere, Frances Shaw (2013) highlights the range of strategies feminist bloggers use 
to successfully defend these communal ties against disruptive trolls and violent harassers, 
including moderation, exposure, and humor. Collective efforts to develop digital tools for 
navigating and interrupting online harassment compliment these networked, public-
facing, community-building efforts, such as FemTechNet’s (2017) Center for Solutions to 
Online Violence, a digital hub for rapid response and educational resources, and 
HeartMob (2017), an online tool for documenting and requesting support for harassment.  
But, despite their enduring salience for feminist activists and scholars, “safety” 
and “community” are fraught concepts. 
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“Safe” is a relative term, one whose meaning varies from person to person, from 
one setting to the next, in relation to its binary opposite, unsafe. Safe space practitioners, 
however, often overlook the highly contextual nature of safety. As Betty Barrett (2010) 
laments, the ambiguity of “safe space” has led the term to become “an overused by 
undertheorized metaphor” (p. 1) in both academic and activist discourses, a shortcut that 
gestures toward presumably shared attitudes regarding the friendliness of a space for 
certain identities and ideologies. Polletta (1999) offers a litany of social scientists’ 
“different names for the same thing” (p. 1) when it comes to research on safe spaces: 
“protected spaces,” “spatial preserves,” “havens,” “sequestered social sites,” “cultural 
laboratories,” and “spheres of cultural autonomy,” in addition to social movement 
theorists’ “free spaces” and “submerged networks.” Beyond social scientists, groups as 
varied as educators (Stengel & Weems, 2010), performance artists (Hunter, 2008), 
climate scientists (Rockström et al., 2009), people with environmental illnesses (Coyle, 
2004), doomsday preppers and survivalists (O’Brien, 2012), and even white supremacists 
(Futrell & Simi, 2004) have adopted the term. Across these cases, “safe space” is often 
invoked as “code” that “covers rather than clarifies the logic of safe spaces” (Stengel, 
2010, p. 524). Participants rarely articulate specific guidelines for protecting the space 
prior to the action or discourse that occurs within it. Instead, safe space principles often 
develop relationally as interactions unfold within the designated space and participants 
respond to one another’s behavior. This flexibility in practice helps explain the popularity 
of safe space as an organizational tactic. At the same time, however, the interactional 
construction of safe spaces often means that participants only reflect on their practices 
when unspoken assumptions about the space are violated and conflict arises. In both 
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theory and practice, then, “safe space” has been treated as a closed concept, erasing the 
context-specific work required to construct and maintain its material and symbolic 
boundaries in a particular setting. 
Like “safety,” “community” eludes precise definition. As Lingel (2017) 
highlights, “many people have powerful associations attached to being part of a 
community and yet struggle to define what separates a community from a group, family, 
neighborhood, or place of employment” (p. 5). Joseph (2002) argues that these powerful 
associations lead to the romanticization of community “as an unequivocal good” beyond 
critique, an “indicator of a high quality of life, a life of human understanding, caring, 
selflessness, belonging” (p. vii) enriched by deep social connections. Consequently, 
“community,” like “safe space,” is often treated as a closed concept that can be taken up 
and transplanted across a variety of contexts, without adaptation, specification, or 
reflection on the work required to actually cultivate communal bonds (Joseph, 2002; 
Stengel, 2010). When “community” is invoked in both popular and scholarly discourse to 
describe a particular set of social relations, the individuals in question are typically 
presumed to already share some essential identity and concomitant experiences, values, 
and goals, such that active community-building work is not necessary (Joseph, 2002). 
This elides important differences among so-called community members and, as Joseph 
(2002) agues, replicates and reifies existing hierarchies of gender, race, class, and 
sexuality.  
Among feminist activists in the United States, the search for safety in community 
has historically raised concerns about who feminist social movements fight for and 
represent, a question that has troubled gender justice projects since at least the nineteenth 
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century. Reflecting on the second-wave era, feminist theorists and activists writing in the 
1980s grappled with the strengths and limitations of community-building tactics 
grounded in identity politics (Joseph, 2002). On the one hand, identity-political 
movements throughout the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S. exposed the exclusions of liberal 
ideologies, which frame public institutions as rational and objective and all citizens as 
equal under the law regardless of their private differences (Joseph, 2002; Young, 1997). 
Second-wave feminists, in their efforts to make the personal political, raised 
consciousness about the ways in which power operates at the level of everyday life 
through discourses regulating gendered identities, roles, and performances that privilege 
men and disenfranchise women. Their activism pushed women’s concerns, once labeled 
as “private” and therefore nonpolitical, into public deliberation and won concrete gains in 
the form of civil rights legislation and social resources (Joseph, 2002; Young, 1997). In 
the process, second wavers fostered community ties rooted in women’s shared 
experiences and needs, which not only generated positive self-definitions and alternative 
epistemologies, but also functioned as a foundation for solidary collective action (Collins, 
2000; Joseph, 2002; Taylor & Whittier, 1992).  
On the other hand, however, the identity-as-community approach signature to 
much second-wave organizing ironically reproduced many of the same elisions as 
liberalism, erasing politically salient differences among women in the name of unity. As 
Joseph (2002) argues, “the invocation of a community of women has often served to 
produce a white women’s movement that could not adequately address or account for 
women who were simultaneously or even primarily faced with oppressions based on race 
or class or sexuality” (p. xvii), instead reproducing the racism, elitism, and heterosexism 
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of society at large. Critiques launched by feminists of color in the decades following the 
second wave, such as Cherríe Moraga’s and Gloria Anzaldúa’s (1981) This Bridge Called 
My Back, Audre Lorde’s (1984) Sister Outsider, and bell hooks’ (1981) Ain’t I a Woman: 
Black Women and Feminism, among many others, questioned whether communities built 
around singular identity categories could ever enact revolutionary change. These early 
“third-wave” theorists, in other words, argued that existing frameworks for community 
based on some shared, essential identity or experience do more to obfuscate than 
challenge traditional power relations. They called for a more multifaceted 
conceptualization of subjectivity, one that recognizes the ways in which gender interacts 
with race, class, sexuality, and other identity categories, in order to build more inclusive 
and generative feminist communities. While their critiques were lodged at twentieth-
century feminist movements, they reiterated the concerns of nineteenth-century 
abolitionists and suffragists like Maria Stewart, Sojourner Truth, and Anna Julia Cooper, 
who questioned black women’s marginalization in abolitionist and women’s rights 
movements, despite their simultaneous oppression along the axes of race and gender 
(Hancock, 2015; May, 2015).  
It is from this history of critique that Crenshaw’s (1989, 1991) concept of 
intersectionality, outlined in Chapter 2, emerged. In contrast to the “single-axis 
framework” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 139) for interpreting identity built into the second-wave 
identity-as-community framework, the intersectional framework’s multidimensional 
theorization of identity and power necessitates a feminist community-building practice 
grounded in what Vivian May (2015) calls “a politics of coalition: to contest shared 
logics across systems of domination, solidarities need to be forged via mutual 
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commitments, not via principles of homogeneity or sameness” (p. 4). In place of the 
homogenizing essentialism of the identity-as-community framework, an intersectional 
approach to community-building prioritizes coalitional solidarity across lines of 
difference, with an eye toward the utopian goal of dismantling the many overlapping 
oppressions that constitute the matrix of domination (Collins, 2000; May, 2015).  
Intersectionality, in other words, can be understood as what Joseph (2002) calls 
“an ethical practice of community” (p. 5), a reflexive method of collective organizing that 
incorporates a critical awareness of the potential erasures and exclusions embedded in 
communal safe spaces. As the Roestone Collective (2014) argues, scholars and activists 
aiming to practice intersectional politics should “treat safe space as a living concept, 
identifying tendencies and variations in its use, and recognizing its situatedness in 
multiple contexts” (p. 1347). Instead of approaching “safe space” as a prefabricated 
social structure that can be implemented across different settings, the Roestone Collective 
reconceptualizes safe space as “relational work” (p. 1348), as constantly unfolding social 
processes rather than structures that preexist their participants’ interactions. While 
cautioning against a normative theory of how safe spaces should be cultivated, the 
Roestone Collective highlights certain “paradoxes” that emerge from the relational work 
required to create a safe space in any context. According to the Collective, the relational 
work invested into safe spaces involves both reifying the binaries that marginalize groups 
in order to create a space explicitly for them and drawing inevitably exclusionary 
boundaries around the people that space is meant to protect and uplift. The Collective’s 
aim is not, however, to suggest that safe spaces should not exist; rather, by framing safe 
spaces as constantly in flux and always already incomplete, they direct researchers’ 
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attention toward the processes through which safe spaces are cultivated and encourage 
safe space organizers to incorporate reflexivity in their cultivation practices. When 
practitioners underscore the relational work required to actively maintain safe, communal 
spaces, they move toward a more reflexive, intersectional community-building practice, 
one that is conscientious of whose voices and needs are centered, and whose are not. 
Over the past two decades, thanks in no small part to the wide variety of 
accessible definitions of intersectionality available online, Crenshaw’s theory has jumped 
from law journals to everyday activist vocabulary, spreading, as Ange-Marie Hancock 
(2015) argues, like a “viral meme” (p. 18); in 2016 alone, the Wikipedia page for 
“intersectionality” was viewed more than 500,000 times, averaging approximately 1,400 
views per day (Pageviews Analysis, 2017). Digital media platforms have contributed to 
the diffusion of intersectionality as popular shorthand for evaluating the inclusivity of 
political organizations, events, actions, analyses, and more.  
But have digital media platforms facilitated the practice of intersectionality as a 
method for community-building? As discussed in the previous chapters, existing research 
illustrates the technological affordances of social media platforms for promoting 
intersectional discourse (Brown et al., 2017; Daniels, 2016; Kuo, 2016; Tynes, 
Schuschke, & Noble, 2016). The role digital media play in feminists’ cultivation of 
intersectional communities, however, remains understudied. Although scholars have also 
used the term “community” to describe networks of hashtag users and bloggers (e.g., 
Keller, 2016; Mendes, Ringrose, & Keller, 2018), these public, openly accessible, 
densely populated platforms facilitate a fundamentally different type of sociality than the 
“submerged networks” (Melucci, 1989) of second-wave feminist consciousness-raising 
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groups. My focus here is on the sociotechnical practices contemporary feminists engage 
in to foster closed-off, separatist safe spaces, where participants meet, virtually and face-
to-face, to find community with like-minded activists outside the public eye. While much 
research on media and social movements emphasizes how digital networks have altered 
the shape and reach of public protest actions, in this chapter, I analyze how digital 
networks are creating new possibilities and challenges for feminists when it comes to 
internal community-building. 
Methods, Data, and Theoretical Resources 
Here, taking up Joseph’s (2002) call for more ethical practices of community and 
the Roestone Collective’s (2014) reconceptualization of safe space as a “living concept,” 
I analyze the relational work invested into the construction and maintenance of three 
networked communities: Permanent Wave Philly, the feminist zine community, and the 
Girl Army Facebook group. 
My study of contemporary feminist communities began with Permanent Wave 
Philly, whose members describe the group on its tumblr page as “a network and 
community of feminist artists and activists” (Permanent Wave Philly, 2015) committed to 
producing an empowering arts and music scene that centers women, people of color, and 
LGBTQIA+ people. I met a handful of PWP members in 2014 at the rally for the first 
March to End Rape Culture protest I attended, where the collective had setup an 
informational table. I attended my first PWP meeting about a month later, in October 
2014. Following the meeting, I joined the PWP listserv, where I explained my research 
interests and asked if the collective would be willing to allow me to join as both a 
participant and an observer. They agreed and I officially began fieldwork with the 
collective at its monthly meeting in November 2014.  
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As a new PWP member, I quickly learned about the feminist zine community. 
The collective publishes an annual zine, collaboratively authored, edited, and produced 
by its members. During my first month of fieldwork, I volunteered to work with another 
member to sell copies of the PWP zine at the 2014 Philly Zine Festival, one of dozens of 
annual exhibition events for zinesters that take place in the U.S. (Stolen Sharpie 
Revolution, 2016c). I was curious to learn more about why these paper-based goods, 
which reach an intrinsically limited audience, generated enough interest in the internet 
age to warrant an entire festival circuit. Talking to festival-goers at our table and 
observing exchanges between zine-makers and readers at others, it became apparent that 
zines perform an important community-building function, particularly within 
marginalized communities whose members may otherwise be alienated from one another 
or may lack safe spaces to connect and express themselves.  
In January 2015, a year into my fieldwork, a member invited me to join Girl 
Army via Facebook. The group, which at the time had approximately 800 members, was 
made up primarily of feminists based in the greater Philadelphia area, including 
participants from both of the Philly feminist field sites discussed in this study – 
Permanent Wave Philly and the March to End Rape Culture. I immediately recognized 
the group as a communications hub for all things feminist in Philadelphia; members 
posted details about local events and organizations and called for volunteers to support 
local efforts. But, as I watched members share personal stories and request advice, it soon 
became clear to me that Girl Army was much more than a channel for learning about 
feminist happenings in the Philadelphia are. Like Permanent Wave, the Facebook group 
was a community for likeminded feminists to connect with one another, only instead of 
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meeting in person once per month, they met every day and often several times throughout 
the day in this digitally mediated space. 
Together, these three communities represent three different mediated modes of 
feminist community-building: PWP meets in person, holds in-group discussions via an 
email listserv, performs public outreached through their social media accounts, and 
produces zines and music events; the feminist zine community creates and exchanges 
printed booklets and connects with fellow zinesters via the internet and at festivals; Girl 
Army members may sometimes meet up offline at local events, but they connect 
primarily through the Facebook group platform. The overlap in membership across these 
sites suggests that each mode fulfills a particular function within the contemporary 
feminist repertoire. In this chapter, I put these three case studies into conversation with 
one another to better understand how do-it-ourselves feminists are using media to build 
communities, what affordances and limitations different mediated community-building 
practices offer, and what role these communities play in members’ activism and personal 
lives.  
 For each case study, I followed the grounded, practitioner-centric, media-as-
practice approach outlined in the Introduction and conducted a combination of participant 
observations, interviews, and/or textual analysis. Following the lead of existing 
scholarship on publicly accessible online feminist communities, I draw on theories of 
communities (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991; Joseph, 2002; Polletta, 1999), safe spaces (The 
Roestone Collective, 2014), and counterpublics (Fraser, 1992) to examine the boundaries 
feminists draw around these three sites and the political affordances and limitations these 
boundaries create.  
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Below, I outline in further detail my methodological approach to each case study. 
Permanent Wave Philly  
Of all three field sites, Permanent Pave Philly most resembles the feminist 
communities that constituted the second wave; the group meets in person to hold focused 
discussions about inequities in the arts and music scene and to plan events and projects 
aimed at countering these inequities. Drawing on three years of ethnographic fieldwork 
and interviews with three of the collective’s core members, I describe PWP’s successes 
and struggles to build a community that reflected the world they wanted to see.  
As a participant observer, I attended the collective’s monthly meetings, 
participated in listserv discussions between meetings, assisted with the organization and 
execution of PWP-hosted events, and contributed to, edited, produced, and sold PWP 
zines. While in the field, I took photos and recorded “jottings,” which I later used to 
produce formalized, typewritten field notes. I estimate that I conducted approximately 
100 hours of fieldwork with PWP.   
Six months into my fieldwork, I conducted interviews with three of PWP’s most 
reliable and committed members – Callie, one of the collective’s founders, Jenny, a long-
time member, and Dee, a relatively new but highly active member widely considered to 
be PWP’s most reliable organizer who often took on informal leadership positions within 
the group.12 Interviews were semi-structured, with a loose agenda open to participants’ 
directions and interests, and included questions related to members’ reasons for joining 
																																																								
12 To protect participants’ privacy, I use pseudonyms throughout this chapter in place of 
all participants’ real names. Exceptions were made for zinesters, who wished to retain 
attribution for their creative work. 
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the group, their joys and frustrations as group members, their aspirations for the group, 
and what they understood to be the group’s greatest strengths and weaknesses.  
Feminist Zines 
Unlike either Permanent Wave Philly or Girl Army, the U.S. feminist zine 
community is a dispersed, national network, whose members often only convene at zine 
festivals, libraries, and stores and across a variety of different websites and platforms. 
While my analysis in this section is informed in part by my own experiences creating and 
reading zines, the diffuse nature of the zine community makes more extensive participant 
observation difficult. Instead, in order to understand how they build communities through 
their print media practices, the role digital media plat in this process, and the relationship 
between these communities and their feminist politics, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with a dozen feminist zinesters.  
Given that both “feminist” and “zine” are highly contested, difficult to define 
terms, I drew my sample of interviewees from a zine exhibition with an explicit link to 
feminism – the Philly Feminist Zine Fest (PFZF). Held most recently in June 2014 and 
distinct from the more general annual Philly Zine Fest, PFZF is one of the three most 
visible feminist zine exhibitions in the U.S., alongside NYC Feminist Zine Fest and 
Feminist Zine Fest Pittsburgh (Stolen Sharpie Revolution, 2016c). I invited each of the 
more than 50 PFZF exhibitors listed on the 2014 fest’s website to participate via email. 
Twelve exhibitors agreed to participate, and I conducted each interview through the 
medium of the participants’ choosing: via email or face-to-face in a public setting.  
Interviews were semi-structured and included questions related to participants’ 
zinester biographies, motivations for zine-making, processes of zine production and 
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circulation, understanding of zines’ political roles, reach, and efficacy in comparison to 
and in conjunction with digital networks, and experiences within feminist zine publics. 
Using NVivo, I coded interview transcripts following Miles’, Huberman’s, and Saldana’s 
(2013) two-level qualitative coding scheme: a general etic level of coding including 
categories related to the three key analytics outlined above (practices, publics, and 
material cultures) and a specific emic level of coding grounded in participants’ own 
terminology for describing their experiences. To develop a holistic understanding of 
participants’ media-making practices, I also analyzed print copies of their zines and, 
when applicable, zinesters’ websites or online zine shops.  
Girl Army 
Girl Army’s highly digitally mediated nature sets it apart from both Permanent 
Wave Philly or the feminist zine community. Still, its members share a similar goal – to 
cultivate a space where marginalized people can openly connect and reflect on their 
shared experiences, free from the threats or censorship they might face in other, more 
public-facing arenas.  
To establish a holistic understanding of the construction of Girl Army as an online 
safe space community, I spent nine months as a participant observer within the Facebook 
group. I gained formal entry to Girl Army as a research site with permission from the 
group’s six moderators, who in turn assigned me as an official seventh moderator, so that 
I would have access to the group’s backstage interface, where the screening process for 
new members and posts unfolds. To inform members of my status as a researcher, I 
published a post within the Girl Army group, explaining the measures I would take to 
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protect their privacy and inviting members to communicate questions or concerns to me 
via comments to the post or via direct Facebook message.  
During my online fieldwork, I engaged with the Girl Army group page as any 
other active Facebook user might, checking notifications from the group periodically 
throughout the day and publishing and commenting on posts via Facebook’s mobile app. 
I also set aside one hour dedicated to participant observation within the group via desktop 
web browser on a daily basis. I spent approximately 300 hours interacting with Girl 
Army on the go or at my desktop. Whether mobile or sitting at my desk, I took screen 
captures and field notes to record especially significant moments of interaction within the 
group, which I later used as the source material for more formal memos reflecting on 
emergent themes and patterns. Given the often-sensitive nature of Girl Army posts, I 
stored screen captures in password-protected files and used pseudonyms for all members 
in notes and memos; pseudonyms are also used throughout this chapter.  
Interviews with moderators, members, and ex-members shed light on how, why, 
when, and where members visit the Girl Army Facebook group, on members’ perceptions 
of the group as safe space, on the ways in which members construct boundaries around 
the group, and on the role the Facebook group played in members’ everyday lives. Using 
direct Facebook messages, I recruited seven interviewees who belonged to four different 
categories within Girl Army: 1) one group moderator, 2) three active members who, on at 
least a weekly basis, posted to the group or commented on others’ posts, 3) two less 
active members who are more likely to “lurk” than participate in group discussions, and 
4) one former member who exited the group on her own accord during the course of my 
fieldwork. Given that the bulk of Girl Army communication happens via Facebook, I 
228228 
offered to conduct interviews in whatever setting and via whatever medium members felt 
most comfortable. Three interviews were conducted in person at coffee shops, two 
interviews were conducted via Facebook message, and two interviews were conducted 
via Skype video chat. Interviews varied in length from 25 to 45 minutes, were semi-
structured, and covered participants’ history of membership within Girl Army, reasons 
for joining the group, particular moments of fulfillment through or frustration with the 
group, and, most importantly, their understanding of what qualifies as a feminist safe 
space, how Girl Army is cultivated as a safe space online, and what role the Girl Army 
safe space plays within their personal lives and activist engagements.  
Lastly, I analyzed posts and comment threads published to the group during and 
before my fieldwork to develop a sense of the different types of posts members made and 
the discursive practices used during discussion. Data collected through all three methods 
– participant observation, interviews, and textual analysis – were coded for emergent 
themes. After drafting an initial version of my analysis, I shared my findings with 
participants through a post in the Girl Army group; their feedback helped further refine 
the argument presented in the next section.  
In each of these three communities, I argue, feminists attempt to foster networked 
safe spaces and their digital community-building practices model radical new 
possibilities for collective discourse and action, on- and offline. The boundary 
maintenance work necessary for cultivating these spaces, however, paradoxically limits 
their inclusivity, impact, and sustainability, suggesting a need for more reflexive, 
processual models for building and maintaining safe communities.  
I begin with Girl Army and the search for feminist safe spaces on Facebook.  
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Findings and Discussion 
Girl Army 
In 2012, a small group of Philadelphia-based women connected over a shared 
desire for sisterhood. Each felt that their social lives were lacking deep friendships with 
other women, which, in turn, created a lack of access to empathy for their gender-specific 
experiences and concerns. They decided to make a conscious effort to build a community 
whose bonds were rooted in womanhood in all of its multiplicities. As the group’s 
official description explains, they dubbed their group “Girl Army” in hopes of fostering a 
reserve of women who could be rallied at a moment’s notice to offer members a 
“supportive community.” In its earliest days, the Girl Army community often took the 
form of regularly scheduled “night picnics,” an effort to reclaim women’s right to move 
through public after dark while enjoying safety in numbers. One member started a secret 
Girl Army Facebook group to facilitate communication, coordinate logistics, and invite 
friends to night picnics. As friends and friends of friends joined the group, what started 
out as a meeting space for a small number of women grew into an active feminist 
network. By the time I began fieldwork in September 2015, Girl Army, open only to 
Facebook users invited by current members and approved by one of six moderators, had 
expanded its ranks to more than 850 members who identify as trans or cisgender women 
or nonbinary individuals from the Philadelphia area and beyond. 
On any given day, Girl Army members discuss current events, exchange 
resources, call for backup against online harassment, ask for advice, tell deeply personal 
stories, share feminist memes, support causes through online petitions and fundraisers, 
and organize offline meetups. But while posts vary widely, one key feature keeps Girl 
Army members, most of whom have never met in person, returning to the community day 
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in and day out — the promise of safety. Members consistently describe Girl Army as a 
“safe space,” frequently invoking the term in posts as a preface before sharing a personal 
story, requesting support, or starting a discussion on a controversial issue, reminding 
readers to be gentle in their responses and signaling toward the danger of discussing these 
topics elsewhere: “It feels like a safe space to ask...,” “I feel sooo foolish for letting this 
effect me in anyway and even mentioning this out loud but ya know, safe space...,” “I 
need to talk some shit out in a safe space where advice or opinions or whatever else are 
welcome and encouraged...,” “I don’t usually post in here but I have a problem that I’d 
love to get some advice on/vent about in a safe space…” Since its inception, the primary 
purpose of Girl Army has been to provide members with a digitally networked safe space 
that can be accessed anywhere instantaneously through the Facebook app or website.  
But what does safety mean in this context? And how do members create and 
maintain safety through the Facebook platform? In this section, drawing on nine months 
of ethnographic fieldwork and interviews with members and moderators, I describe the 
technological and social practices Girl Army members perform in an attempt to 
reconfigure a Facebook group into a networked safe space. For Girl Army members, I 
argue, achieving “safety” involves 1) constructing technological and symbolic boundaries 
that separate the group from rape culture; 2) centering the voices of women and 
nonbinary individuals; and 3) creating the conditions for the open discussion of 
oppressive experiences. Members and moderators appropriate and adapt and the 
Facebook group interface in an attempt to create a space apart from the violence of 
popular misogyny, where they imagine and attempt to build an online community that 
embodies feminist values. But faced with the always already incomplete nature of safe 
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spaces and the structural constraints built into the Facebook platform, their efforts 
inevitably fall short. Through the technological and social boundaries they draw around 
the group, Girl Army members center white, cisgender, female experiences, excluding 
marginalized voices and reifying the very binaries feminism seeks to upend. Ultimately, 
the relational work invested into the construction and maintenance of Girl Army is both 
necessary for and paradoxical to its constitution as a networked safe space. 
Constructing community boundaries. Given that “safety” is a relative term, the 
Roestone Collective (2014) argues that safe spaces only become meaningful when 
compared to unsafe spaces, or public spheres that pose some threat of violence. In Girl 
Army, members often use the term “rape culture” to name the unsafe public against 
which the group forms an oppositional stance as a counterpublic safe space. Throughout 
my fieldwork, members frequently mentioned “rape culture” in discussions, but never 
paused to explicitly define the term, suggesting that it serves as tacit shorthand for a 
shared set of experiences. Many Girl Army members organize and participate in 
Philadelphia’s annual March to End Rape Culture, the city’s local chapter of the 
international SlutWalk movement, discussed at length in Chapter 2. Each year, members 
use the group to recruit March volunteers and to promote fundraising events for the 
annual protest. With the group’s support for the protest in mind, I draw on the March’s 
official definition of “rape culture,” repeated from Chapter 2, here to help shed light on 
how Girl Army members define unsafe space:  
Rape culture is a term used to describe a culture in which sexual violence is 
 accepted as a part of everyday life. There are many different aspects of society 
 that contribute to rape culture including victim blaming, rape jokes, transphobia, 
 slut shaming, keep survivors in silence, racism, the use of bodies as sexual 
 objects, lack of education around consent, intimate partner violence, homophobia, 
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 sexist media messages, the list is never ending (March to End Rape Culture, 
 2015). 
 
“Rape culture,” in other words, captures an intersectional understanding of oppression, a 
“matrix of domination” (Collins, 2000, p. 18) in which the vectors of gender, sexuality, 
and race interlock to produce a particular system of power rooted in sexual violence and 
the discourses that enable it. As the March’s list suggests, rape culture encompasses a 
spectrum of oppressive experiences that range in severity, from sexist media messages to 
intimate partner violence. Accordingly, Girl Army members occupying a variety of 
subject positions call on the term in posts to explain a wide variety of everyday 
encounters with oppression, including sexual violence and fear of sexual violence, 
harassment from catcallers in the street or trolls online, sexism in the workplace, and 
belittlement from medical authorities. At the crux of the capacious term is an 
undermining of marginalized individuals’ autonomy over their own bodies, which results 
in a range of violent experiences. Importantly for my purposes here, in interviews, 
members frequently linked rape culture’s material violence with its symbolic violence, 
pointing toward a system of power that threatens the physical safety of gendered bodies 
while also silencing its victims. Rebecca, a recent Girl Army recruit, put it this way:  
In the mainstream world, for some reason, being a person who might have a 
 vagina, or who might identify as a girl, or might be identified as a woman-lady-
 person is enough reason for someone to not listen to you and to shut you down. 
 And the experiences that many people have every day of just being followed and 
 harassed on the street, or stalked or raped or beaten by people we know, or don’t 
 know, the idea that something about our very existence is either a threat or an 
 aberration, to be met by real and symbolic violence. That’s where I think the idea 
 of safety matters. (personal communication, November 18, 2015) 
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For Girl Army members, safety means freedom from rape culture, from the misogynistic 
norms that demean, suppress, and enable violence against women and nonbinary 
individuals. 
As with other safe spaces, in Girl Army, the search for safety starts with the 
construction of community boundaries. Members and moderators draw technological and 
discursive boundaries around the group to separate their safe space community from the 
broader rape culture.  
This boundary maintenance work begins with moderators’ strategy for admitting 
new members into the group. In an interview, Jasmine, Girl Army’s founding and 
primary moderator, explained that, like second-wave safe spaces, the group “is a non-
men space” (personal communication, December 9, 2015). Unlike second-wave safe 
spaces, where membership was controlled through face-to-face encounters, these 
contemporary feminists use digital media to guard their safe space’s boundaries. Girl 
Army moderators take advantage of Facebook’s “secret” group settings to carefully 
screen users’ requests to be added to the group. Only existing members can find Girl 
Army on Facebook and view posts in their newsfeed. To join the group, new members 
must first be invited by an existing member and then approved by a moderator. This 
screening process enables moderators to limit membership to users who, through their 
profile pictures and names or through communication with moderators outside the group, 
identify as women or nonbinary individuals. The group’s separatism is informed in part 
by the very practical consideration that perpetrators of sexual violence and harassment 
are typically men. But Girl Army’s gendered boundaries also emerge from a desire to 
correct the gendered power dynamics of rape culture, which privilege and excuse male 
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perpetrators while casting doubt on victims, most of whom are women (Casteel, Wolfe, 
& Nguyen, 2017). As Rebecca explained, in Girl Army,  
You can have a discussion without immediately being interrupted or trolled about 
 experiences related to gender, sex, and sexuality, and particular types of embodied 
 experiences. You can just not have people saying, “Well, that's not true,” or 
 “You're wrong about your own experience,” or “Hashtag not all men,” or “Why 
 do you hate men?” (personal communication, November 18, 2015) 
 
 By filtering the group’s membership, moderators aim to foster a culture of respect and 
validation that counteracts members’ everyday experiences of rape culture. 
Alongside this technical boundary work, members also discursively construct Girl 
Army as a safe space in opposition to the broader rape culture by sharing personal stories 
of navigating unsafe space, online and in person. Jasmine captured the constant threat of 
offline physical violence many women experience when moving through public space in 
a post inviting members to  
talk about the risks of getting from A to B. The risks we experience in just passing 
 through public space to get from one place to another. The things we do or carry, 
 or avoid to try to minimize those risks or defend ourselves. The stress this causes 
 and the toll it takes.  
 
A transfeminine member of color and sex worker described Girl Army as a space that 
provides respite from the everyday dangers of rape culture’s interlocking systems of 
oppression in an interview:  
As long as patriarchy, and ciscentricism, and racism exist, I am not safe. As long 
 as whorephobia is a thing, I am not safe. As long as NB-phobia is a thing, I am 
 not safe.13 And I’m very aware of that everyday, when I get dressed in the 
 morning...I need to pick my wardrobe somewhat more carefully than I would like 
 to because the image that I present to the world could get me arrested. It could get 
 me killed. (personal communication, November 11, 2015) 
 
																																																								
13 Here, “NB” is an abbreviation for “nonbinary.” 
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In addition to frequent posts describing encounters with either physical violence or the 
threat of it offline, members post stories detailing encounters with rape culture online. 
Members often share screen captures of men harassing them through various digital 
platforms and frequently call for backup fending off bigotry in discussion threads 
elsewhere online. From deeply disturbing insults to rape threats, members have posted 
stories detailing the consequences faced for ignoring men’s messages or refusing men’s 
sexual advances on dating applications, for sharing feminist viewpoints via social media, 
or for simply, as one member put it, “internetting while female.” Girl Army members’ 
practice of naming the countless digital and in-person manifestations of rape culture they 
encounter on a daily basis not only draws a discursive boundary around Girl Army as a 
safe space formed in sharp relief to rape culture; their personal storytelling also forges 
bonds of solidarity through shared experiences and creates opportunities for collective 
interventions into everyday forms of oppression.  
Paradoxically, however, the group’s dependence on the notion of unsafe rape 
culture to construct Girl Army as a safe space risks reifying safe/unsafe spatial binaries 
that “can enact or reflect masculinist social control to regulate women’s use of and 
movement through public spaces” (The Roestone Collective, 2014). On the one hand, as 
a “secret” Facebook group, Girl Army provides members with a support base to rally in 
times of need and to develop responses to oppressive situations in private. In the case of 
both offline and online violence, Girl Army as a digital object can create material 
interventions. The group, accessible through Facebook’s mobile app, provides a 
constantly available resource for requesting support for a situation unfolding in the 
moment or thinking through a repeated experience, such as street harassment, so that 
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members might react differently in the future. Yet, on the other hand, Girl Army’s 
technologically enabled insolation from broader publics inadvertently supports the 
relegation of certain voices to the margins by carving out a specific space for those 
voices. Fraser (1992) cautions that counterpublics risk becoming “enclaved” unless they 
take up “a publicist orientation” and, in addition to functioning “as spaces of withdrawal 
and regroupment,” perform “agitational activities directed toward wider publics” (p. 
124). One interviewee described Girl Army as a “potential space,” a community whose 
bonds might provide the foundation for collective action directed outside its boundaries, 
but which has primarily remained a site for intragroup dialog, which she feared might 
lead the group to become an “echo chamber.” While Girl Army members practice 
separation in order to collectively strategize personal practices of resistance and healing 
outside the public eye, the group’s necessary foregrounding of the safe/unsafe binary 
raises questions about feminist safe spaces’ reification of the very dualisms they seek to 
dismantle and, in turn, their ability to engage with the broader public sphere.  
Moreover, the group’s digital nature undermines the boundary members draw 
between Girl Army as safe and broader online and offline publics as unsafe. Facebook’s 
technical settings may afford the group a certain degree of privacy but, given that the 
majority of members registered accounts under their real names, deeply personal and 
potentially compromising posts are inextricably linked with members’ identities. One 
member remarked in an interview that the lack of anonymity enables members to hold 
each other accountable, whereas anonymity elsewhere on the web has enabled users to 
threaten and harass women and queer and gender-nonconforming people. Even with 
privacy settings in place, however, the lack of anonymity has also resulted in members 
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with ulterior motives taking screen captures of conversations and publishing them in 
other contexts. In one particularly egregious example, a member shared her story of 
having to file a complaint with the police because a man she met through another 
Facebook group threatened to rape her; another member screen-captured the conversation 
and sent it to the man in question. While Girl Army moderators removed this member for 
violating the safe space, it remains impossible to prevent members from publishing 
potentially compromising information about one another in contexts outside the group. 
As a former member who left Girl Army precisely for this reason told me in an interview, 
“It’s the internet. Nothing is safe” (personal communication, December 9, 2015). 
Paradoxically, the same digital accessibility that bolsters Girl Army’s reach and influence 
as a safe space also threatens its safety. While, in interviews, some members said the 
risks of publishing private information online were negligible in comparison to moving 
through public space with feminine, trans, or queer bodies or bodies of color (to quote 
one interviewee, “For me, life is not safe”), social media platforms present new 
challenges for feminist safe spaces.  
Centering marginalized voices. Girl Army’s diminutively feminine yet militant 
name stems from the legacy of the Riot Grrrl movement of 1990s, which emerged at the 
intersection of punk music and U.S. feminism’s “third wave” and aimed to reclaim 
femininity as a source of strength rather than weakness (Marcus, 2010). As one member 
explained in an interview, Girl Army takes up the Riot Grrrl proclamation that 
“femininity is worth celebrating...it’s not a bad thing to, you know, be radically 
feminine.” Girl Army is, in form and content, a space where “girl” is treated, to quote one 
member, as a “radically inclusive” and fluid term that captures “gender beyond the 
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binary” and imagines “the possibility of a different gender order and one that’s better for 
all of us.” Members and moderators understand Girl Army to be a space that provides 
safety for users who identify as women or whose gender identity transcends the male/ 
female binary, blurs the boundaries imagined to separate the binary’s polar extremes, or 
fluctuates over time. In other words, the group serves users excluded from what Fraser 
(1992) describes as the “masculinist conception of the public sphere” (p. 117), which 
limits political participation to the realm of men and political discourse to the concerns of 
hegemonic masculinity. Girl Army emerged as a counterpublic in response to these 
exclusions to “help expand discursive space” (Fraser, 1992: 124) and re-center 
marginalized bodies and issues.  
On multiple occasions, Jasmine has described Girl Army’s mission as an effort to 
“fill the void of a ‘safe space’ for women to speak to other women.” Zola, a longtime 
member, referred to the group as “a sisterhood online” that, in a society where women are 
encouraged to “constantly compete with each other” rather than forge bonds of solidarity, 
provides a much-needed source of community (personal communication, November 10, 
2015). Another interviewee described the bonds of that sisterhood as a shared struggle: 
“Women, both trans and cis, usually share a lot of history with aspects of their 
oppression, with the sources of their oppression.” Girl Army is, in theory, meant to unite 
women and nonbinary individuals who are marginalized and alienated from each other 
within the public sphere; the group’s safety is predicated on its status as an inclusive 
space for otherwise excluded people.  
In practice, however, Girl Army members’ technological and social practices 
privilege cisgender womanhood.  
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While moderators’ membership screening practices help center some 
marginalized voices, they exclude others. Facebook users who do not pass as women in 
their account names or profile pictures or who do not identify themselves to moderators 
as genderqueer are excluded from the group. Transgender men, who experience high 
levels of gender-based violence and harassment (Meicher, 2017), are also barred from 
Girl Army’s “non-men space.” One interviewee drew attention to the contradictions 
between Girl Army’s strict drawing of boundaries between femininity and masculinity 
and its intersectional conceptualization of gender-based oppression:  
I’m interested in whether or not we should include transmasculine or male-
 identified people in the group because effeminate men face a lot of similar 
 intersections of oppression as cis and trans women. In a patriarchal culture, a lot 
 of people, both men and women, are victims of misogyny. (personal 
 communication, November 11, 2015) 
 
Girl Army’s technological boundaries also raise questions about exclusion along the axes 
of race and class. The strategy moderators use to control access to the group suggests that 
Girl Army is largely an extended network of mutual “friends,” which, in turn, implies 
that racial and economic hierarchies may be reproduced within the group. Plus, group 
membership requires digital media access and literacy, which suggests that the group 
likely privileges young, educated, middle- to upper-class women.  
Similar biases are reflected in Girl Army members’ social practices. In group 
conversations, members tend to discursively center cisgender womanhood. When, in 
August 2015, Jasmine published a post asking members if Girl Army should be open to 
people who do not identify as women, only a few members said that they think the group 
should be inclusive of all gender identities. Most others requested that they group 
continue to bar men and expressed desires to keep the group “safe” for discussing female-
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specific concerns without feeling guilt for excluding people, particularly transgender 
women, who may not share these physiological experiences. The vast majority of posts 
published in the group throughout my fieldwork revolved around female experiences, 
including reviews of feminine hygiene products, questions about birth control, stories 
about childbirth, and discussions of issues related to women’s reproductive health rights. 
While the group claims to be open to transgender women and nonbinary individuals, in 
practice, Girl Army discussions often focus on experiences connected to female 
physiology and cisgender womanhood.  
Girl Army members link safety to inclusion and openness. As one member 
alluded to in an interview, within the broader public sphere, women, women of color, 
queer and trans women, and nonbinary individuals are often silenced or discredited on the 
basis of their identities, adding an extra burden to their presentation of self in everyday 
life. Girl Army limits membership to these groups in order to re-center marginalized 
voices within the safe space’s boundaries and foster solidarity through coalitional bonds. 
However, the group’s privileging of cisgender womanhood through its technological and 
discursive practices raises questions about Girl Army’s inclusivity. Toward the end of her 
thread on whether or not to admit people who do not identify as women into the group, 
Jasmine stated, “I want everyone EVERYONE to feel good in here.” Conversely, in a 
thread three weeks later, Jasmine, frustrated with a member who criticized moderators’ 
practices for screening new members, stated firmly, “Anyone who doesn’t get why 
restricting membership is important maybe doesn’t understand the purpose of a safe 
space.” At the heart of Girl Army lies a tension between creating a space that is inclusive 
of some marginalized identities and drawing boundaries that are exclusive of others. Girl 
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Army ties safety to open access, but in order to draw protective boundaries around 
particular identities and experiences, moderators must limit accessibility, demonstrating 
the partial and incomplete nature of the community as a safe space.  
 Fostering open expression. Throughout my fieldwork, Girl Army’s moderators 
established but one guideline for the group, decreed concisely in the group’s description: 
“This group has one basic rule and that is Real Talk. Silencing or bullying members 
won’t be tolerated. Checking each other’s privilege is encouraged, disagreeing is fine, 
debate is good.” Repeatedly in group posts and interviews, members suggested that Real 
Talk is the most important affordance of a safe space. As Zola explained to me, the 
ability to speak openly without being silenced or criticized is the signature achievement 
of safe spaces: 
A safe space is an inclusive spot where it doesn’t matter who you are, that if you 
 have any kind of issue, or just want to kind of talk without any judgment, that’s a 
 safe space. It doesn’t matter whether it’s in person, or if it’s online, or if it’s your 
 mom, or your dad, if you have that safe space where you just feel so, like, all that 
 burden is just gone, and you don’t have to put on any kind of mask. That’s a safe 
 space. (personal communication, November 10, 2015) 
 
The group, in other words, empowers members to speak freely, unfettered by the 
“silencing practices” (Shaw, 2013, p. 94) of online or offline misogyny. Like the in-
person consciousness-raising meetings of the second wave, Girl Army promises members 
a safe space for openly sharing experiences they might not feel comfortable sharing 
elsewhere, such as accounts of sexual violence and harassment, mental health struggles, 
or relationship issues. In discussion threads, members not only offer one another support 
and exchange resources; they also identify patterns across their experiences and trace 
connections between their personal lives and overarching systems of power. To borrow 
Collins’ (2000) term, these open dialogues are the first step in the process of 
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rearticulating personal issues as collective struggles, of developing new frameworks for 
interpreting and responding to everyday manifestations of oppression. Providing a safe 
space to engage in Real Talk is perhaps the group’s most transformative political 
intervention.  
But, as Zola’s definition suggests, safe spaces are not bounded fields located in 
particular places and times, but interpersonal achievements. Safety requires work. It is not 
built into the Facebook platform and “Real Talk” is not guaranteed in a Facebook group 
with hundreds of members. Instead, the relief from the weight of burdensome masks that 
Zola describes, the freedom to “talk without any judgment,” must be actively cultivated 
and maintained.  
Following Fraser’s (1992) theory of subaltern counterpublics, whereas other 
deliberative spaces might “bracket” inequalities and proceed as if they do not exist, Girl 
Army members “unbracket ” (p. 120) inequalities and address them head-on. While the 
group’s description does not outline explicit rules for encouraging and engaging in Real 
Talk, in practice, Girl Army members and moderators draw on a variety of sociotechnical 
strategies to create the conditions necessary for open expression. In the process, the group 
prefigures a more empowering mode of online sociality informed by a politics of 
validation and care that honors individuals’ right to speak openly about their own 
experiences, free from threats of violence. 
Within Girl Army, fostering open expression begins with fostering respect for 
individuals’ personal authority, so as to counteract the delegitimization of marginalized 
voices in more mainstream publics. Members occupying dominant sociocultural positions 
are often asked to step back from discussions concerning the lives of more marginalized 
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groups. For example, when, in November 2015, a member began a thread on cultural 
appropriation, members of color asked their white counterparts to either cede the floor to 
members from the culture in question or consult the writing of people of color published 
elsewhere online. Similarly, in her aforementioned post about street harassment, Jasmine 
made space specifically for marginalized voices: “Not all harassment is identical...I want 
to invite everyone to discuss their experiences, but especially want to hear from those 
who are not white or cis, since your voices are often not heard in this conversation.” 
When privileged members do not share the floor, they are typically kicked out of the 
group. Moderators have also removed members who, at various points throughout my 
fieldwork, questioned the validity of survivors’ accounts of sexual violence.  
Members also maintain open discussion with care for one another’s emotional 
wellbeing through the use of trigger warnings or cautionary notes that precede potentially 
distressing content. While the group does not have explicit rules requiring trigger 
warnings, members use them to mark posts whose content might induce trauma-related 
stress, especially personal stories related to sexual violence, domestic violence, and self-
harm, or add them to posts after moderators instruct them to do so. Moderators also 
intervene on discussion threads when members “tone police,” or derail discussions 
related to experiences of oppression to ridicule a commenter for using angry or 
impassioned speech. Girl Army moderators’ stance against tone policing creates a safe 
space where participants have the freedom to fully express emotions that are often 
invalidated within the broader public sphere. While expectations for behavior within Girl 
Army become clear only through participation within the group, several interviewees 
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commented that members who misstep are often given second chances. As one 
interviewee commented,  
I genuinely feel like I can say whatever I want on Girl Army and I feel like even if 
 I say something that people disagree with or even something that’s wrong, I can at 
 least have an opportunity to learn from it. (personal communication, November 
 11, 2015) 
 
The safe space is meant to be a comfortable one for learning through discussion. 
Still, even within this safe space, members sometimes wish to share a story or 
request anonymously, a challenge given that Facebook requires users to register their 
accounts under their real names (Facebook, 2018). Girl Army moderators, however, have 
developed a workaround. Using Facebook Messenger, Members can send a moderator a 
message to post in the group on their behalf. While the moderator will know the true 
identity of the author, the rest of the group will not.  
And yet, despite the group’s combined ideals of accessibility and openness, there 
are several barriers to entry when it comes to Real Talk in Girl Army. What Jasmine and 
others have referred to as “101 questions,” or questions about the basics of intersectional 
feminism, are not allowed in Girl Army, which presumes access to engagement with 
feminist theory prior to joining the group. While this rule, which is not stated in the 
group’s description, prevents women of color, queer and transgender women, and 
nonbinary members from feeling obligated to educate more privileged members about 
oppression, nowhere do moderators or members explicitly define intersectionality or 
provide resources about intersectional feminism. The group description advises members 
to be open to disagreement, an inevitable byproduct of “real talk” among more than 800 
members, but this appeal to an undefined set of values draws boundaries around what can 
be discussed. 
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This discursive boundary-making took on a technical dimension when, after the 
previously mentioned question about cultural appropriation was later deemed offensive, 
Jasmine banned the member who posed the question and changed the group’s privacy 
settings to require moderators to prescreen all posts prior to their publication. The 
Facebook group platform does not provide any mechanisms through which members can 
challenge moderators’ choices to censor posts or ban users. Moderators are not 
democratically elected; rather, a Facebook group’s founder becomes the default 
moderator and she can grant moderator status to any other members of her choosing, 
who, in turn, may grant moderator status to other members. Once a moderator chooses 
not to publish a post, it disappears from the Facebook platform altogether. Similarly, once 
a moderator chooses to remove a member from the group, that member will not be able to 
find the group through Facebook’s search function, cutting her off from a potentially 
valuable source of support. Banned members can attempt to make amends with 
moderators via direct messages on Facebook but these, too, can be blocked. As such, 
Facebook’s group platform is not conducive to the democratic values or horizontal 
organizing traditionally favored by feminist activists (Freeman, 1972). Each moderator 
has complete control over the group and members must ultimately rely on moderators to 
foster safety within the group.  
 
Through their technological and social practices, moderators encourage 
discussion while also protecting members from certain types of content, making the Girl 
Army safe space simultaneously open to but limiting of discourse, just as it is both safe 
but unsafe, inclusive but exclusive. The Girl Army safe space would not exist without the 
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boundaries members establish to guard group access and regulate group interactions, but 
these boundaries also paradoxically reify the very social inequities Girl Army, as a 
feminist community, aims to transform. Like all safe spaces, the group is always already 
incomplete and imperfect, and the structural constraints of the Facebook platform add 
new challenges to the process of safe space cultivation. Still, the group’s sociotechnical 
practices for building and maintaining a networked safe space point to the obstacles 
marginalized users face in more public arenas while also modeling more empowering 
practices of online discourse and engagement.  
Feminist Zines  
Zines are handcrafted, self-published, self-funded physical ephemera, usually 
resembling a magazine or book, on any topic that interests the author(s) and can be 
shared with few or many readers. The small booklets have played a big role in the 
feminist media repertoire since at least the 1980s, when the earliest proponents of the 
Riot Grrrl movement first began publishing manifestos on sexism in the punk music 
scene (Duncombe, 2008; Piepmeier, 2009). These young feminists appropriated the zine, 
which got its start in the 1930s among mostly male science fictions fans before expanding 
in the 1970s to the male-dominated world of punk rock, as a community-building tool 
(Duncombe, 2008), as a community-building tool. Zines offered the Riot Grrrl generation 
a variety of political affordances. Feminist zines opened up productive third spaces for 
authors who fell outside the boundaries of white, heterosexual masculinity and who, 
consequently, lacked access to or representation in media outlets (Licona, 2005). The 
medium offered an accessible venue for these underrepresented voices, unfettered by the 
restrictive norms encoded into commercial media representations of gendered, racialized, 
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and sexualized bodies (Chidgey, Payne, & Zobl, 2009). Feminist zinesters performed the 
important work of making those encoded norms visible, cutting and pasting images from 
commercial print media to critique them and offer alternatives (Zobl, 2009). Through 
their circulation, zines forged communal bonds that facilitated the collective formation of 
critical feminist subjectivities (Harris, 2003) and created spaces for the negotiation of 
complex feminist identities (Guzzetti & Gamboa, 2004; Piepmeier, 2009). Moreover, 
feminist zinesters’ politics extended beyond content to infuse the production and 
circulation processes, which typically unfolded through alternative economic practices 
that subverted capitalist marketplace norms and blurred the boundaries between 
producers and consumers (Chidgey, 2009). The democratic exchange and, more recently, 
the diligent efforts to archive these feminist ephemera have created a vibrant record of 
feminist history grounded in the work of grassroots activists and makers, whose extra-
institutional voices are typically underprivileged within dominant discourse (Chidgey, 
2013; Eichhorn, 2013).  
Nearly 40 years since the start of the Riot Grrrl movement, print zines are making 
an unexpected resurgence. It is impossible to estimate the number of contemporary 
zinesters in the United States, whose subversive, hodgepodge texts are not catalogued in 
the Library of Congress or issued ISSNs, but recent mainstream news headlines have 
heralded their comeback: “Zines Have a Resurgence Among the Web-Savvy” (Wortham, 
2011); “Are Zines Making a Comeback, Too?” (Bose, 2014); “How Zines Survive in the 
Internet Age” (Carville, 2015); “Yes, Zines Still Exist, and They’re Not Antiques” 
(Berube, 2013). Today, there are more than 60 active zine festivals (Stolen Sharpie 
Revolution, 2016b), dozens of distros and stores (Stolen Sharpie Revolution, 2016a; 
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Stolen Sharpie Revolution, 2016c), and about 120 zine libraries and archives across the 
United States (Barnard Zine Library, 2016). At the time of writing, a search for zines on 
Etsy, a popular craft marketplace website where many zinesters sell their wares, returns 
approximately 32,000 listings. Among U.S. feminists, the genre remains an important 
political tactic; more than 600 feminist zines are currently listed for sale on Etsy, annual 
feminist zine festivals in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and New York attract hundreds of 
makers and readers every year, and feminist zine collections, like the Barnard Zine 
Library, are thriving. 
Why do feminists continue to handcraft and self-publish zines when they can, and 
have with great success, blog or tweet? The push-button publishing platforms of Web 2.0 
have streamlined all of the aforementioned features of zines. Like the Riot Grrrl zinesters, 
feminists have coopted digital media platforms to create accessible, participatory spaces 
for alternative discourses, activist communities, and the formation of critical 
subjectivities. Many feminists do both, printing zines and maintaining an active social 
media presence. The genre’s resurgence, however, suggests that zines fulfill a need for 
feminist communities unmet within the digital media landscape. The humble do-it-
yourself zine perseveres in spite of, but perhaps more accurately, because of the rise of 
blogging and social media platforms.  
In this section, I argue that feminist zinesters merge print and digital media tactics 
to cultivate a form of community otherwise unavailable online. Feminist zinesters use 
social media platforms to promote their work, but rarely make copies of their zines 
available for reading online. In this way, digital networks act as porous yet protective 
boundaries that provide access to the zine community, but not to the actual content of 
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zines themselves. Feminist zinesters’ combined print and digital practices produce a 
networked safe space, open to newcomers but closed off from the gender-based 
harassment that tends to plague online spaces. Like Girl Army and Permanent Wave 
Philly, feminist zinesters draw on a number of different sociotechnical strategies to 
construct boundaries around their networked safe space, to center the voices of women, 
LGBTQ people, and people of color, and to foster free expression without fear of violent 
backlash. While there are limitations to the genre as a community-building tactic, 
contemporary feminist zinesters’ practices have implications for what safer, more 
empowering online spaces might look like.  
Constructing community boundaries. Zines have an intrinsically limited 
distribution. Whereas a blog post’s reach can grow exponentially among a limitless 
number of readers, a zine’s circulation is restricted by its print run, or the number of 
copies its author produces. Even so, a zine’s reach is difficult to measure. Bloggers might 
operationalize their audience’s size in terms of subscribers or unique visitors, but 
zinesters, who typically do not use subscription-based models to circulate their print 
booklets, cannot be certain how many hands their work passes through; a dozen readers 
may purchase copies of a zine and share them with friends and family, while a dozen 
others might peruse an issue in a bookstore. Bloggers and other social media users also 
typically have a means to engage in dialogue with their followers, such as comments 
sections. A zinester, on the other hand, stands at the end of a one-way communication 
flow from zine maker to zine reader. In other words, a zinester’s public is often invisible 
to her, only coming into view at festivals and through Etsy transactions. 
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And yet, my interviewees spoke of the feminist zine network as a community and 
identified community-building as one of their primary motivations for making zines.  
Some described zine-making as a community-building practice that brings people 
together, face-to-face, to coauthor a zine or to mingle at a zine festival. Moose Lane 
highlighted this as a significant accomplishment in an increasingly mediated world:  
Even though zines are not a good medium for back-and-forth, I think the actual 
 zine community is stronger than online ones, in part because there is a lot more 
 face-to-face interaction…I have met almost all of my friends on the East Coast 
 through zines in some way. In most online communities, I kind of lurk. I’m not 
 much of an active participant. It’s a really good way to be exposed to a wide 
 variety of experiences and views, but at the end of the day I’m still sitting at home 
 behind a computer screen. (personal communication, March 29, 2016) 
 
The face-to-face production and exchange of zines paired with the medium’s 
extra-institutional, do-it-yourself nature makes it ideal for building communities that 
prefigure their authors’ political goals and values. For Kerri Radley, “One of the things 
that I love about the zine community is that I feel like we can shape it to be what we want 
to. Through active participation, putting on and attending events, and sharing our zines, 
we work to create the type of community that we want to belong to” (personal 
communication, April 19, 2016).   
But while these in-person interactions are important, a more abstract sense of 
connection figures centrally into zinesters’ experiences of community. My interviewees 
frequently described zinesters as sharing, at some fundamental level, a common set of 
experiences and politics, such that a zine maker can imagine addressing an audience who 
already understands her perspective: “The zine community, for the most part, is such a 
welcoming and supportive space, that it makes sense that feminists have been drawn to 
the medium,” Kerri Radley explained, “It’s a space that is generally safer, one in which 
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they have a voice and can be heard” (personal communication, April 19, 2016). This 
sense of safety and camaraderie is grounded in the zine’s historical association with 
countercultural and leftist movements (Duncombe, 2008). A feminist zinester may never 
meet all of her readers but, by virtue of their interest in zines, she can safely guess that 
they share at least some of her political goals and values. She cannot make the same 
assumption on highly public social media platforms like Twitter, where users span the 
political spectrum. As Moose Lane quipped, “Most of the rabid misogynists, transphobes, 
homophobes, racists, et cetera, you meet online don’t read zines” (personal 
communication, March 29, 2016). The countercultural roots of the medium form a 
symbolic boundary around the zine community, creating a space “of withdrawal and 
regroupment” (Fraser, 1992, p. 124), where likeminded activists can engage exclusively 
with one another without facing suppression or interruption.  
Feminist zinesters, in other words, preach to the choir. For some critics, this 
makes zines a weak medium for political engagement. Sandoval and Fuchs (2010), for 
example, argue that “the success of alternative media depends on their ability to gain 
public visibility for their critical media content…to do more than to ‘preach to the 
converted,’ they have to try to increase their public visibility and to attract as many 
recipients as possible” (p. 148). Reaching a wide audience, however, is not the primary 
purpose that zines fulfill within feminists’ repertoire of media practices. While a social 
media platform would undoubtedly offer greater visibility, feminist zinesters prioritize 
what many of my interviewees referred to as “personal impact” over readership numbers. 
Christine Stoddard, who runs a popular online magazine that generates ad revenue, also 
makes zines in small runs, producing no more than 100 copies of a single title. “I’m not 
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looking to communicate en masse with a zine,” Stoddard said, “that’s what the Internet is 
for. I’m looking to make that personal impact, to give someone a print artifact to cherish 
and remember” (personal communication, March 26, 2016). Moose Lane, who publishes 
work on a Tumblr blog, expressed a similar sentiment:  
I’m on Tumblr, and I post a lot of art there, as well as reblog puns and cat 
 pictures. A lot of what I post isn’t all that personal, and the stuff that is feels like 
 shouting into the void. Sometimes, that’s what I want — self-expression without 
 examination or response. But I don’t use zines in the same way. (personal 
 communication, March 29, 2016) 
 
Regardless of whether or not they ever meet their readers in person, zinesters expressed a 
feeling of personal connection with their readers, facilitated through the exchange and 
circulation of zines, that they do not experience online. Several interviewees framed zines 
as objects of mediation that, in comparison to digital media, foster more authentic 
relationships between authors and readers. Christine Stoddard explained that 
So much web content is meant to be consumed quickly. People usually are 
 clicking around too much to really focus on any single piece for too long. Zines 
 require a longer time commitment. They engross you in a way that most web 
 content does not. That alone can impact the reader very personally and make your 
 message resonate with them for years to come. (personal communication, March 
 26, 2016) 
 
While each of my interviewees maintains an active social media presence, they turn 
toward zines to share personal experiences with a small, supportive audience.  
The underground, alternative nature of zines enables this intimate community 
experience. The degree of countercultural capital required to participate in the zine 
community, however, can make the accessible DIY practice ironically inaccessible to 
readers not yet acquainted with the medium. Duncombe (2008) describes early zine 
scenes as “self-ghettoized” (p. 176), unsustainable, and even “elitist” (p. 174) 
underground communities, whose members struggled to engage with more mainstream 
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publics or extend a hand to newcomers. This elitism is especially problematic for 
feminists, given women’s historical exclusion from the cultures and movements 
surrounding zine scenes (Duncombe, 2008). Moreover, zinesters are often not inspired to 
start making zines until they get their hands on someone else’s self-published work 
(Piepmeier, 2009); repeatedly in interviews, feminist zinesters reported that it was a 
serendipitous first encounter with zines in an offbeat bookstore, a public library, or a 
classroom that sparked their zine-making careers.  
Contemporary feminist zinesters use digital media platforms to democratize 
access to zines, a practice that may have much to do with zines’ apparent resurgence. 
Christine Stoddard reported that “the internet has made it so much easier to discover new 
titles and zine festivals” (personal communication, March 26, 2016). While, true to their 
roots, interviewees reported selling zines at alternative bookstores, 10 out of 12 
interviewees also sell their zines online, through their own personal websites or through 
Etsy shops. Others send their zines to distros, who sell and ship zinesters’ work, almost 
always through an online store, to readers for a portion of the cover price. All 
interviewees have blogs linked to their zine projects, usually hosted on Tumblr, which 
has garnered a reputation as a platform for leftist “social justice warriors” (Brandt & 
Kizer, 2015). Importantly for the zine community as a whole, social media have also 
facilitated what my interviewees described as the recent surge in zine festivals. While, 
like all aspects of zine culture, the history of zine fests has not been well documented, 
interviewees speculated that these exhibits and pop-up shops, often hosted in community 
centers and open to zinesters who pay small tabling fees, are a recent phenomenon. “I 
have seen more zine fests pop up in the last half-decade and many more are continuing to 
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go strong,” Moose Lane observed, suggesting parallels between the rise of zine fests and 
the development of Web 2.0 (personal communication, March 29, 2016).  
For my interviewees, modern-day zine-making is a material social practice 
channeled in large part through digital media, mirroring the structure of networked 
publics, or “spaces and audiences that are bound together through technological 
networks” (boyd, 2008, p. 125). Feminist zinesters, readers, and newcomers to the zine 
world use digital media to facilitate interactions online and face-to-face. In contrast to the 
“self-ghettoized” zine communities of previous generations, to borrow Duncombe’s 
terminology, social media platforms have contributed to what Rauch (2015) calls “a 
converged media environment” (p. 126), blurring the boundary separating zinesters’ 
alternative discourse from the mainstream. Nonetheless, the boundary remains, and 
feminist zine communities, while networked, are counterpublics, purposefully formed in 
juxtaposition to wider publics that marginalize women, trans and queer folks, and people 
of color. The boundary encompassing feminist zine counterpublics, while made 
permeable via digital networks, is protected through many zinesters’ strict policies 
against scanning and publishing their zines online. Kerri Radley, for example, never 
shares digital copies of her zines:  
I’m a firm believer in my zines remaining in physical form and on paper only and 
 I do not allow any of my zines to be digitally archived ... Even though I can never 
 truly 100% control what happens to my zines or their content, keeping them out 
 of the digital sphere does allow me better control over what happens to my 
 writing—where it’s shared, who it’s shared with, who it’s attributed to, and who 
 makes money off of it. (personal communication, April 19, 2016) 
 
Most of my interviewees only make their zine content available to those who take the 
steps necessary to acquire physical copies, through online shops or in-person festivals. 
Anyone interested in a feminist zinester’s work is likely to be granted access, as zines are 
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often made available at low prices, on a sliding scale, or for barter or trade, but the reader 
must first invest energy into obtaining a copy of her work. This practice not only grants 
zinesters more control over the distribution of their work, but also makes it difficult for 
readers to harass writers with whom they disagree. While some may view zines’ one-way 
flow of communication as a weakness when it comes to building communities, Adelaide 
Barton explained that for feminist zinesters, “this is actually a benefit. The internet is rife 
with trolls, especially ones that are looking to attack a woman voicing her opinion, or 
anyone challenging the patriarchy” (personal communication, April 6, 2016).  
Feminist zinesters merge digital and print media practices to cultivate a 
distributive communication structure (Rentschler, 2015), forging network ties with new 
readers, maintaining relationships with existing readers, and connecting with one another, 
but keeping their zines’ content offline. Digital networks, then, constitute a boundary 
between zine-makers and readers, providing entry to the feminist zine community, but 
not immediate access to feminist zines, themselves. Feminist zinesters’ boundary 
maintenance work gives shape to a networked safe space, where marginalized media-
makers can express themselves freely without facing harassment. 
Centering marginalized voices. The tools and materials zinesters use to practice 
their craft range in degree of professionalism, from paper, pens, Sharpies, glue sticks, 
scissors, and stolen time on the office’s Xerox machine to cardstock, artist-grade inks and 
paints, silk screen, lithographs, letterpresses, Photoshop, and professional printers. But 
while feminist zinesters’ creative practices and aesthetics may vary, the community 
shares a common set of norms, which guide the zine production process. As Moose Lane 
explained, “What separates zines from other self-publications is a commitment to do-it-
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yourself ethics (or do-it-together ethics) and the prioritization of the spread of ideas and 
art over making money” (personal communication, March 29, 2016). My interviewees’ 
zines are often explicitly feminist in content, dealing with questions related to gender-
based inequities, but the DIY ethics of the zine-making process itself prefigures feminist 
ideals in ways that digital media platforms and commercial media outlets simply cannot. 
Christine Stoddard observed that 
Zines are about as approachable as media-making gets. As long as you have a pen 
 and paper, you can make a zine. If you have access to a copier, you can make 
 multiple copies of it...You can be the writer, artists, and publisher. Because the 
 barrier to entry is low, making zines is very empowering. Anybody can make 
 their voice heard…Traditional media is fun of barriers and, historically, those 
 barriers have been less amendable to female creators. Those barriers don’t exist in 
 the zine world. (personal communication, March 26, 2016) 
 
Christine’s comments point toward what Fraser (1992) describes as the “informal 
impediments to participatory parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and 
legally licensed to participate” (p. 119), the everyday systems of power that structure 
participation in the public sphere. White male producers dominate commercial media 
industries (Smith, Choueiti, Pieper, 2017), gender-based harassment silences women on 
social media platforms, and economic privilege restricts access to both, but anyone with a 
pen and paper can “make their voice heard” through a zine. Although some of my 
interviewees expressed concerns about an aesthetic shift toward more “slick and 
professional” zines, to borrow Kerri Radley’s description, a zinester can invest as much 
or as little artistry and resources into her work as she chooses and still participate in the 
zine community (personal communication, April 19, 2016). Aesthetics may shift, but 
accessibility remains a key value of the feminist zinesters’ DIY ethics. At its core, 
feminist zine-making constitutes an accessible alternative media practice that eschews 
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marketplace values, subverts the producer/consumer binary, and, in the process, creates 
outlets for marginalized voices, unrestricted by gendered or class-based barriers to entry.  
Just as the zine community opens up new opportunities for otherwise 
marginalized media-makers, it also creates spaces for the representation of bodies and 
subjectivities excluded from dominant discourse and commercial media. Moose Lane’s 
zine series, Get the Fuck Outside (GTFO), focuses on exploring the great outdoors and 
represents a diversity of characters in the process: “The illustrations in GTFO are 
centered around ladyfolk, though the content is for anyone. I do this deliberately because, 
socially, men tend to have easier access to the outdoors, either due to social expectations 
growing up, or due to perceived dangers for women of traveling alone in remote places” 
(personal communication, March 29, 2016). Generating visibility through alternative 
media representation is especially important to Kerri Radley, whose zine, Deafula, shares 
her experiences navigating the world as a deaf woman: 
Deafula has garnered a wider reach than I ever expected or thought possible, 
 reaching into the thousands annually. Given how near and dear the topics I cover 
 in Deafula are to my heart, and how important it is to me to increase visibility for 
 deaf and disabled folks, my zine having reach is meaningful to me. (personal 
 communication, April 19, 2016) 
 
Through the representation of underprivileged identities, zinesters critique, explicitly or 
implicitly, the discourses that relegate those identities to the margins of society and 
construct counterdiscourses of inclusion and empowerment.  
But while some authors, like Kerri, reach an impressive number of readers, 
cultivated in part through their online promotional work, the enclaved nature of the zine 
community raises concerns about whether the medium silos already marginalized voices. 
As is the case with Girl Army, the feminist zine community networks a safe space for 
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bodies and issues that, because they are marked by gender, are often excluded from more 
mainstream arenas for political discourse and action. In doing so, however, the 
community risks reifying the hegemonic norms that enable the white male domination of 
the public sphere by creating a release valve for the oppressed, a counterpublic sphere 
where women can freely critique systems of power without actually disrupting them. 
Still, while they acknowledged this critique, my interviewees insisted that zines are not 
intended to serve as launching pads for public-facing actions and critique; like Christine 
Stoddard said, “that’s what the internet is for” (personal communication, March 26, 
2016). Rather, while social media platforms offer spaces for planning and executing 
broader outreach, the feminist zine community offers a space for uninterrupted 
engagement with others who share similar experiences of marginalization.  
Fostering open expression. As demonstrated by the variety of topics, aesthetics, 
and forms that characterizes the genre, zines offer creators an outlet for open expression, 
free of censorship, limitations, and interruptions. “Zines are a medium where it is easy to 
express ideas without (much) fear of repercussion, or without bending to outside 
influence,” Moose Lane explained, “This makes it a good medium for feminists to 
express personal experiences, stories, theories, etc.” (personal communication, March 29, 
2016). With the zinester as author, editor, and producer, she subverts the 
producer/consumer binary and is not beholden to filter her work through the perspectives 
and expectations of anyone else. Adelaide Barton’s gendered experiences as a woman 
zinester illustrate that this is an especially important affordance for feminist media-
makers: “There’s something about the expression of a zine which doesn’t allow for 
interruptions. I feel that as a woman, I’ve been socialized to tolerate interruptions, even 
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when it results in me not being able to finish articulating my point” (personal 
communication, April 6, 2016). While, as Moose Lane suggested, sharing personal 
stories on social media often “feels like shouting into the void,” zinesters described 
feeling as if their audience, however small, actually listened to what they have to say 
(personal communication, March 29, 2016). As Adelaide Barton explains to the 
uninitiated in her zine about zines, You Should Know About Zines, “It’s not easy to 
‘spam’ zines, so folks are more likely to actually rad them and consider what they have to 
say.”  
The materiality of zines enables this uninterrupted freedom of expression. Zines, 
unlike digitally mediated expressions, are not easily traceable back to their authors, 
granting zinesters the option to publish under true anonymity. As Dee, a member of 
Permanent Wave Philly, explained, “With zines, you have a little more control than the 
Internet. Google is a helpful tool, and also a very hurtful tool. ere are things that you can 
write about in zines, various hard things, that you don’t want Google-able, that you don’t 
want associated with your name” (personal communication, May 24, 2015). Zines, as 
ephemera, are temporary and potentially anonymous material artifacts, providing 
zinesters an outlet for deeply personal stories and the freedom to experiment with 
feminist identities and theories without worrying about damage to their future 
reputations. The genre’s materiality also makes it difficult to troll or harass zinesters. It is 
precisely zines’ intrinsically limited audience that makes the genre so attractive to 
feminists in an age where reaching large audiences is easier than ever, but often comes at 
the cost of harassment, violent threats, and hate speech. In Adelaide Barton’s experience, 
“Zines don’t really provide a platform for abusive comment sections. Anyone who wants 
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to harass a feminist zine-maker must put in more effort to do so, and do so in a way that 
is not immediately attached to their zine” (personal communication, April 6, 2016).  
Zines, as accessible DIY media that operate outside of both marketplace logic and 
sociopolitical constraints, enable the invention and circulation of counterdiscourses that 
might otherwise find no outlet within commercial media. Almost all of my participants 
described zines as affording them more authentic, intimate, or personal expressions than 
other media outlets. According to Moose Lane, for example, the internet “tends to reward 
short pieces or snippets, where zines can really be as long as you want” (Moose Lane, 
personal communication, March 29, 2016). Similarly, Kerri Radley observed that 
“Digital expression is much looser and less controlled, more exhibitionist and a curated 
expression of the self. Zines are more intimate and truer to the self” (personal 
communication, April, 19 2016). The medium also grants authors greater flexibility when 
it comes to incorporating more personal touches into the design of zines. As Candice 
Johnson, a Permanent Wave Philly member, explained, the materiality of zines offers a 
degree of personalization not readily accessible through digital platforms: “There’s more 
of a human imprint on a zine, because you can see the way that they chose to type it and 
design it, whether it’s collage or there’s doodles and drawings and stuff. It feels personal, 
and its tangible, so you can have it and refer back to it and keep it in a collection” 
(personal communication, May 24, 2015). The unfiltered, slow, low-risk, hands-on 
process of zine production lends itself to personal meditations one might not otherwise 
share publicly. The topics considered across my interviewees’ zines attest to the 
medium’s intimate nature: personal experiences with street harassment, disability, sexism 
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in academia, menstruation, sexual health, gender identity, familial relationships, trauma, 
and more all find an outlet in their handcrafted booklets.  
 
Free from digital surveillance, online harassment, the capitalist value of fast 
production and consumption, and the approval or resources of a commercial host, zines 
offer feminists an unrestricted and unregulated medium for expression. While limited in 
reach and impact, for feminist community-builders, zines offers a safer, more 
empowering alternative to digital media platforms, where violent threats and hate speech 
continue to suppress marginalized voices. If, as Couldry (2012) argues, media are 
practices that emerge in response to users’ needs within a particular context, zine-making 
practices supplement feminists’ digital media repertoire with a networked safe space free 
of the harassment and vitriol that has characterized web 2.0 platforms. Zines’ resurgence 
comes at a time when feminists are seeking alternatives to digital media platforms, where 
violent threats and hate speech continue to suppress marginalized voices.  
Permanent Wave Philly  
In 2010, feminist writer and musician Amy Klein started a blog to document her 
band’s tour and share her thoughts on gender and the male-dominated punk music scene. 
Soon after, she began receiving messages from young women who identified with her 
perspective and wanted to establish feminist connections beyond the blogosphere. Klein, 
inspired by her readers, took to Twitter and Facebook and called for a gathering of 
feminists at her Brooklyn apartment in December of that year. About twenty people 
attended and brainstormed ideas for empowering women in the arts, media, politics, and 
everyday life. After the meeting, Klein started an email listserv to facilitate 
262262 
communication within the budding feminist community and to begin putting their ideas 
into action. The group eventually came to be known as Permanent Wave (PW), a playful 
riff on both the feminist wave metaphor and the chemical hair treatment. A descendent of 
the Riot Grrrl movement, PW grew into a key player in both the DIY arts scene and the 
grassroots activist network of New York City, hosting feminist punk shows on some 
weekends and organizing feminist street protests on others. But PW’s most important 
actions took place outside the public eye. The collective created closed-off spaces, virtual 
and in-person, where members could safely discuss experiences of oppression and 
request support. Although Klein founded PW, the group had no formal leaders or 
structure; if you were a member of the listserv, you were a member of Permanent Wave. 
And while PW had a loose focus on gender and the arts, members’ interests drove the 
group’s particular projects. As the mission statement published on PW’s website 
explained, “PW is YOU! There is no secret organizational code or anything. The 
organization is simply small groups of people working together and making shit happen” 
(qtd. in Jen G, 2012).14  
Over the course of the next year, Permanent Wave grew both its local and online 
presence and the listserv expanded to include hundreds of members from across the 
country. Among them was Erin, a seventeen-year-old aspiring punk musician living in 
Philadelphia and looking to make her own feminist intervention into the city’s 
underground music scene. Erin founded Permanent Wave Philly (PWP) with the help of 
older women musicians and activists and organized a meeting of Philadelphia-based 
listserv members in December of 2011. Following Permanent Wave NYC, the 
																																																								
14 This account is gleaned from Plitt, 2012. 
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Philadelphia chapter’s mission was to create a space where feminists could connect with 
one another via email and in person, openly discuss issues related to gender, politics, and 
culture, and work together to organize shows and events that prioritized women, LGBTQ 
people, and people of color. In pursuit of these goals, PWP met at least once per month, 
hosted several punk music shows, film screenings, and visual art showcases every year, 
often as benefits for local feminist organizations, and published an annual zine. Like the 
original PW, a listserv demarcated membership and facilitated communication within 
PWP between meetings. But unlike PWNYC, PWP had staying power. After the New 
York chapter began to dissolve in 2012 due to an organizational dispute over the group’s 
lack of racial diversity, PWP continued to meet and host events until members, suffering 
from burnout, decided the group should go on “hiatus” in early 2017.  
On its official website and social media pages, Permanent Wave Philly describes 
itself first and foremost as a community. When I asked Dee, one of the group’s earliest 
members, about the political significance of PWP in an interview, she echoed this 
emphasis on community: 
The only show organizers I knew existed were white men. Like, they’re the only 
 people who book shows…And they do a lot of things based on who they’re 
 friends with and who knows who, and it was just like, very, very, 
 exclusive…Everyone has definitions of community, everyone defines what their 
 community is personally. But I for sure knew that that was not my community. 
 And I was really excited by Permanent Wave Philly building a community and 
 doing their best, doing our best, to help a better community, a better scene, exist. 
 (personal communication, May 24, 2015) 
  
But how did PWP build a feminist community out of a listserv? What practices 
did members perform to cultivate a feeling of safety and solidarity within the group? 
Permanent Wave Philly is, I argue, a networked safe space, built by its members from the 
ground up during their free time, with only digital media platforms and their own 
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personal skills at their disposal. Starting from scratch without the resources of a formal 
organization, PWP worked to construct their own community boundaries and to develop 
community practices that centered marginalized voices and fostered open expression. The 
networked affordances of an email listserv presented PWP members with both the 
opportunity and the challenge to create a new social formation that, unlike other punk, 
DIY, and leftist scenes in Philadelphia, called “girls to the front.”  
Constructing community boundaries. Unlike Girl Army, Permanent Wave 
Philly, as founding member Callie told me in an interview, is an “open collective,” a 
group whose boundaries are fluid and whose core membership is constantly rotating. 
“You don’t need an application to do it,” Dee explained, “We don’t require a screening, 
but I feel like if somebody comes to a meeting, that’s the screening of if they fit or not. 
And we’re always going to say, ‘Come on back’” (personal communication, May 24, 
2015). The group is open to anyone, regardless of gender identity, who wants to join. As 
a testament to this, the group’s mission statement includes an open call for participation: 
Permanent Wave Philly is a network and community of feminist artists and 
 activists. We seek to challenge gender inequality not only in all forms of the arts, 
 but also in politics, our personal lives, and anywhere else it seems necessary. We 
 want to continue what was started generations ago by creating a revolutionary arts 
 movement and community that's relevant to women, LGBTQ-people, people of 
 color, and anyone who has been excluded from subjective mainstream norms. We 
 want you to join, collaborate, and inspire us. (personal communication, May 24, 
 2015) 
 
Anyone interested in supporting PWP’s mission can, Callie told me matter-of-factly, 
“just walk in and join us” (personal communication, May 24, 2015). 
In reality, however, joining the group is not quite so easy. Potential members must 
cross several community boundaries before they can participate in PWP.  
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First, newcomers must find Permanent Wave, either online or in-person, a task 
made difficult by the group’s countercultural characteristics. Members frequently referred 
to PWP as part of Philadelphia’s “DIY scene,” a network of local bands and amateur 
bookers who host shows in offbeat venues, typically someone’s basement or living room, 
and operate outside the professional music industry. Like the zine community, the DIY 
scene provides an outlet for unconventional music and art and, historically, leftist politics 
and alternative identities, but lacks the visibility of more mainstream cultural circuits. As 
such, a certain degree of countercultural capital is required to enter the scene, to know 
where shows are hosted, and to become an active participant, either as a musician or a 
booker.15 The same is true for Permanent Wave Philly. Most of the group’s members 
came to PWP through existing connections to the DIY scene; some played in local bands 
while others had either booked or attended house shows prior to discovering the group. 
The group’s alterity acts as a barrier to entry to those not already “in the know” about the 
Philly DIY scene, which in turn limits participation to those who share the scene’s punk 
ethos and leftist politics. PWP’s underground nature raises concerns about exclusivity 
and impact; as Jenny lamented in an interview, “We get into our own little bubble” 
(personal communication, May 24, 2015). The group’s purposeful positioning along the 
margins of the city’s arts and culture scene, however, not only grants them a certain 
creative freedom, but also helps members form counterpublic connections with 
likeminded artists and activists. 
In addition to this symbolic boundary, the PWP listserv, hosted on the free-to-use 
Google Groups platform, functions as a technological boundary around the group. 
																																																								
15 See Silberling, 2015 for more on Philadelphia’s DIY scene and Lingel (2017) on DIY 
punk scenes as countercultural communities.  
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Newcomers, once they encounter PWP through the broader DIY scene, officially “join” 
the group when they become a member of the PWP listserv, either by filling out a sign-up 
form in person at a PWP event or sending a request to the group’s email account. Only 
listserv members can learn about internal meetings, help coordinate event logistics, and 
weigh in on organizational issues. PWP members carefully maintain the listserv as a 
boundary between the group and the broader public. Consistently throughout my 
fieldwork, there were between ten and 20 active PWP members, who reliably attended 
meetings, participated in events, and contributed to listserv discussions. But when, in 
2015, members realized their at times heated email discussions were reaching more than 
70 different people, they decided to cull the listserv down to 30 people to protect the 
community’s privacy. The listserv provides the informal grassroots collective with a 
formal method for demarcating and maintaining membership boundaries. PWP’s social 
and technological boundaries close the counterpublic collective off from more 
mainstream publics, creating a space specifically for feminist activists and artists. 
The networked affordances of a listserv enabled Permanent Wave Philly’s 
founders to construct their own activist community from the ground up, without the 
institutional resources or structure of a more conventional organization like a nonprofit. 
Reflecting the DIY ethos of the punk scene and the do-it-ourselves logic of contemporary 
feminism, PWP was not built around a bureaucratic system of formal leaders or positions, 
but a dispersed, participatory communication network, where any member who wants to 
develop or contribute to a group project can. Through the group’s networked structure, 
PWP members practice a horizontalism that, in theory, counteracts the marginalization of 
women, LGBTQ+ people, and people of color in the punk scene and beyond.  
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In practice, however, PWP’s listserv-as-community structure often gave rise to 
informal leaders who dominated the group. In her 1972 study of second-wave feminist 
collectives, Jo Freeman warns activists about what she calls “the tyranny of 
structurelessness,” the risk of a group’s commitment to leaderlessness masking the 
growth of unchecked hierarchies. In PWP, the horizontally networked nature of the 
listserv exacerbated this age-old organizing problem. Listserv membership indicates that 
one belongs to the Permanent Wave community, but it does not clarify what one’s role is 
in the community or how community decisions are made. Members with more time on 
their hands or a higher level of commitment were more likely to take on tasks like calling 
for meetings, checking and responding to emails, posting on the group’s social media 
pages, and coordinating event logistics. With the structure of the group and members’ 
expectations of one another left unspoken, individual members could take charge and 
make unilateral decisions, while the rest of the group was left without a formal 
mechanism through which to hold these informal leaders accountable.  
This issue came to a head in the aftermath of PWP’s 2015 show at PhilaMOCA, 
described in the introduction to this chapter. While, on the surface, the event appeared to 
have been a success — the turnout was decent, the audience enjoyed themselves, the 
bands were well paid, and PWP made a profit selling merchandise — behind the scenes, 
Erin organized the show by herself, booking bands without consulting the rest of the 
group. The result was a lineup that did not reflect the group’s feminist focus on centering 
the work of marginalized artists. “The opening band was a bunch of cis white dudes,” 
Dee lamented at a meeting following the show, and there were no people of color in any 
of the other bands. Worse still, the opening band’s lead singer was known to post 
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degrading images of and messages about women on his social media accounts. Dee 
placed blame on Erin, but other group members acknowledged that they had failed to 
question Erin’s choices or even check in on the progress of her event planning. The 
show’s shortcomings ultimately stemmed from a collective failure to practice 
community.  
The PhilaMOCA show points to a particular challenge for feminist community-
builders in the digital age. While platforms like email listservs may make it easier than 
ever for even the youngest, unseasoned activists to give shape to new communities, it is 
not enough to simply create a listerv and call it a community. In fact, doing so often 
obfuscates the work required to combat the imbalances of power that inevitably emerge 
within any social space. This is particularly problematic for feminist activists seeking to 
create communities that counteract patriarchal systems of oppression. When a 
community’s structure is left unspoken, emergent hierarchies can sideline already 
marginalized voices. Dee pointed toward the tyranny of structurelessness within PWP at 
the post-show meeting: “I guess I thought this was a collective, and that ‘collective’ 
means a certain thing, and that everyone was on the same page about that. But I guess I 
was wrong.” For the collective to prefigure its members’ feminist values, steps needed to 
be taken to articulate the community’s structure, cultivate a sense of belonging, and build 
a system of accountability within a community’s boundaries. 
Centering marginalized voices. Rather than, as Dee commented, assume 
everyone is on the same page about what the collective’s goal are and what it means to 
participate in the collective, members worked on making the group’s mission, structure, 
and expectations for one another explicit throughout the latter half of PWP’s active years. 
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Through trial, error, and reflection on missteps like the PhilaMOCA show, Permanent 
Wave Philly members developed a set of specific strategies to push toward their goal of 
centering marginalized voices, not only in their shows and events, but internally, within 
their own community of organizers. These strategies were developed at meetings and 
added to an internal document referred to as the collective’s “Extended Mission 
Statement” and made accessible for reading and editing to all members via the group’s 
Google Drive. A key mantra for the group became “acting with intentionality,” as 
members sought to align their events and their organizing methods with their feminist 
politics. PWP’s networked community, closed off from outside influence and driven by 
its members’ interests, offered the ideal space to experiment with intersectional 
organizing practices and imagine alternatives to existing models of social and political 
engagement. 
For PWP, whose core members were a racially diverse group of women ranging 
in age and sexual orientation, acting with intentionality meant centering marginalized 
voices throughout the entire organizing process, from the early stages of planning a show 
through to its execution. At meetings and in interviews, members frequently described 
feeling alienated and unrepresented at shows, where male audience members 
aggressively crowded the pit and “guy punks” took center stage. Permanent Wave Philly, 
Callie explained, was founded with the intention of creating platforms and spaces that 
empower artists and fans who are women, queer, and/or of color, a political intervention 
into the DIY scene that could also spill over into everyday life:  
It seems like a ‘personal is political’ kind of thing, because a lot of us have been 
 going to shows or any kind of event and we just feel excluded. We feel like we’re 
 not welcomed and we’re discouraged from making our own art or doing our own 
 creative work or intellectual work. And also just didn’t feel a sense of community 
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 when we go to shows…We don’t see ourselves represented when we do go to 
 shows…I want to go to the shows that I want to see, and I want to feel like I can 
 do this, and I want to see other women and gender-queer people making music 
 and doing really cool stuff. It’s not that these people don’t exist, that they don’t do 
 stuff. But it’s like, they’re not always recognized…I know I just wanted to be 
 recognized, to be supported. (personal communication, May 24, 2015) 
 
PWP’s activism was motivated by the idea that a seemingly personal experience — 
feeling alienated at shows — was rooted in a systematic imbalance of power — the 
white, heterosexual, male domination of the punk music scene. The collective took 
concrete steps to address this imbalance on stage, in the pit, and behind the scenes.  
Within Philadelphia’s DIY scene, PWP was best known for booking bands that 
were, in Kai’s words, “inclusive of women, of queer folks, trans folks, people of color… 
Anyone who isn’t represented by, I don’t know, the Electric Factory or something.” 
Frequently throughout my fieldwork, local bands or venues would reach out to PWP via 
email or Facebook message, requesting assistance organizing shows that highlighted “girl 
punks.” The collective filled a gap in both the alternative and mainstream music 
landscapes by creating a team of show bookers specifically focused on promoting and 
supporting artists who were not straight, white, cisgender men. As much as possible, 
PWP also aimed to book diverse bands who, either in their lyrics or in their work off 
stage, advanced feminist causes. Dee put it simply at a meeting — “We choose bands 
because they’re the kind of people we would like to hang out with.” After the 
PhilaMOCA show, PWP members collaborated on a list of local bands that featured a 
diverse line up and aligned with the collective’s values and went to work booking shows 
for those artists and promoting their music across PWP’s social media networks. But 
beyond simply showcasing marginalized artists, the collective helped to sustain them. 
PWP never took a profit from admissions sales for a show, instead giving all proceeds 
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from the door to the bands and covering its own expenses by selling zines, handmade 
merchandise like patches and buttons, and baked goods. True to its mission to diversify 
music and the arts, the collective also created opportunities for people to try playing an 
instrument for the first time. Every February, PWP hosted its annual “Galentine’s Day 
Show,” open only to performers who identified as women, nonbinary, or queer and 
featuring cover bands with little or no music experience; collective members provided 
participants with free music lessons leading up to the show.  
Permanent Wave Philly’s activist work also extended to the audience and 
collective members worked to create an empowering show experience. Here, as with the 
feminist zine community, accessibility was a key value. Like other DIY shows, PWP 
charged admission on a pay-what-you-can sliding scale, often between $5 and $10, and 
never turned away anyone who could not afford entry. In an effort to make their events as 
accessible as possible, the collective also aimed to host shows exclusively at venues open 
to people all ages, not just those over 21.  
But PWP did more than make their shows accessible to diverse audiences; 
members actively worked to cultivate safe spaces for audiences at their shows. The 
collective’s “Safer Spaces Policy,” outlined in the introduction to this chapter, works 
from the assumption that no space can ever be truly safe for all people at all times but 
asks participants to respect one another’s physical and emotional boundaries to the best 
of their abilities. Implementing a safer space policy at a show is, as Jenny explained in an 
interview, an explicitly political critique of the world outside that show:  
Just by having a safer spaces policy is talking about the fact that this isn’t the 
 same state outside of the room…I think just acknowledging that is a huge thing 
 for people. I remember having discussions with my coworkers, who were just 
 like, ‘Well, why do you need feminism? We’ve all got jobs.’ This is so much 
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 more complex and we’re helping to do what we can to acknowledge what’s 
 wrong and try to fix it. (personal communication, May 24, 2015) 
 
Safer space policies implicitly gesture toward the existence of domination throughout 
everyday life. Like Girl Army, PWP’s safer space policy produces a counterpublic 
sphere, where the obstacles that prevent marginalized groups’ full participation are 
explicitly addressed and an alternative mode of sociality that prioritizes care and 
validation is modeled.  
While PWP’s more publicly visible actions — its diverse band lineups and shows 
with safer space policies — disrupted the gendered power dynamics of the DIY and punk 
music scenes, their most important political intervention happened behind the scenes, 
within their own community of organizers. In an interview, Callie described PWP’s intra-
organizational work as an opportunity to live out utopian visions for a feminist future on 
a smaller scale: 
I would like to see patriarchal and oppressive attitudes eliminated. And that’s 
 really hard, and I think we’re all sort of working toward it in our own ways. But 
 the way I see how we organize our shows, it’s kind of like we’re making that 
 happen on a smaller level. (personal communication, May 24, 2015) 
 
For Callie and others, organizing a show or event did not just involve coordinating 
logistics; it offered an important opportunity to prefigure feminist values.  
PWP members implemented a number of different strategies for modeling their 
feminist politics through their organizational practices. To keep meetings accessible, 
collective members usually gathered in a public space, such as a park or a community 
center, rather than a commercial space, such as a cafe, where members would have to 
spend money, or a private space, such as a home, which can feel uncomfortable for 
newcomers. At the start of meetings, key responsibilities, such as facilitator, note taker, 
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email checker, and social media coordinator, were rotated among volunteers. Members 
applied a similar approach for organizing events. Anyone interested could take the lead 
on organizing a particular show or project with support from others who volunteered to 
perform more minor tasks, such as working the door or handling setup, and always in 
communication with the rest of the collective. All members were granted access to the 
collective’s email account and a “how-to guide” for booking bands and venues, so that 
even those members without experience could take the lead on organizing a show. PWP’s 
practice of rotating leadership positions subverted the sociopolitical structures that 
impede marginalized groups’ access to leadership positions in the public sphere.  
But while leadership roles rotated among individual members, decision-making 
was a collective process. Options for bands and venues to book were discussed as a 
group, ideally in person, and all decisions were made through consensus. Because PWP’s 
active membership was constantly in flux, true consensus was not required. Instead, at 
least four people present at a meeting and in agreement could make a decision on behalf 
of the group. Striving for consensus was critical to PWP’s status as a feminist 
counterpublic because it established what Dee in an interview called a system of “checks 
and balances” that helps ensure the all interested members have a say in a given matter. 
Still, arriving at consensus was often slow and arduous. As Jenny explained in an 
interview,  
Consensus is something we take very seriously, but it does take time to arrive at 
 something that everyone feels comfortable with. Because that’s so important to 
 us, that’s something we’re not willing to sacrifice to have a finished product. 
 There are times when it’s like, an hour or two-and-a-half hour meeting, and we 
 have something that is still not done. And I want to leave, you know? But it’s also 
 a conversation I want to continue. That’s something that can be both really great 
 and really hard. (personal communication, May 24, 2015) 
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At times, consensus only came after hours-long meetings and debates, a source of 
frustration that led some to leave the collective. But as Callie argued at a meeting, “It’s 
not about efficiency…I mean if anything, slowing down the process is like, the whole 
point…It’s about doing something together as a community.” For PWP members, the 
behind-the-scenes process of collectively organizing a show together as a community 
mattered more than the product, the show itself. Following the PhilaMOCA show, 
members even agreed to remove the collective’s name from any event they planned if the 
behind-the-scenes process did not live up to their “Extended Mission.”  
The PWP listserv presented collective members with both the challenge and the 
opportunity of structurelessness. The group’s email network drew feminist activists and 
artists together within a bounded space that they could shape to both fulfill their 
organizing needs and mirror their political values. Although the process could be 
inefficient and, at times, even fruitless, for Permanent Wave members, the process of 
constructing and maintaining a safe, empowering community was activist work, in and of 
itself. 
Fostering open expression. When successful, Permanent Wave Philly’s tactics 
for centering marginalized voices throughout their organizational process created 
platforms for punk music artists and fans sidelined within the broader DIY scene and the 
public at large. Throughout my fieldwork, bands and audience members frequently 
thanked PWP for organizing events that highlighted underrepresented voices and that 
offered freedom of expression, away from the aggression and sexism they had come to 
expect at more typical DIY shows.  
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In line PWP’s emphasis on process over produce, however, the collective’s most 
transformative work happened off stage and outside the public eye, where members 
worked together to offer one another opportunities for creative control otherwise 
unavailable within the DIY scene. Members frequently spoke of the empowering 
experience of coming up with an idea for an event, pitching it to the collective, and 
bringing it to fruition with, in Jenny’s words, “the power of Permanent Wave” on your 
side. Prior to joining PWP, most members had never planned their own house show 
before, let alone a public event. In a music scene that offers little room for artists and 
organizers who are not white men, the ability to flex creative control over a house show 
was exhilarating:  
Definitely for me in the beginning, that felt really powerful, because I felt that you 
 had to have some kind of magical authority to put together an event and actually 
 have people go to it, oh my God. So, when I first started putting on shows with 
 Permanent Wave, yeah, it definitely felt, I felt, powerful in a situation where I 
 usually feel more powerless in the world. (personal communication, May 24, 
 2015) 
 
Throughout my fieldwork, I often witnessed PWP’s more seasoned bookers encourage 
novices to take the lead on a show, offering them assistance and advice along the way. 
Successfully hosting a show with the support of the group gave members a sense of self-
confidence that they carried with them into their everyday lives. 
Beyond planning shows together, PWP members also cultivated a community 
where members could openly discuss their experiences with gender-based oppression, 
especially sexism in the DIY scene. “If I didn’t have this group, where we meet every 
couple weeks to rant after every show, I don’t know what I would do,” Dee told me in an 
interview. Members often began meetings sharing stories of frustration from the most 
recent “guy punk” house show, or outside the scene, their latest run-in with a street 
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harasser or a sexist coworker. The “safer space” policy of PWP’s shows applied to its 
meetings as well; wherever members convened, they offered one another a counterpublic 
sphere where they could give voice to these experiences and offer one another the 
reminder that they were not alone in their struggles. When new members attended 
meetings for the first time, they were welcomed with open arms and treated as friends. 
Every meeting began with group introductions, which almost always included an 
icebreaker members refer to as “Rose, Bud, Thorn”; each attendee shared something 
positive that happened to them recently, something they were looking forward to, and 
something that had been troubling them. With anywhere from four to 10 people at a 
meeting, the process could take upwards of 30 minutes, but like consensus-based 
decision-making, this opportunity to share personal stories openly was part of PWP’s 
community-building and maintenance practice. In its ideal form, the PWP collective 
provided members with a counterpublic safe space, where they found political agency 
and solidarity among a group of activists and artists who shared a common set of 
experiences and goals.  
But “acting with intentionality” to center marginalized voices and foster open 
expression requires a great deal of time, energy, and patience, which can become a 
challenge for activists juggling the work of community-building with a day job and other 
responsibilities. As Dee told me in an interview, “This is not any of our main thing. It’s 
just not. It’s not our job. We’re not getting paid to do this.” After instituting their 
“Extended Mission” following the 2015 PhilaMOCA show, Permanent Wave Philly 
successfully hosted several events, but the effort required to live up to their ideals was 
often strenuous. Members began drifting back to old habits, allowing those with the most 
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spare time to take charge without the group’s consent, which inevitably led to internal 
disputes. By the fall of 2016, most members stopped attending meetings altogether. In 
early 2017, reluctant to officially end the group, PWP members decided to go on 
“hiatus,” ending their listserv correspondence and engagement with the DIY scene.  
 
Permanent Wave Philly’s six-year run offers important lessons for feminist 
community-builders in the digital age. While they struggled to live up to their ideals, 
collective members’ efforts to grow a listserv into a feminist community that “acted with 
intentionality” illustrate the relational work required to cultivate safe spaces, online and 
off. As Dee told me in an interview, “The important part is that we try. It’s not that we 
always accomplish that, but that’s our intention, and that really matters…When we mess 
up, we want to do better. We try to reevaluate the situation…We try to make sure that if 
something went wrong, it’s better for next time.” PWP’s resolve to be reflexive, to 
dissect and improve their organizing tactics until they aligned with their intersectional 
values, serves as a reminder that safe space communities are not fixed objects, but 
collective projects that require constant maintenance and tireless commitment.  
Conclusion 
 Safe space communities have long played a key role in the tactical 
repertoire of U.S. feminist movements. But within our contemporary media landscape, 
where public and openly accessible digital platforms for expression and deliberation 
abound, the closed-off enclave has taken on new relevance for feminist activists. As I 
argue in the previous chapter, contemporary U.S. feminists have, with great fervor and 
success, adapted highly visible networked protest forms like hashtag activism to suit their 
goals and values. However, as body politics are reinscribed online, the same social media 
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platforms that have popularized feminist ideas and launched viral campaigns like 
#MeToo into global movements for gender justice have also given rise to a largely 
unchecked culture of networked misogyny, whose proponents subject anyone who is not 
a conservative, white, cisgender, heterosexual male to backlash, harassment, and violent 
threats (Banet-Weiser, 2018a; Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016). In a 2014 piece for the 
Pacific Standard, feminist journalist Amanda Hess cites sociologist Zygmunt Bauman to 
argue that while men surf the web as “tourists,” freely moving from one site to the next in 
search of new experiences, harassment displaces users with gendered, racialized, and 
sexualized bodies as “vagabonds…pushed and pulled through mean streets where they 
could never hope to settle down.” The three communities under study in this chapter – a 
secret feminist Facebook group, the feminist zine network, a grassroots feminist arts 
collective – provide a desperately needed safe space where women and other 
marginalized groups can not only “settle down,” but feel protected and uplifted. By 
bringing, to again borrow the Riot Grrrl mantra, girls to the front, these communities 
cultivate spaces that explicitly recognize the ways in which white male supremacy 
operates and develop alternative, more empowering ways of being, online and off. While 
their particular practices vary, each community draws on the social and technical 
affordances of digital media platforms to construct and maintain boundaries that filter out 
harassment, prioritize marginalized voices, and encourage free and open expression. 
Through their example, these communities help us imagine what a feminist internet 
might look like. 
At the same time, however, these three case studies also illustrate that certain 
paradoxes characterize safe spaces. These paradoxes are magnified for intersectional 
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feminists seeking to build safe, inclusive communities in the digital age. Girl Army, for 
example, purports to offer safety for women and nonbinary individuals, who often face 
threats of violence for expressing themselves in public spaces and on the internet, but 
because the group is hosted on a corporately owned social media platform, moderators 
cannot completely guarantee the safety and privacy of Girl Army members. Permanent 
Wave Philly and the feminist zine community both describe themselves as inclusive 
spaces, where media-makers sidelined in mainstream commercial industries can enjoy 
creative agency, but the amount of countercultural capital and digital media literacy 
required to know about and enter these spaces renders them somewhat exclusive. 
Similarly, while each of the three communities under study offers an outlet for open 
expression that is otherwise unavailable, both their internal principles and external 
boundaries restrict the flow of free speech; Girl Army moderators, for instance, ban 
members who ask “feminism 101 questions” and the materiality and limited print run of 
zines means that feminist zinesters often reach only a small audience. And, while the 
mission of all three communities is to center marginalized voices, each paradoxically 
risks contributing to the marginalization of those voices by carving out a siloed space for 
them.  
Safe but unsafe, inclusive but exclusive, open to but limiting of discourse, the 
three communities I studied in this chapter demonstrate that feminist safe spaces are 
always already incomplete, excluding some to include others, and imperfect, potentially 
reifying the inequities feminism aims to transform. These paradoxes have haunted 
feminist safe spaces across their history in the U.S., but the digital environment raises 
new questions for feminist community-builders: what does safety look like online? How 
280280 
do social media platforms constrain or enhance activists’ ability to cultivate safe space 
communities online? What impact can enclaved, digitally networked communities have 
on more visible, mainstream publics? How can we begin reshaping public-facing 
platforms to reflect the values of safety and inclusion embedded in feminist 
communities? 
The answers will vary depending alongside the specific goals, context, forms, and 
practices of the feminist community in question. Taken together, however, my three case 
studies suggest that when it comes to cultivating safe space communities, activists should 
follow Permanent Wave Philly’s lead and instead strive for safer spaces, always working 
from the assumption that no space can ever be truly safe for all participants at all times. 
The comparison implied in the term “safer spaces” between the activist community at 
hand and the broader public sphere makes visible the relational nature of safe spaces as 
living concepts that require constant maintenance, rather than closed objects with fixed 
but unspoken principles. Framing networked feminist communities as ongoing projects, 
always conducted in negotiation between activists’ values and the digital community-
building tools at their disposal, encourages a more reflexive safe space praxis, one that 
works to account for a community’s exclusions and shortcomings. This relational, 
processual approach to building communities will be integral to the long-term 




CHAPTER 5 – Conclusion: Strength in a Feminist Present 
 
I started this study caught between the hopeful swell of recent editorials heralding 
the arrival of the “Year of Women” and the harsh reality of President Donald Trump’s 
regressive policy efforts. How can commentators feel so certain that women’s time has 
arrived or, if it has not come yet, that a feminist political future is eminent, given the 
Trump administration’s attacks on reproductive justice, immigrants’ rights, civil rights 
legislation, and more? The answer is rooted in a feminist groundswell that has been 
building steadily for decades in the United States in spite of the rise of the new right, 
neoliberal conservatism, and the concomitant antifeminist backlash and decline of 
collective action. Drawing on an array of media tools and platforms, contemporary 
feminists have been engaged in a revitalization project, rebuilding feminist actions and 
spaces for the twenty-first century. The current generation of activists has moved away 
from the highly structured movements that characterized previous “waves” of U.S. 
feminism and toward networked feminism. This highly mediated organizing logic enables 
a diversity of people to join and shape collective actions, free from the gatekeeping 
functions of formal leaders or the entrenched exclusions of institutionalized politics. At 
the same time, as the contradiction between “The Year of Women” and the Time of 
Trump suggests, without the resources of formal organizations, networked feminism 
faces a wide range of obstacles when it comes to creating lasting social and political 
transformations. These challenges include, but are not limited to, violent backlash, 
activist burnout, commercial cooptation, movement sustainability, and, consequently, 
difficulty changing institutions, laws, and policies. At this critical juncture, activists’ 
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networked media practices have left feminist movements simultaneously reinvigorated 
and precarious.  
This project explored the questions this dilemma raises: how are activists 
negotiating between the affordances and shortcomings of networked feminism to craft an 
activist praxis that reflects their values and responds to the challenges of the current 
context? Why, despite their “double entanglements” (McRobbie, 2004), do networked 
media figure so centrally in contemporary feminists’ political visions? And what are the 
implications of feminists’ networked media practices for the long-term shape and reach 
of feminism, social movements, and political activism? Existing scholarship at the 
intersections of both gender and media and movements and media presents important 
insights into the structure of political opportunities and constraints surrounding 
networked feminism and offers detailed case studies of individual feminist media 
campaigns and their outcomes. Missing, however, is a theoretical framework built around 
actual activists’ agency, perspectives, and experiences that sheds light on the relationship 
between feminists’ political visions and their networked media tactics and, in turn, 
creates space to reflect on activists’ shared triumphs and struggles.  
In this qualitative study of networked feminism, I have approached feminist 
media as political practices, informed by activists’ goals, contexts, and resources, to 
better understand what feminists are doing with media and why. Through a practitioner-
centered methodology grounded in six case studies, I have explored three key types of 
networked feminist practices: networked feminist organizing, networked feminist 
visibility campaigns, and networked feminist community-building. An overarching media 
praxis, or embodied relationship between feminists’ political goals and media tactics, 
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connects all three types of practices. I call this praxis do-it-ourselves feminism (DIOF). 
Networked feminist practices can vary in form and content but they share a common DIY 
ethos, a collectively held set of normative assumptions that, with a little media savvy, 
anyone can build their own feminist actions and spaces from the ground up, regardless of 
previous organizing experience or available resources. Like other DIY projects, DIOF is 
an accessible, bottom-up, extra-institutional practice whose practitioners tactically “make 
do” (de Certeau, 1984) with whatever materials are on hand to quickly address a problem 
or need. But unlike other do-it-yourself forms of social or political engagement, do-it-
ourselves feminism is a collective activist praxis, whose campaigns may start with the 
actions of one person with a social media account and an idea for a protest, but grow to 
include dozens, hundreds, or, at the global level, thousands or even millions of 
participants. DIOF represents a paradigm shift in the organizational logic behind U.S. 
feminism that reverses the typical trajectory of movements; now, instead of having to 
build organizational capacity prior to launching a major action, with large audiences only 
a few keyboard strokes away, the action happens first and the capacity-building may 
follow later. The result is protest actions that enable the collective articulation of dissent 
from a diversity of subject positions, rather than a singular, unified message filtered 
through an individual leader or organization. While a similarly networked mode of 
activism can be found across other social movements, DIOF represents a distinctly 
feminist praxis, shaped to embody feminist values and respond to the particular political 
challenges facing feminist activists.  
When it comes to organizing feminist protests, the DIOF praxis can be found 
across actions at a variety of scales. The Women’s March on Washington (WMOW) 
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began after one person — a retired grandmother living in Hawaii — created and shared 
an event on Facebook. Her mediated outreach eventually sparked the wave of global 
street protests that took place around the world on Trump’s Inauguration Day. Similarly, 
Philadelphia’s March to End Rape Culture (MTERC), a local protest event that draws a 
crowd of about 500 to 1,000 people annually, grew out of the international SlutWalk 
Movement, which started when two activists used social media accounts to mobilize 
protesters in Toronto after a police officer blamed rape victims for their own assaults at a 
university assembly. But the DIOF praxis extends well beyond the initial sparking of a 
protest event. The same do-it-ourselves sensibility guides the logistical planning and 
execution of an action. The ad-hoc planning committee behind WMOW, for example, 
developed and revised the movement’s mission statement in response to feedback and 
critiques dispersed networks of activists circulated through social media. The DIO ethos 
is deeply embedded in the organizing team behind MTERC, who have purposefully 
avoided formalizing as a structured organization or nonprofit in order to ensure broad 
participation and creative freedom. Every year, MTERC organizers start from scratch 
and, through online outreach and fundraising events, promote the protest and pool the 
resources necessary to host the march. At both events, protesters rally together but under 
a variety of rallying cries, collectively representing their individual experiences and 
concerns while also standing in solidarity with one another. Whether mobilized at the 
global or local level, do-it-ourselves feminism draws on everyday media tools to create 
openly accessible outlets for personalized protest expressions. In turn, this organizational 
paradigm produces more inclusive feminist movements and campaigns, free from the 
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structural inequities ingrained in organizational bureaucracies or institutional politics, 
reflecting contemporary feminists’ core guiding value of intersectionality. 
The same participatory, self-starting logic underpins feminist campaigns to make 
visible everyday social injustices that, like sexual harassment and assault, are otherwise 
normalized into invisibility. Through networked visibility tactics like hashtag feminism, 
activists engage in contentious performances that, following the classic U.S. feminist 
mantra, “make the personal political” by pushing it into the realm of public deliberation. 
The networking functions of the hashtag form bridge the individual with the collective; 
campaign participants can add their own experience or concerns to the hashtag, 
personalizing their expression of dissent while also participating in a solidary collective 
action by virtue of using the same hashtag as others. In the case of #MeToo, for example, 
hundreds of thousands of sexual violence survivors shared their personal narratives; 
while each story was unique, activists were connected through their collective 
participation in the hashtag’s overarching narrative frame — the phrase, “Me, too” — 
which explicitly emphasized the widespread nature of sexual violence. Other movements 
have used hashtag activism and similar networked visibility tactics. But for U.S. 
feminists, who have historically worked to expose the ways in which power operates in 
everyday life, the practice helps reframe seemingly private experiences of injustice as 
public issues that require public responses. Moreover, the open accessibility of a Twitter 
hashtag, built into a social media platform that many peruse on a daily basis, brings a 
broader diversity of voices into visibility campaigns, enabling more intersectional 
feminist actions in the process. 
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Behind the scenes, in closed-off spaces where activists gather to connect, regroup, 
and plan actions, feminists also use networked media to build their own communities. 
Together, my case studies of the Girl Army Facebook group, the national feminist zine 
network, and the grassroots music and arts collective Permanent Wave Philly speak to the 
do-it-ourselves logic scaffolding contemporary feminist communities. In each case, 
feminists use media tools, such Facebook or email listservs, or engage in collective 
media-making projects, such as producing a zine or hosting a punk show, to create 
enclaved safe spaces, purposefully closed off from the “networked misogyny” (Banet-
Weiser and Miltner, 2016) that plagues public-facing media sites. Whereas, in previous 
generations, feminist community spaces were structured through a web of organizations, 
across these field sites, groups of otherwise unaffiliated activists who shared a common 
goal or need came together to construct their own communities, using networked media 
as their building blocks. Within the boundaries of these spaces outside the public eye, 
feminists can foster communities that prefigure their values, establishing social practices 
that center marginalized voices and encourage the open expression of experiences 
silenced or ignored within dominant discourse. While the search for community has long 
been a goal for U.S. feminists, in both the current digital media landscape and political 
climate, women, people of color, and queer people face especially high levels of 
harassment and violent threats. At precisely the same moment when public platforms for 
self-expression and political dissent abound, private feminist communities, where 
members can seek support and talk openly, are more important than ever. The DIO 
communities studied here suggest that networked media offer feminists new opportunities 
for community-building at both the local and translocal levels. 
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For today’s activists, DIO feminism updates traditional feminist values, like 
personal politics and community, while also incorporating more contemporary goals, 
such as intersectional analysis and inclusion, and responding to current challenges, 
including the need to revitalize collective politics and circumvent networked misogyny. 
The do-it-ourselves media praxis, however, also suffers from a number of shortcomings 
that undermine all three types of networked media practices.  
Chief among them is the question of sustainability. Within each type of 
networked feminist practice — organizing, visibility, and community — burnout, 
attention, and cooptation are major issues.  
The bottom-up, participatory nature of do-it-ourselves organizing allows a more 
diverse range of activists to become involved in protest mobilization and enables a 
greater degree of creative freedom over the shape a protest takes, producing movements 
that, in form and content, embody the feminist value of intersectionality. At the same 
time, without the resources of a formal organization, the labor required to mobilize a 
protest can wholly consume activists’ time and energy. This is the case, for example, with 
the MTERC organizing team, which has struggled to maintain a stable membership over 
the years. These same features of DIOF also empower feminists to build communities 
that live out their political visions, but, as my case study of Permanent Wave Philly 
illustrates, the effort required to constantly act with “intentionality” can strain activists 
and even lead to in-fighting, both of which threaten the longevity of the group.  
Similarly, when it comes to networked visibility campaigns and hashtag 
feminism, activists use social media to quickly mobilize protest actions and invite a broad 
range of participation, laying the groundwork for a viral wave of dissent like #MeToo. 
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But publicly sharing personal stories on a globally networked stage can be both risky and 
traumatic, endangering the marginalized groups the tactic is meant to uplift. Through 
their mediated, personalizable nature and emphasis on visibility, these networked protest 
campaigns scale quickly and attain mainstream media attention easily. But they are also 
easily coopted by commercial interests, as seen in celebrities’ and corporate entities’ use 
of #MeToo as a branding strategy. Moreover, while the months-long discourse that has 
unfolded in the wake of #MeToo stands as an important exception, hashtag networks can 
disperse just as quickly as they came together, fading from public discourse before ever 
developing the capacity necessary for long-term struggle. The strengths of the do-it-
ourselves praxis ultimately undermine its staying power. 
Networked feminists’ turn away from formally structured organizations facilitates 
more inclusive movements and communities. Their refusal to engage with institutional 
politics, however, raises concerns about contemporary feminism’s ability to make the 
policy reforms necessary to push toward a more equitable future in the U.S. MTERC 
organizers, for example, frequently use the march’s official social media account to raise 
awareness about legislative issues or encourage followers to contact their representatives. 
But in the seven years since the march first took place, organizers have not made 
formalized efforts to lobby for better sexual violence legislation in the Philadelphia area. 
In contrast, the WMOW planning committee has formalized into a highly structured 
“National Team,” which has organized and funded efforts to support women candidates 
for local and national office. Their formalization efforts, however, have led to a less 
accessible movement structure and have raised criticisms about the activists who turned 
the global movement into a professional career. Do-it-ourselves practitioners have 
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struggled to strike a balance between the openness of remaining informal and the often 
exclusionary business of engaging in institutional politics.  
Lastly, the do-it-ourselves praxis is encumbered by the structural constraints of 
the corporately-owned social media platforms its practitioners rely on.  
Sites like Facebook and Twitter were not engineered with feminists’ intersectional 
values or organizing needs in mind. In several of the case studies taken up in this project, 
activists struggled to protect one another from violent harassment or backlash. 
Misogynist Twitter trolls harassed WMOW attendees and threaten survivors who posted 
#MeToo with rape. Both instances serve as a reminder that the same platforms that have 
raised U.S. feminism’s profile have also facilitated the wave of “popular misogyny” 
(Banet-Weiser, 2015b, 2018b) that carried Trump to the Oval Office. Platform safety 
issues also plague closed-off feminist communities. In Girl Army, for example, there was 
little moderators could do to truly keep their safe space “safe,” as members with ulterior 
motives took screen captures of highly personal posts and shared them with others 
outside the group. 
Beyond participants’ safety, in several cases, social media platforms exacerbated 
members’ struggle to develop decision-making and accountability practices within 
otherwise informal groups. Facebook grants group moderators unilateral control over the 
group, leaving Girl Army members powerless to push back on moderators’ choices to 
delete posts or ban members. In Permanent Wave Philly, where membership is defined 
through enrollment in the collective’s email listserv, activists struggled to define the 
group’s collective structure and prevent individual members from making decisions on 
behalf of the group.  
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DIO feminists’ reliance on digital media raises concerns about the inclusivity of 
contemporary feminist movements and spaces. Networked feminist activism might allow 
for a diverse range of voices to shape movement mission statements or join hashtag 
campaigns, but participation is predicated on access to and literacy in the technologies 
that facilitate these actions.  
The affinity networks of feminist campaigns and communities can also produce 
echo chambers, silo marginalized voices, and wall movements off from the very 
audiences activists are seeking to address. While news media coverage of networked 
visibility campaigns and street protests can help mitigate this shortcoming somewhat, the 
political uniformity of a feminist hashtag and closed-off nature of a feminist Facebook 
group can limit feminism’s reach. Activists have to find ways to account for limitations 
of their networked media practices, while also taking advantage of their affordances. 
But this project is about more than the affordances and limitations of networked 
feminist activism. The stories from the field collected here demonstrate that do-it-
ourselves feminists are constantly negotiating among their activist values, the challenges 
engrained in the current context, and the structural constraints embedded in their 
networked media tools to develop and refine an activist media praxis that puts their 
political vision into action.  
This dynamic is perhaps most evident in my case study of #MeToo, in which 
participants developed performance maintenance strategies, enacting care labor for 
survivors who chose to share their stories, correcting campaign erasures, and working to 
maintain narrative control over the hashtag. But a similar emphasis on reflexivity and 
revision can be found elsewhere. The WMOW planning committee publicly revisited 
291291 
their “Unity Principles” following critiques from activists standing at various 
intersections of difference. When infighting indicated that the groups’ informal nature 
had led to a failure to articulate shared values, both the MTERC organizing team and 
Permanent Wave Philly paused to collectively develop mission statements. Feminist 
zinesters use public-facing social media sites to expand the accessibility and reach of 
their closed-off community. And in the months after my fieldwork ended and I shared my 
findings, Girl Army moderators put their heads together to develop a less hierarchical 
mode of decision-making despite the Facebook platform’s shortcomings and reevaluated 
their exclusion of trans men from the group.  
These are just a few examples of the creative tactics contemporary feminists use 
to push against the structural constraints of both networked activism and social media 
platforms and strengthen their praxis. Their ongoing reflections and efforts demonstrate 
that while do-it-ourselves feminism may be precarious, it is also a complex, interactional, 
and recursive praxis, always in progress and constantly evolving, even while activists 
also juggle the everyday labors of organizing for social justice.  
Implications for the Study and the Practice of Networked Activism  
 
The dynamics of do-it-ourselves feminism highlighted throughout this project 
offer a number of important take-aways for social movement theory, media activism 
research, new media studies, and feminist media scholarship — five fields that converge 
through the study of networked feminism. 
For social movement theory, the do-it-ourselves feminist media repertoire 
productively challenges and expands conventional definitions of “politics” and 
“activism.” Much existing scholarship assumes the political process model’s emphasis on 
292292 
state-targeted, public-facing performances of dissent. Networked feminists’ collective 
actions expose the political dynamics of everyday life beyond the walls of state 
institutions and their behind-the-scenes community-building work illustrates that the fight 
for social justice does not begin and end with the protest.  
The processual nature of do-it-ourselves feminism points to the need for scholars 
of movements and media to treat networked activism as a media practice, not simply 
media content, one with historical precedents that is shifting and evolving over time. 
Analyses of networked activism as either effective or ineffective overlook crucial 
components of the much larger picture that is activist media practices. When activist 
media, digital and otherwise, are framed as practices, a more expansive view of media as 
complex arenas for political participation becomes possible. The media-as-practice 
approach helps point toward activists’ historical struggles to negotiate between their 
political values and their media tactics. Similarly, centering contemporary practitioners’ 
voices in the study of emerging media activism forms produces analyses that hold at once 
both the affordances and limitations of these new modes of protest. Rather than the 
either/or assumptions of the “techno-optimist” versus “techno-pessimist” debates, this 
both/and approach pushes beyond the overly simplistic narratives of technodeterminism 
and moves scholarship toward more robust theories of how practitioners navigate the 
double-edged nature of networked activism. 
Do-it-ourselves feminism offers a related set of lessons for the field of new media 
studies. Attention to the affordances and limitations of networked feminism and the 
strategies feminists use to juggle both can expand critical analyses of the structural 
constraints built into social media platforms. In light of the lack of alternatives with 
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comparable reach and accessibility, activists are developing agentive strategies to 
navigate platforms’ shortcomings without compromising their values. Embedded in their 
media practices are instructive visions of more empowering digital media platforms.  
The media-as-practice approach taken here also highlights gaps in the growing 
body of feminist media studies scholarship focused on networked feminism. With few 
exceptions, a great deal of existing scholarship on networked tactics like hashtag 
feminism, feminist blogging, and online feminist communities takes up media content as 
its object of analysis. This leaves core components of the feminist media repertoire 
understudied. If I had not taken a multi-sited, ethnographic approach and “followed the 
people” (Marcus, 1995), I would not have had access to the networked organizing 
practices behind the March to End Rape Culture or the mediated safe space practices of 
inward-facing feminist communities. This practitioner-centered approach also pushed me 
to hone in on #MeToo participants’ tweeted reflections on the campaign, highlighting a 
key tactic — performance maintenance strategies — missing from research on hashtag 
feminism. Future work in the field should continue to document feminist media 
campaigns while also grounding itself in feminist activists’ perspectives in order to build 
a stronger theoretical toolkit for the study of networked feminism. 
Most importantly, this study has implications for activists embedded in the 
everyday fight for social justice. The trials and triumphs of the practitioners across my 
field sites suggest that, in order to sustain long-term struggles, networked activists must 
develop tactics for building movement capacities while also retaining the openness and 
inclusivity signature to do-it-ourselves feminism. What striking this balance looks like in 
practice remains to be seen, but it will require the same degree of self-critique and 
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ongoing reflexivity contemporary feminists bring to their work. The energy they devote 
to, in Permanent Wave Philly members’ words, “acting with intentionality” models a 
feminist approach to collective engagement for activists and advocates everywhere who 
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